

Military Review

THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY ■ MARCH-APRIL 2001



Regional Concerns

Colombia's Threats to Regional Security, *see page 2*

Report Documentation Page				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.					
1. REPORT DATE APR 2001		2. REPORT TYPE		3. DATES COVERED 00-03-2001 to 00-04-2001	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Military Review: The Professional Journal of the U.S. Army. March-April 2001				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S)				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Combined Arms Center ,Fort Leavenworth,KS,66027				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT					
15. SUBJECT TERMS					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Same as Report (SAR)	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 117	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified	c. THIS PAGE unclassified			



**Lieutenant General
William M. Steele**
Commandant, USACGSC

**Brigadier General
David H. Huntoon Jr.**
Deputy Commandant, USACGSC

Military Review Staff

Colonel Lee J. Hockman
Editor in Chief

Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan J. Smidt
Managing Editor

Lieutenant Colonel Hector J. Acosta
Editor, Latin American Editions

Major Larry Seefeldt
Production Editor

Christy Bourgeois
Patricia H. Whitten
Associate Editors

Vaughn Neeld
Books and Features Editor

D. M. Giangreco
Design Editor

Charles A. Martinson III
Art and Design

Winona E. Stroble
Webmaster

Patricia L. Wilson
Administrative Assistant

Consulting Editors
Colonel Luiz Peret

Brazilian Army, Brazilian Edition

Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Mezzano

Chilean Army, Hispano-American Edition

Lieutenant Colonel Hernan Vazquez

Argentine Army, Hispano-American Edition

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

Eric K. Shinseki

General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

Joel B. Hudson

JOEL B. HUDSON

Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army 0015108

Military Review's Mission is to provide a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs; to focus on concepts, doctrine and warfighting at the tactical and operational levels of war; and to support the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center and Command and General Staff College (CGSC).

Professional Bulletin 100-99, *Military Review*, appears bimonthly. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official US Army position and does not change or supersede any information in other official US Army publications. Authors are responsible for the accuracy and source documentation of material they provide. *Military Review* reserves the right to edit material. Basis of official distribution is one per 10 officers for major commands, corps, divisions, major staff agencies, garrison commands, Army schools, Reserve commands and Cadet Command organizations; one per 25 officers for medical commands, hospitals and units; and one per five officers for Active and Reserve brigades and battalions, based on assigned field grade officer strength. *Military Review* is available on microfilm from University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, and is indexed by the Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin.

Military Review, The Professional Journal of the United States Army (US ISSN 0026-4148) (USPS 123-830), is published bimonthly by the US Army CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254. Paid subscriptions are available through the Superintendent of Documents for \$30 US/APO/FPO and \$37.50 foreign addresses per year. Periodical postage paid at Leavenworth, KS, and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Military Review*, The Professional Journal of the United States Army, C/O Superintendent of Documents, P.O. Box 371954, Pittsburgh, PA 15250-7954.

Military Review

Headquarters, Department of the Army

Prepared by

US Army Command and General Staff College

Volume LXXXI—May-June 2001, No. 3

www.cgsc.army.mil/MilRev

milrev@leavenworth.army.mil

Professional Bulletin 100-01-4/5

CONTENTS

2 Colombia's Threats to Regional Security

by Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired

16 Regional Concerns

17 Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia

by Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired

27 Russia's Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

by Jacob W. Kipp

39 Mexico's Evolving Security Posture

by Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

47 China's Electronic Strategies

by Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, US Army, Retired

55 Cuba's Transition

by Lieutenant Colonel Geoff Demarest, US Army, Retired

64 Islamic Extremism in Former Soviet Republics

by Major Gregory R. Sarafian, US Army

71 Expeditionary Forces: Superior Technology Defeated—The Battle of Maiwand

by Colonel Ali A. Jalali, Former Afghan Army; and Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired

83 Insights

The Airborne Division in 2010

by Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., US Army

87 Almanac

Force Protection Implications: Task Force Smith and the 24th Division, Korea 1950

by Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy, US Army, Retired

93 Review Essay

A War to be Won

by James B. Patrick

96 Book Reviews contemporary readings for the professional

103 Letters to the Editor

From the Editor

This regional studies issue admits to a wide world of genuine security trouble spots but finds the priority to our south, particularly in Colombia. Here, in our own hemisphere, is a war whose outcome is in doubt—an outcome that could entirely change our effort to confront transnational crime. Given that fact, the war's regional implications could ultimately have a greater effect on our nation's oil supply than events on the Asian continent. Other perennial worries within the Western Hemisphere are naturally amplified. Cuba's post-Castro future is already under construction, and three social components will figure prominently in the changes. Mexico's security challenges involve its armed forces and concern the United States and other nations in the region.

Meanwhile, old preoccupations with controlling energy resources cannot be discarded. Caucasus hydrocarbons could become a new focal point for geostrategic competition, and not by coincidence, the study following the Caucasus oil article considers Russian policy for using short-range nuclear weapons. A discussion of Islamic fundamentalism casts another shadow over former Soviet Republics in Central Asia.

Farther East, China, a country of vast human resources, is considered in an information-age context. How China will marshal its relative advantage in human intellect, and for what purpose, is a growing concern. In a historical review, a rare explanation of an Afghan battle indirectly warns about ill-considered expeditions and diffuse possession of high-technology weapons.

US Army concerns are more global than ever. *Military Review* will help you stay informed. Let us hear from you.

LJH





Colombia's Threats to Regional Security

Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired

Colombia's complicated internal conflict is causing problems across international borders. Long-term government failures to provide a lawful environment have invited criminal activity that does not respect boundaries. How countries in the region respond to Colombia's plan to deal with the outlaws is an important factor. More important still is how Colombia addresses the conflict's center of gravity—the FARC.

COLOMBIA'S ANDEAN neighbors voice concern about the spillover of Colombia's conflict into their sovereign territories. What's more, ever since the United States announced its support to Plan Colombia, they cite the United States as progenitor of more problems to come. Colombia's troubles *are* having an impact on its neighbors, but the spillover from the US contribution to Plan Colombia is overstated.¹ The problems in the region are longstanding and are best understood today in terms of the growing power of the narcoguerrillas. Seeing that, Colombia's weaker neighbors would be understandably cautious in their statements regarding powerful outlaw organizations whose fortunes are on the rise.

Colombia has immense geostrategic importance to the United States and the rest of the world community. Uniquely located astride two oceans, its commerce continues to grow along north-south trade routes. It is three times the size of Montana and has various climates and growing zones that support a bountiful agricultural industry. The Andes Mountains are a compartmentalizing feature of Colombian life that have given rise to multiple urban centers, a historical federalist/anti-federalist argument and a corresponding lack of central government presence and influence in some outlying areas.

Historically, many of Colombia's remote regions have interacted more easily with trade centers outside Colombia, finding the lines of drift into other countries more useful than the cross-compartment routes within their own.² Reduced dependence on and allegiance to Bogota contribute to the overall lack of enthusiasm for central government programs in these areas, especially when they contain a punitive dimension. The US initiative under Plan Colombia centers on eradicating coca crops in the remote border department of Putamayo, across from Ecuador's Sucumbio province. This plan is under way, and large plantings of coca are being destroyed.

Backing up Colombia

Colombia has been a Cold War target for international communist expansion for obvious strategic reasons. Both the Soviet Union and Cuba supported insurgencies intended to spread communist influence throughout the region. One of the two main armed leftist guerrilla groups of the National Liberation Party (*Ejército de Liberación Nacional*—ELN) was a direct product of Cuban socialist internationalism. The danger of global communism may have passed, but Colombia still faces the ELN and the much more powerful Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias*

de Colombia—FARC), which the Soviet Union formerly supported. Both groups have devolved into big guerrilla business, chasing US narcotics dollars along with, or in competition against, other outlaw gangs. Together they spread narcotrafficking, gunrunning, kidnapping, extortion and other forms of pseudoinurgent terrorism throughout the region.

With those threats in mind, the United States pursues important interests in northern South America, including eradicating illicit drugs, strengthening democracy, and promoting political and economic progress and stability. The US government underscored these interests with a July 2000 supplemental aid package to assist Colombia. It added \$729.3 million for military and police assistance to existing programs for 2000 and 2001, plus \$311 million for economic and social assistance. The military aid portion will train three 900-man battalions to establish secure environments in which counterdrug police can operate. Other funding supports aircraft for the Colombian National Police, a joint intelligence center at Tres Esquinas military base on the Caquetá River and air-ground-river interdiction operations.³

This aid was intended to support a wider strategy under which President Andrés Pastrana sought \$7.5 billion in Colombian and foreign funding for security and nation assistance designated Plan Colombia. But now the term “Plan Colombia” seems to be used only in reference to the US aid package, especially the military portion focused on Putamayo.⁴

Former US President William J. Clinton officially identified all Columbia's bordering countries as illicit drug-producing countries, transit countries or both.⁵ Correspondingly, US supplemental funding also provides \$180 million to enhance regional drug-interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama and Brazil.⁶ The drug trafficking is but one of a number of interrelated problems that Colombia shares with its neighbors. Insurgent terrorist activity, arms trafficking, money laundering and Colombians displaced from rural homesteads have concerned border countries. Colombia has long been a transit route for drugs and other contraband coming out of Peru, and Venezuela has long been a source and conduit for weapons going into Colombia.

The Cold War Ends: Colombia Drops Into the Rift

During the Cold War, the insurgency was the central national security issue. Cuba supported the ELN, and the Soviet Union supported the FARC. The Army's main effort was counterinsurgency, not

counternarcotics. The guerrillas targeted Colombia's richest areas, where they could extort money from the leading producers of cattle, coffee, coal, emeralds, oil and bananas. International support, however, provided them war materiel, training and sanctuary.

When the Cold War ended, and along with it communist materiel support, many guerrillas aban-

The danger of global communism may have passed, but Colombia still faces the ELN and the much more powerful FARC, which the Soviet Union formerly supported. Both groups have devolved into big guerrilla business, chasing US narcotics dollars along with, or in competition against, other outlaw gangs. Together they spread narcotrafficking, gunrunning, kidnapping, extortion and other forms of pseudoinurgent terrorism throughout the region.

doned communist ideology and turned to drugs as an important source of income. The narcoguerrilla nexus became the FARC's main financial pillar, earning it about \$500 million a year—more than half of their annual income—helping them infiltrate and weaken government institutions.⁷ Even Colombia's former President Ernesto Samper was caught in the web of narcocorruption when drug money was discovered to be a major source of his campaign financing.⁸

Private security forces and paramilitary organizations also appeared during the Cold War. Wealthy land owners, small communities and oil companies responded to the government's inability to provide basic security. They hired private security forces to protect people and property, and in time, the various paramilitaries grew and many combined. Today, the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC) is a major contending force led by outlaw Carlos Castaño.⁹ The AUC is involved in skimming earnings from the drug trade and continually violates human rights by intimidating peasants into not supporting the communist guerrillas.

More than 35,000 Colombians died during the 1990s as a result of the insurgency.¹⁰ Capital flight and emigration have reduced Colombia's ability to deal forthrightly with the crisis. Instead of taking to the field to lead the nation's youth against the rebellion, many of Colombia's elite have demurred or moved overseas. High school graduates are all but exempt from the fight. While guerrillas have grown to about 20,000 troops and the AUC to perhaps

7,000, Colombia's army of 121,000 is too small, strategically immobilized and ill-equipped to handle the threat decisively.¹¹

In July 1998, as both army and police units suffered battlefield losses to guerrillas, Pastrana flew to San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá Department

Plan Colombia is not well-supported by other South American countries, who portray it as a threat to their own security rather than as an effective plan for attacking the underworld. Potential social impacts do exist, and neighbors would prefer to keep Colombia's problems inside Colombia. Besides, some South American and European countries prefer to deride Plan Colombia as a US creation—an interventionist policy offensive to sovereignty.

to powwow with FARC chief Manuel Marulanda Velez. Marulanda demanded that the government crack down on the paramilitaries and vacate government armed forces and police from 42,000 square kilometers (km) of key terrain in southern Colombia now called the *despeje* (clearance zone or zone of government withdrawal). Desperately wanting to arrive at a peace agreement, Pastrana agreed and withdrew government presence by November 1998. From a military perspective, this could create a strategic disadvantage for Colombia's armed forces; the FARC gained both sanctuary and positional advantage.

The *despeje* is essentially a special FARC sovereign zone that borders on the Sumapaz area to the north, a rugged mountain avenue of approach to Bogota peopled by pro-guerrilla communities.¹² The *despeje* also lies astride the drug crop areas, including Putumayo, helping to further encumber government access to the coca growing areas. The *despeje* lies at the upstream limits of riverine access into Colombia from Venezuela and Brazil, and it is a relatively short distance from the triconed boundary of Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. For all this, the guerrillas have conceded virtually nothing, even increasing the pace of kidnappings. The guerrillas have continually restated their goal of assuming power in Colombia and turning it into a socialist state—by force if necessary. The response of the Pastrana government so far has been to extend the *despeje* period repeatedly. At his February 2001 meeting with the FARC leader, Pastrana extended the *despeje*, which he now referred to as the FARC zone, another eight months. The Pastrana govern-

ment also has sought ways to give the smaller ELN a *despeje* of its own northwest of Barracambermeja along the Magdalena River.

From their protosovereign country within a country, the guerrillas operate on interior lines to engage government forces in conventional combat, attempting to seize strategically key terrain. The *despeje* and adjacent areas to its south, including Putumayo, have become the center of the cocaine industry. Until the recent start of Plan Colombia, coca in this area grew unchecked by government control. Most of the world's coca is grown in Colombia, and more than 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States is made in or transits this region.¹³

US supplemental aid supports a counterdrug campaign mainly in Putumayo Department. Eradicating coca in Putumayo would reduce drug industry income to the FARC, theoretically increasing its willingness to discuss peace terms with the government. The FARC is the center of gravity in Colombia's narcoinsurgent war, and drug production is an important FARC strength that can be attacked for leverage. In late 2000, fighting between FARC and AUC forces for control of Colombia's heaviest concentration of coca production in Putumayo seemed to favor the AUC. Defiantly, Marulanda relaxed the confrontation between the government and the FARC and turned government energy more toward attacking the FARC's most effective enemy, the AUC.

For example, Colombian Attorney General Alfonso Gomez Mendez is seeking to prosecute the AUC leadership for kidnapping and murder, while Marulanda and Pastrana are forming a national commission to study the problem of AUC terrorism. Just after his meeting with Marulanda, Pastrana commented, "We prepared to disagree, but Marulanda is beginning to understand that it is a grand design for social revolution and that the military part of the plan is focused on drug eradication and on the need to fumigate coca fields . . . provided this was done in consultation with local farming communities."¹⁴ Or perhaps Marulanda realized that Plan Colombia spray planes were destroying coca fields that belonged to the AUC and not the FARC's fields safe inside the *despeje*.

Plan Colombia is not well-supported by other South American countries, who portray it as a threat to their own security rather than as an effective plan for attacking the underworld. Potential social impacts do exist, and neighbors would prefer to keep Colombia's problems inside Colombia. Besides,

some South American and European countries prefer to deride Plan Colombia as a US creation—an interventionist policy offensive to sovereignty. The plan will not likely regain international adherence and enough foreign capital to significantly improve conditions inside Colombia.¹⁵


Colombia's Impact on its Neighbors

Most of Colombia's internal refugees are families displaced by fighting among the warring forces and attendant human rights violations. Except for citizens of "border cultures" who regularly cross border lines for work and family activities, Colombians mostly displace into poverty conditions around Colombia's larger cities—Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla. Soacha barrio, outside Bogota, increased its population from 300,000 to more than one million in the past six years.¹⁶ In 1999 the Mayor of Cali, frustrated with the costs of supporting the *desplazados*, reportedly announced that he would install checkpoints along avenues of approach into the city to identify and turn them back.¹⁷

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates the number of internally displaced persons throughout Colombia ranges from 450,000 to 1.6 million. About 60 percent of the displaced people receive humanitarian aid, mostly from nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Although appropriate laws are in place, the Colombian government has been slow to help internally displaced citizens.¹⁸

Colombian emigration into neighboring countries—mostly Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama—does not match Colombia's internal displacement. Nevertheless, the outflow of Colombians into neighboring border areas is a matter of concern as governments anticipate that Plan Colombia operations will stir up additional refugee problems.¹⁹ Through the first weeks of February 2001, however, coca crop eradication in Putamayo did not produce an unmanageable wave of migration. Putamayo had never been a major source or receptor of migrants, and the overall population there is low.

In addition to migration, potential spillover effects include drug and arms trafficking, and guerrilla and paramilitary activity. At first glance, the effect of Colombia's conflict on each of its neighbors seems about equal, but the causes and responses vary from country to country. Each country contends with threats, and how they handle matters has made a difference. Brazil and Peru espouse a direct, no-nonsense response to threats and have fared better than Colombia for it. Ecuador and



FARC chief Marulanda demanded that the government crack down on the paramilitaries and vacate government armed forces and police from 42,000 square km of key terrain in southern Colombia now called the despeje. Desperately wanting to arrive at a peace agreement, Pastrana agreed and withdrew government presence by November 1998. . . . [the guerrillas] conceded virtually nothing, even increasing the pace of kidnappings.

Panama seem to be dithering, subjecting themselves to border violations. Venezuela's direction is difficult to calculate, given its dynamic and mercurial leader, Hugo Chávez.

Venezuela: guerrillas, paramilitaries and refugees. Colombia's border with Venezuela is a dominion of FARC, ELN and paramilitary units that move across the border to attack one another, prey upon both countries' populations and seek advantage in the drug and arms trades. Colombia's border department of Norte de Santander is important as a major coca growing area (an estimated 23,000 planted hectares) the FARC controls.²⁰ In recent years paramilitary forces have moved into the area to deny the sustaining population base to the FARC.

In practice, the FARC depends on the local work force to produce drug products and sustain its soldiers. The paramilitary forces know this and attack both guerrillas and civilians, driving refugees across the border. The Venezuelan government's concern about a huge refugee surge is evident in its lack of support to them. Occasionally there are incidents of turning back Colombian "displaced persons in

transit” to their home country. The UNHCR says that it is Venezuelan policy to repatriate refugees, and its major goal is to reach an agreement on *nonrefoulement* (nonforced return) and the right to seek asylum.²¹

Colombian kidnapping rings add to the situation’s complexity by capturing Venezuelan ranchers and selling them to guerrillas in Colombia.²² Neither

A “ranchers’ cooperative” leader in one of Venezuela’s border states opined that “Venezuela is in danger of losing its sovereignty” in the border area. Now even Venezuelan government officials acknowledge that the situation is critical . . . [but assert] that increased US support to military operations will lead to greater conflict among Colombian belligerent forces, thus causing increased problems in Venezuela.

Colombian nor Venezuelan forces can stop the lawlessness. The FARC and ELN have actively engaged in kidnapping and extorting ranchers and land owners on both sides of the Colombia-Venezuela border. The resultant landed class flight has harmed Venezuela’s meat and milk industry, and allowed narcoguerrillas to move in. In 1997, Aristides Moncada Padilla, a “ranchers’ cooperative” leader in one of Venezuela’s border states opined that “Venezuela is in danger of losing its sovereignty” in the border area.²³ Now even Venezuelan government officials acknowledge that the situation is critical; Plan Colombia became a convenient name for their concerns. Chávez is critical of Plan Colombia, asserting that increased US support to military operations will lead to greater conflict among Colombian belligerent forces, thus causing increased problems in Venezuela.

The Colombia-Venezuela border has long supported a border culture in which both nationalities have moved freely across border lines, but as the Colombian paramilitary, guerrilla and military forces joust to position themselves for peace talks, the resulting uproar has encouraged increased emigration from Colombia to towns inside Venezuela. For example, Machiques, a Venezuelan city of 100,000, is roughly 80-percent Colombian.²⁴ In June 1999 3,500 Colombians crossed into Venezuela after a paramilitary rampage against presumed FARC sympathizers.²⁵ Venezuela views every such surge by unwanted foreigners as a threat to its sovereignty.

After a group of 30 Colombians crossed into

Venezuela on 24 October 2000, Foreign Minister Jose Vicente Rangel—recently appointed defense minister—asked the Colombian government to improve border security and blamed Plan Colombia for increasing violence at the border.²⁶ The presence of an estimated 1.5 million Colombians in Venezuela support Rangel’s professed concerns. Although Venezuelan border policy seems to play into the hands of Colombian narcoguerrillas by driving workers back to their farms, considerable drug production has moved into Venezuela. The US Office of National Drug Control Policy considers it a secondary source-country; more than 100 metric tons of cocaine leave Venezuela for the United States and Europe annually.²⁷ Much of the coca grown in the *despeje* also passes through Venezuela. The FARC’s 16th Front ships products to European and US markets via Guaviare River basin in Colombia and the Orinoco River in Venezuela.²⁸

Venezuela is also noted for the huge amount of contraband that transits the country, especially guns. Throughout Colombia’s history of internal war, Venezuela has been a constant, if not always reliable, pipeline for arms and other contraband. In describing counter guerrilla operations in northern Colombia, a Colombian army colonel claimed that “50 percent of the arms we captured had Venezuelan army markings.”²⁹

Brazil: defending the frontier against FARC incursions. Venezuela shares with Brazil these same kinds of spillover problems. Less concerned about refugees, Brazil pays attention to drug and arms trafficking and occasional FARC incursions. Brazilians have reason to be concerned about Colombia’s internal problems. Colombian insurgents and narcotraffickers have been active in Brazil’s border regions for many years. Threats to Brazilian interests include smuggling contraband ranging from guns to exotic animals; direct assaults against the environment and economy from illegal loggers, gold miners, fishermen and hunters; and Colombian insurgent and drug-trafficking activities. These threats have troubled the Brazilian government for more than a decade as shown by a number of well-reported events.

In 1991 a 40-man FARC guerrilla unit attacked an army jungle operations detachment inside Brazil along the Traira River. Three soldiers were killed and nine were wounded.³⁰ The attack was repulsed when Brazilian special forces counterattacked into Colombia to kill seven guerrillas and recover Brazilian weapons and ammunition.³¹ In September 1996 the Brazilian army went on full alert because

Some of the 528 policemen and soldiers held captive by Colombian guerrillas. The pictures were published in the 14 August 2000 edition of Colombia's *Semana* newsweekly.



To drive the FARC out of Mitú, 500 Colombian army paratroopers landed at the Querari, Brazil, airstrip (close to the border about 75 km east of Mitú) and attacked westward into their own country, regaining Mitú on 4 November. In the battle, 150 Colombian combatants, seven civilians and five FARC guerrillas were reported killed, and the FARC took 40 to 45 police prisoner.

of reports that FARC elements had crossed the border into Brazil near Tabatinga, about 400 km south of the Traira River incident. About 1,000 soldiers deployed throughout Tabatinga to guard border locations, military installations and the airport.³²

On 1 November 1998, across from the Dog's Head (*Cabeça do Cachorro*) region of Brazil's Amazonas state, 1,400 FARC combatants attacked to seize Mitú, the provincial capital of Colombia's Vaupes Department. Mitú serves as a transshipment point for chemicals essential in making cocaine. The contraband chemicals move up the Vaupes River from Brazil to production areas in Colombia.³³ To drive the FARC out of Mitú, 500 Colombian army paratroopers landed at the Querari, Brazil, airstrip (close to the border about 75 km east of Mitú) and attacked westward into their own country, regaining Mitú on 4 November. In the battle, 150 Colombian combatants, seven civilians and five FARC guerrillas were reported killed, and the FARC took 40 to 45 police prisoner.³⁴

Again in 1999 Brazilian intelligence identified the army's airfield at Querari as a FARC target. It was thought that the FARC intended to deny Colombian armed forces' use of the strip during a guerrilla follow-on attack against Mitú. Pre-empting the

FARC in late October, a 249-man Brazilian special forces unit spearheaded a major offensive to secure the Querari airfield and reinforce the Dog's Head area with 5,000 men of the Amazon Military Command. They deployed along the border from Sao Joaquim to Vila Bittencourt on a 600-km front to deter any attack.

Guerrilla use of narcotrafficking to sustain the Colombian insurgency reinforces the threat to Brazil. Its vast forested areas in Amazonas state, laced with the world's greatest river network and adjacent to other drug-producing countries, have made Brazil a major transit country for drugs bound for the United States and Europe. Brazil is a key supplier of chemicals needed to make cocaine. The river system is ideal for shipping large quantities of kerosene, sulfuric acid, potassium permanganate and acetone needed to produce the white cocaine hydrochloride crystals. The chemical trade is facilitated at Manaus' free trade zone where 256 companies import chemicals used to make drugs. Legitimately imported chemicals are repackaged for shipment to illicit drug labs in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador.³⁵

An investigation last year by the Brazilian Parliamentary Investigative Commission (CPI) revealed that large Brazilian narcotrafficking groups are selling

weapons to the FARC via the Brazilian-Colombian border, using river corridors. The Colombian National Police have reported intercepting such “imports” as AK-47s, HK.91 (G3s), A-3s, ArmaLite-15s, Dragunov sniper rifles, Galil rifles, .50-caliber machine guns, 40mm grenade launchers and C-90 grenades, although not necessarily all from Brazil.

Brazilians have reason to be concerned about Colombia's internal problems. Colombian insurgents and narcotraffickers have been active in Brazil's border regions for many years. Threats to Brazilian interests include smuggling contraband ranging from guns to exotic animals; direct assaults against the environment and economy from illegal loggers, gold miners, fishermen and hunters; and Colombian insurgent and drug-trafficking activities.

There are continuing unofficial reports that the FARC has added man-portable, ground-to-air missiles, such as SA-14s and SA-16s from Russia and US Redeye and Stinger missiles from Syria, to its war chest.³⁶ The CPI also detailed the involvement of 827 Brazilian officials, such as legislators, magistrates, ministers, bank presidents and policemen, involved in Brazil's drug and arms trades.³⁷

This concern for narcoguerrilla trade at the Brazilian border caused Brazil to strengthen its border with Colombia under Operation *Cobra*. The scant 20-man Amazonas federal police force has been increased to 180 law enforcement officers, and equipment includes 18 patrol boats, two airplanes and a helicopter.³⁸ Seven federal police bases are now established along the border to inspect for contraband moving along rivers and roads.

This increased government presence in Brazil's border region developed slowly. Its historical dimensions go back to founding Fort San Francisco at Tabatinga in 1776 and, more recently, the 1985 Calha Norte Project for security and development along the jungle border line. Today Brazil keeps about 22,000 troops stationed near the border, and any additional buildup will be “to defend and safeguard our frontier” but not to fight alongside the Colombians, according to Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia.³⁹

The current forward stationing of troops coincides with the long-awaited \$1.4-billion System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM). The SIVAM is an integrated system of 10 giant radars (radomes), 100 weather stations, surveillance aircraft, commu-

nications monitoring and digitized satellite imagery supported by a satellite-based radio and telephone network. This year the United States is providing \$3.5 million to Brazil for the SIVAM project, plus some small boats for counterdrug riverine operations. The SIVAM concept is to protect against weather hazards, jungle fires and criminal activities and to control the Amazon airspace.⁴⁰ SIVAM security requirements include monitoring drug traffic, mineral and hard wood smuggling, demarcation lines, Indian reservations, national borders, forest fires and river navigation. SIVAM is the infrastructure for the wider concept of a Brazilian interagency System for the Protection of the Amazon (SIPAM).

Some years ago Brazilian security officials in Manaus and Tabatinga believed the surge of transnational crime, guerrilla terrorism and lawlessness on their border was the result of successful drug interdiction operations in Bolivia and Peru. Despite historical trends that show these as long-standing security issues, Plan Colombia is cited now as an additional factor in Brazil's increasing border problems. Brazil's tough, no-nonsense attitude toward the narcoguerrillas is echoed by Peru's stand against guerrilla forces. After dispatching two guerrilla threats, Peru is now attending to its northern border with Colombia.

Peru attacks the problem. Most of the 1,000-mile border between Colombia and Peru runs east-west through an area of dense jungle along the Putumayo River—Colombia's Amazonas Department to the north and Peru's Loreto Department to the south. A Colombian panhandle at the eastern end of the border turns sharply south, reaching the town of Leticia, which faces the Brazilian town of Tabatinga. Loreto's capital at Iquitos is 90 miles south of the frontier. The vast strip of jungle between the Putumayo and Peru's Napo River has historically been of interest to Indians and oil explorers, but in recent years reports have surfaced that the FARC has been operating coca-production camps in the area. This area is so remote that it does not significantly affect FARC military operations, gunrunning or narcotrafficking, compared with other border areas. The population is too thin there to sustain guerrillas or present a noticeable refugee problem should fighting flare up.

Peruvian officials claim that there have been no clashes between Peruvian troops and guerrillas in the northern border area, although FARC activities have been detected there for years. Peruvian Defense Minister Walter Ledesma has stated that there is “total tranquility on the border”; never-

theless, the government reinforced the border area in February 2000.⁴¹

Indeed it may be correct to say that there has been no direct spillover effect along this border line—that is, if the unchallenged FARC presence is ignored. Nevertheless, the Colombian conflict spawned an incident involving FARC arms trafficking that was serious enough to bring down President Alberto Fujimori's government last year. Peruvian National Intelligence Service Chief Vladimiro Montesinos Torres was implicated in an international arms-trafficking operation that apparently delivered 10,000 assault rifles to the FARC. The resulting furor and political maneuvers eventually left Montesinos and Fujimori out of power and out of the country.

In that gunrunning event, East German rifles passed through Jordan, crossed the border into Colombia and were delivered directly to the FARC using Russian-built IL-76 cargo aircraft flown by Russians and Ukrainians.⁴² After a failed initial flight in March 1998, the second flight left Amman, Jordan, on 23 March 1999. More than 2,500 rifles were parachuted in wooden crates near Barranco Mina along the Guaviare River about 250 miles east of the FARC's *zona de despeje*.

The FARC's 16th Front coordinated the weapon-smuggling operation, received the weapons, established caches and distributed the rifles. In April the Colombian army conducted a counterinsurgency operation in which 16th Front commander Esteban González was killed and four Venezuelans were captured. Soon after, the Colombian army captured more than 100 rifles, and the serial numbers revealed their origins.⁴³

Three more flights were made through August 1999 using a flight itinerary of Amman; Mauritania; Trinidad and Tobago; and Iquitos, Peru. Each flight airdropped 2,500 rifles to the FARC. Peruvian narcotics police agents eventually grounded the aircraft. Reportedly, Jordanians were to provide 40,000 more rifles when the deal ended abruptly.

The Peruvians can be expected to handle any major Colombian guerrilla incursion, but the limited guerrilla activity the country does face is located in central and southern Peru, not on the border with Colombia. Peru's insurgent organizations, the Shining Path—*Sendero Luminoso* (SL)—and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) have been defeated strategically, with only small remnants now trying to continue operations. The SL occasionally interrupts free movement of persons by setting up roadblocks in sections of the Upper

Huallaga Valley and attempts to recruit new people.⁴⁴

Police, intelligence and military authorities have been effective in decisively attacking these groups and bringing leaders to trial. The last key SL leaders were arrested in 1999, but there are occasionally reports of countryside skirmishes as SL bands attack government targets. The MRTA has been dormant since its defeat at the Japanese ambassador's residence in Lima in 1997. The Peruvian judicial system deals harshly with terrorists and narcotraffickers.⁴⁵

Peru's counterdrug strategy of alternative development and eradication seems to be on track, reducing coca cultivation 66 percent over the past four years. The Peruvians will continue their counter-narcotics efforts without much interference from the Colombian conflict spillover and will emphasize

A military setback to Colombian rebels could move permanent or semipermanent guerrilla encampments over the border into Ecuador. Their presence would require a response from Ecuadorian military that is not prepared to confront experienced, desperate guerrilla units. A perceived inability to handle the guerrillas could conceivably unhinge the Quito government.

strengthening air and river interdiction and beefing up the alternative development program because of increasing coca prices.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, cocaine labs are generally located in the far eastern reaches of Peru where aircraft can depart before the Peruvian air force can catch them. Colombia no longer plays a major role in transshipping drugs from Peru. Most Peruvian routes move drugs by river and air through Brazil, over land through Ecuador and across the ocean via Callao port near Lima.

An economic recession and increase in coca prices have encouraged Peruvian farmers to reconsider growing coca, thus increasing pressure on Peru's alternative development program of 700 community and farm organizations. The program involves rehabilitating coffee and cacao plantations; producing banana, pineapple and palm heart; building roads and bridges; strengthening local governments; and providing credit assistance for farm families.

Peru's relatively small refugee population of 700 is peopled more by Cubans, former Yugoslavs and Iranians than by Colombians. Peru has been resolving its internally displaced person problem

effectively. About 430,000 Peruvians fled their rural Andean homes, mainly to the cities, during Peru's violent insurgency in the 1980s and early 1990s.

Despite Ecuador's difficult political, economic and security issues, it has maintained the strategic offensive in addressing Colombian spillover. Ecuador agreed to a 10-year arrangement with the United States to allow a forward operating location at Manta, Ecuador, from which military surveillance aircraft could operate to detect drug-trafficking flights in the region.

Nongovernment organizations suggest that the conflict has affected as many as 1.6 million people, but today about 70,000 Peruvians remain internally displaced.⁴⁷ In contrast, Peru's neighbor Ecuador expressed particular concern that Colombia's counter-drug sweep across Putumayo province would generate a refugee flow into Ecuador. A month into eradication operations, however, Plan Colombia had not produced the predicted wave of migrants. More perturbing perhaps to the residents of some towns in Ecuador's Sucumbios province is the loss of income from the FARC, which frequented Sucumbios as a logistics area and sanctuary.

Ecuador and local accommodation. A military setback to Colombian rebels could move permanent or semipermanent guerrilla encampments over the border into Ecuador. Their presence would require a response from Ecuadorian military that is not prepared to confront experienced, desperate guerrilla units. A perceived inability to handle the guerrillas could conceivably unhinge the Quito government. Meanwhile, border Ecuadorians who not only live peaceably with the guerrillas but who also make their living trading with them cannot be expected to support a Colombian plan to undermine guerrilla financial strength. The Ecuadorian border city of Lago Agrio is an established rest and relaxation center for oil workers, guerrilla soldiers and paramilitary troops. Soldiers and coca plantation workers from both sides of the border come to Lago Agrio for dental and medical care.

In cooperation with the UNHCR, the Catholic Church in Lago Agrio registers and assists refugees. It reports that about 100 refugees appear each week, adding to the roughly 2,500 refugees it now helps. The US Committee for Refugees says the Church assisted nearly 1,500 Colombians last year, helping them obtain documents to prevent their involuntary


return to Colombia. It estimates that about 30,000 Colombian refugees were living in Ecuador at the end of 1999.⁴⁸

Officials in Sucumbios have planned for an influx of 5,000 refugees, but as long as the FARC *despeje* provides one available sanctuary, Sucumbios is unlikely to receive a much greater population influx, even as it loses FARC-generated income. If there is insufficient progress with the peace process, and the *despeje* is finally retaken by the Colombian state, then Sucumbios may be in for a greater spillover problem.

Any difficulties Ecuador has on Colombia's border might be manageable if the country were in good shape otherwise, but it has been led by five presidents in as many years and has a fractious legislature. The country is experiencing rural migration to cities and emigration of capable citizens overseas. Indigenous tribes are asserting themselves, encouraged by the FARC guerrillas. Foreign debt consumes about 40 percent of the national budget, and there is little funding left to address problems of acute poverty.⁴⁹ Ecuador has a popular military force, particularly in rural areas. The army is a source of stability, holding sway over matters of internal politics, but it may not be able to control the Colombian border. It is increasing its strength in Sucumbios to about 1,500 men in five border posts and is reinforced by another 1,500 soldiers.⁵⁰

Plan Colombia signals an increase in Colombian armed forces' operating tempo in Putumayo Department, which may increase refugee crossings into northern Ecuador. However, the Colombian government has not caused the most recent increase in migration. The AUC moved into Putumayo in strength in 1999 to contend with the FARC for control of coca harvests there. The AUC made incursions into Sucumbios to catch FARC guerrillas on leave in Ecuador and to attack the FARC logistics apparatus. Recent reports suggest the presence of a FARC sister organization called the FARE (Ecuadoran Revolutionary Armed Forces), but there has been no significant operational group presence.

Fighting among Colombian army units, paramilitaries and the FARC in Putumayo throughout 2000 inflated Ecuador's border economy. As the FARC closed down access to Putumayo, preventing food and other supplies from entering the region, prices on the Ecuadorian side of the border roughly doubled.⁵¹ In Sucumbios' capital city, Nueva Loja, an important FARC weapon-smuggling node, overall business sagged by 70 percent, perhaps because of AUC presence. With the Nueva Loja medical



Clandestine airstrips in Peru are usually located in the far eastern areas, where aircraft can depart before the Peruvian air force can catch them. Here, the airstrip at Campanilla is being blocked and dismantled by Peruvian National Police. (Inset) Aircraft at another airstrip await their next load of illicit cargo.

Colombia no longer plays a major role in transshipping drugs from Peru. Most Peruvian routes move drugs by river and air through Brazil, over land through Ecuador and across the ocean via Callao port near Lima. . . . It may be correct to say that there has been no direct spillover effect along this border line — that is, if the unchallenged FARC presence is ignored. Nevertheless, the Colombian conflict spawned an incident involving FARC arms trafficking that was serious enough to bring down President Alberto Fujimori's government last year.

association treating four or five wounded guerrillas each week, medical business continues apace. According to Doctor Edgar Reynoso, the public hospital “gets 10 to 15 at a time” when there is combat in Putumayo.⁵²

The Ecuadorian army estimates that about 60 percent of residents in towns nearest the border are sympathetic to the FARC, although support diminishes as one moves farther from the border. The mayor of Lago Agrio and several others in the border area are reportedly leftist politicians who are sympathetic to the FARC. Battles, roadblocks and kidnappings have slowed down oil business in the border region. In January 2001 the military found a FARC base camp in Ecuador, adding to concerns that the FARC was moving in. Just three months earlier the government had assailed the FARC for kidnapping 10 foreign oil workers from Ecuador's border area.⁵³

Despite Ecuador's difficult political, economic and security issues, it has maintained the strategic offensive in addressing Colombian spillover. Ecuador agreed to a 10-year arrangement with the United

States to allow a forward operating location at Manta, Ecuador, from which military surveillance aircraft could operate to detect drug-trafficking flights in the region. This operation might help contend with the fact that Ecuador's location is ideal for transshipping illicit drugs, essential chemicals, arms and other supplies needed for drug production—and combat.

The Ecuadorian government has also implemented a supportive asylum policy and has been working with the UNHCR to address refugee issues on the border. As in Venezuela, refugees fleeing Colombia try to remain anonymous to avoid further persecution by the guerrillas and paramilitary forces. It is difficult to bring them into a formal refugee program in border areas where security cannot be assured.⁵⁴ Ecuadorians may be concerned that more lawless activity will move to northern Ecuador as Plan Colombia unfolds. However, drug production, arms trafficking, guerrilla camps and criminal gangs were already evident. Though relatively free of drug production, Panama's border with Colombia shares many of these problems.

Panama's vulnerable frontier. Panama's most contentious national security issue is controlling its border areas. Panama has not had a military since 1989, and it was subsequently abolished by its constitution. Consequently, Panama could not effectively perform counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and counterdrug missions. The Border Police Service now has more than 2,000 personnel stationed

Whatever the political reasoning for President Pastrana's ceding so much land to the FARC, the military consequence is daunting. The FARC zone—the despeje—is a huge base for military operations, recruiting, drug cultivation and arms smuggling, as well as its stated purpose—discussions with the government. With every passing week, the despeje sanctuary makes it less and less likely that the Colombian army will be able to build the kind of force correlation necessary to defeat the guerrilla.

throughout the Darien province bordering Colombia, but it is not organized and trained to stand up to Colombian warriors.⁵⁵ The country would benefit if Colombia's government would increase its control of the lawless situation on that side of the border and perhaps from regional assistance. President Mireya Moscoso continues to seek help.

The Panamanian Public Forces have been unable to deal with foreign armed groups. Colombian AUC chief Carlos Castaño said, "we have declared as military targets all members of the Panamanian National Police who are working in open collusion with the FARC along the border."⁵⁶ Panamanians in the remote, easternmost San Blas and Darien provinces represent only 2 percent of the population and daily fear being harassed and brutalized by Colombian paramilitary forces, guerrillas and criminals.

Paramilitary and FARC incidents have been especially prevalent along the border with Colombia since the mid-1990s. Even Colombian army units have crossed the border into Panama to pursue the FARC.⁵⁷ FARC fronts send elements into Panama's territory for resupply and R&R and to prepare for further combat in Colombia. Paramilitary groups harass Panamanians who support the FARC. Panamanian officials rationalize that the guerrilla presence in the Darien area does not threaten its free trade zone or canal operations.

The view of the border seems less threatening from Panama City.⁵⁸ One incident, however, made

it difficult for the government to ignore. At La Miel, a small village on the north coast, several hundred heavily armed troops of the FARC's 57th Front moved in and directly threatened the Kuna Yala Indian communities of La Miel, Armila and Puerto Obaldia. Then AUC paramilitary forces were spotted in the area. After FARC guerrillas appeared in their village, 120 Panamanians fled La Miel for safer provinces, concerned that AUC paramilitaries would move into the area and kill villagers thought to be supporting the guerrillas.⁵⁹

Refugees crossing the border from Colombia into Darien represent another problem for Panama because they are interlinked to border conflict and incursions carried out by the guerrillas and paramilitaries. The growing number of Colombians crossing the border to safety in Darien has gained international attention. The US Committee for Refugees reported in 1997 that Panama had forcibly returned 90 Colombian asylum seekers. This energized the UNHCR to negotiate with Panama to establish minimal rules of conduct for processing refugees. Rules included adhering to the principle of *nonrefoulement* and temporary refugee security. Panama cannot protect its own citizens in remote border areas from incursions by irregular armed groups into Darien, so protecting refugees is problematic.⁶⁰

The appearance of Colombian refugees places heavy demands on Panama's resources. When FARC guerrillas of several fronts overran the Pacific port city of Jurado, nearly 500 Colombians fled 65 km along the southern coast to Jaque, Panama. Fortunately, several humanitarian organizations provided refugee assistance, and by March 2000 about 100 Colombians had been returned to their homes in Jurado.⁶¹ The situation is similar on Panama's northern coast in westernmost San Blas province. Conflict in Colombia's Gulf of Urabá region has driven refugees west, toward Puerto Obaldia.

Panama's National Organization for Refugee Attention (ONPAR) identified 600 Colombian asylum seekers in Panama at the end of 1998. An estimated 580 Colombians fleeing violence in their home areas sought refuge in Panama's Darien province in 1999, including about 30 in March and more than 550 in December. An additional 7,000 Colombians live in Panama as legal migrants through the 1994 Migratory Regularization Act.⁶² Panama is improving its treatment of Colombian refugees, and it now allows the UNHCR access to new arrivals in coordination with ONPAR.

Arms shipments typically travel along Costa Rica's northern coast to Panamanian border ports like Almirante and Bocas del Toro, then along Panama's Caribbean coast to Colon or adjacent Coco Solo. Contraband—AK-47s, hand grenades and explosives—proceeds via border towns like Puerto Obaldia on Panama's Caribbean coast through the Gulf of Urabá and is sold to Colombian insurgents and drug traffickers.⁶³ When Colombian navy units increase their presence in the Gulf of Urabá, the gunrunning shifts to Pacific Ocean routes.

Panama typically positions patrol boats from its National Maritime Service at border ports on the north and south sides of the isthmus to stop the gun and drug trafficking. However, Panama's small "coast guard" cannot protect the San Blas and Darien littorals from pirate raids against fishermen, and it is ineffective at controlling gunrunning and Colombian guerrilla incursions.

Panama has many of the same, long-standing border problems as its neighbors in the Andean region. It cannot do much about the FARC and paramilitary activity because it lacks combat power. Fortunately, these problems are in an outlying province and, hopefully, can be held at arm's length—the apparent strategy for dealing with the spillover.

Attacking the Center of Gravity

Narcotrafficking, gunrunning and other lawless activities have affected all border areas for many years. Colombia's warring forces move freely into Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama, but in Brazil, the FARC has paid dearly for its incursions. All countries are affected to some degree by refugee problems, but the issue seems manageable, except in Venezuela where there is little accommodation among Colombia, Venezuela and the international organizations. None of these security challenges attacks core national survival interests, but they present political issues and funding requirements.

Colombia's neighbors suggest that the counterdrug campaign in Putumayo will encourage refugees, coca farmers and armed contestants to move across frontiers, especially into Ecuador. The supplemental aid package supporting this campaign provides \$20 million to Ecuador, \$32 million to Peru and \$3.5 million to Brazil to help address these concerns.⁶⁴

There is some justification for regional leaders' fears about Colombia and US assistance to Colombia. The current conflict, now drug-propelled, has been raging on and off for more than 30 years. The FARC has become a huge narcobusiness, with little apparent incentive for ending the war. Whatever the

Panama has not had a military since 1989, and it was subsequently abolished by its constitution. Consequently, Panama could not effectively perform counterinsurgency, counterterrorism and counterdrug missions. The Border Police Service now has more than 2,000 personnel stationed throughout the Darien province bordering Colombia, but it is not organized and trained to stand up to Colombian warriors.

Refugees crossing the border from Colombia into Darien represent another problem for Panama because they are interlinked to border conflict and incursions carried out by the guerrillas and paramilitaries. The growing number of Colombians crossing the border to safety in Darien has gained international attention.

political reasoning for President Pastrana's ceding so much land to the FARC, the military consequence is daunting. The FARC zone—the *despeje*—is a huge base for military operations, recruiting, drug cultivation and arms smuggling, as well as its stated purpose—discussions with the government. With every passing week, the *despeje* sanctuary makes it less and less likely that the Colombian army will be able to build the kind of force correlation necessary to defeat the guerrilla.

Until now the AUC, also an outlaw organization, was successfully reducing the strength of the FARC and ELN. It appears, however, that President Pastrana has acceded to the FARC commander's demand that the government focus on eliminating the AUC. Colombia's neighbors may perceive that the Colombian government is not embarked on a course to defeat the guerrillas or keep them from gaining or sharing power. Colombia's neighbors may not be inclined to expend diplomatic capital on efforts to oppose a rebel movement that continues to gain position vis-à-vis the Colombian government.

The Peruvian experience with the SL and MRTA provides valuable insight into effectively deciding the center of gravity and having the will to attack it. As stated in National Defense University's *Strategic Assessment 1999*, "Once its [Peru's] insurgency was defeated, the state was able to mount a more effective national campaign against drug trafficking organizations, and US assistance had a more substantial impact."⁶⁵ The Colombian government

is emphasizing counterdrug operations at a stage of insurgency in which the FARC appears well able to conduct conventional military operations. The army finds itself fighting in three directions—the guerrillas, paramilitaries and narcotraffickers. As security specialist Michael Radu has observed, “the

The Colombian government is emphasizing counterdrug operations at a stage of insurgency in which the FARC appears well able to conduct conventional military operations. The army finds itself fighting in three directions—the guerrillas, paramilitaries and narcotraffickers. As security specialist Michael Radu has observed, “the primary problems in Colombia are FARC and ELN, and . . . no solution to the drug problem is possible while the insurgents operate at will.”

primary problems in Colombia are FARC and ELN, and . . . no solution to the drug problem is possible while the insurgents operate at will.”⁶⁶

The FARC and ELN have been able to build a modicum of rural support at gunpoint, but the Colombian army and National Police are the second-most-respected institutions in Colombia behind the Catholic Church.⁶⁷ If the army maintains its human rights discipline and gains full support of the civilian political leadership, it could be fully capable of attacking the center of gravity.

Colombia’s neighbors have a big role to play through providing the international support to contain FARC, ELN and paramilitary activities. Their troops are not required to deploy alongside Colombian soldiers, but they are needed in some strength in their border regions. Brazil has been especially effective in denying the FARC a sanctuary for military operations against Colombia. With supportive international involvement and decisive leadership at

home, Colombia has a good chance of eliminating the dangers that cause spillover.

Brazilian National Security Minister General Alberto Cardoso provides a view of Colombia’s security initiatives. “If there is one positive aspect to the emergence of these problems with Plan Colombia, it is that all society has now awakened to the necessity of the defense of the Amazon.”⁶⁸ But Brazil’s actions and comments are derived from a position of relative power and invulnerability. Colombia’s other neighbors are less confident and appear to sense flagging morale in Colombia’s body politic.

Colombia’s military—as apolitical as any in Latin America—may have that tradition tested in the months ahead. Analogous temptations have not always been resisted in the region. Potential imperatives include a leftist guerrilla on the verge of strategic success, the loss of sovereign territory, a faltering economy and a Colombian public wanting a tougher stand against the various outlaw organizations. Article 217 of the Colombian constitution states, “The Armed Forces will have as a fundamental purpose defense of the sovereignty, independence, and integrity of the national territory and the constitutional order.”⁶⁹ Article 217 may gain weight in the minds of more and more Colombian officers, while those parts of the constitution intended to keep the Colombian military under civilian political control may begin to lose their grip. Any decisive move by the Colombian military to arrogate political power likely would weaken prospects for regional security coordination, at least in the near term. On the other hand, if the Colombian government hardens its stance against the narcoguerrillas, then combat correlations inside Colombia could change dramatically in favor of the Colombian army, military disaffection would dissipate, and real support for a combined anti-outlaw plan from Colombia’s neighbors could develop. 🐦

NOTES

1. Plan Colombia is President Andrés Pastrana’s multifaceted nation-assistance strategy.

2. See William L. Scruggs, *The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1910). This century-old volume reflects the close relationships of northern Colombian outlying provinces with Venezuela.

3. The Center for International Policy provides a laydown of US aid to Colombia, <www.ciponline.org/>.

4. President Pastrana’s broader strategy is dismissed. This was certainly underscored on 1 February 2001 when the European Parliament of the European Union voted 474 to 1 against supporting Plan Colombia. Only a week had passed since President Pastrana had traveled to Paris to request \$700 million to support the economic and social development aspects of his peace plan. The Europeans responded with advice on the peace process, land reform and the “risk of sparking off an escalation of the conflict in the region.” The European Parliament opted to align itself against US interests. See “EU Parliament Slaps Down Plan Colombia,” *Agence France Presse*, 1 February 2001, <www.prairienet.org/clm>.

5. “Major Illicit Drug-Producing and Transit Countries,” US Embassy Bogota, 26 January 2001, US State Department, <www.embaixadaamericana.org.br/drugs.html>. “The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, requires the

President to annually submit to Congress a list of those countries determined to be major illicit drug-producing or drug-transit countries. The FAA requires that half of most US Government foreign assistance to any country on the Majors List be withheld until the President determines whether the country should be ‘certified.’”

6. Barry R. McCaffrey, “Remarks on Regional Implications of Plan Colombia,” US Embassy Bogota, 26 January 2001, US State Department, <www.embaixada-americana.org.br/colombia.html>. In 1999 more than 22,957 Colombians died of drug-related deaths according to the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

7. Exact figures are not available, but it is commonly accepted that the FARC alone makes this much at least. See Rafael Pardo, “Colombia’s Two-Front War,” *Foreign Affairs* (July-August 2000), <<http://www.prairienet.org/clm>>, accessed 4 July 2000.

8. An exhaustive study in Spanish indicates the guerrillas’ financial power may be greater than suggested here. See Jesus El La Rotta, M., *Las Finanzas de la Subversión Colombiana: Una forma de explotar la nación*, (Bogota: INCISE, January 1996).

9. AUC member groups are the Peasant Self-Defense Group of Córdoba and Urabá (ACCU), Eastern Plains Self-Defense Group, Cesar Self-Defense Group,

Middle Magdalena Self-Defense Group, Santander and Southern Cesar Self-Defense Group, Casanare Self-Defense Group and the Cundinamarca Self-Defense Group. "United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC)," *Periscope*, CIP online at <<http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm#Paramil>>, accessed 8 January 2001.

10. This is a commonly used number, but the death toll could be far greater.
11. Guerrilla strengths vary by source. The FARC is about 15,000 to 17,000; ELN about 5,000; AUC about 5,000 to 7,000. The credible Latin American News Syndicate in its *Latin American Weekly Report*, 18 May 2000, <www.latam-news.com>, puts the FARC strength at 11,850.

12. Karl Penhaul, "Colombia's Pressure Peak," *San Francisco Chronicle*, 8 February 2001, <www.prairienet.org/clm/>, accessed 9 February 2001.

13. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict Brian E. Sheridan, "Statement for the Record," Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 21 September 2000.

14. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Colombia's President Predicts Cease-Fire by Term's End," *United Press International (UPI)*, 10 February 2001; Jose Ramos, "Colombian Government, Rebels Gear Up for Continued Peace Talks," *Agence France Presse*, 13 February 2001, <<http://www.prairienet.org/clm/>>, accessed 13 February 2001.

15. Structural and social problems—health and education, the criminal justice system and care for internally displaced persons (Colombia's guerrilla war refugees)—all could benefit from international contributions. These are the programs most likely to alleviate the spillover strain that Colombia's neighbors claim to fear. Paradoxically, their complaints about Plan Colombia's military portion stunted foreign aid to portions of the plan that would reduce the war's impact on them.

16. John Otis, "Political Cleansing" in Colombia Rising, Number of Civilians Displaced by 35-Year War Nears Crisis Levels," *Houston Chronicle*, 17 October 1999.

17. Larry Rohter, "Crisis in Colombia as Civil Strife Uproots Peasants," *The New York Times*, 21 October 1999.

18. Nick Rosen, "Plight of the Desplazados," *In These Times*, 31 October 1999, <www.prairienet.org/clm/>.

19. "Colombia," UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Country Profiles, <www.unhcr.ch/world/amer/colombil.htm>, accessed 2 February 2001.

20. "Blood on the Border," *The Economist* (London), 16 September 2000, <<http://www.prairienet.org/clm/>>, 17 September 2000.

21. "Venezuela," UNHCR Country Profiles, <www.unhcr.ch/world/amer/vnzuela.htm>, accessed 2 February 2001. *Nonrefoulement* refers to not returning refugees into harm's way. Also see "Blood on the Border," *The Economist* (London), 16 September 2000.

22. Scott Wilson, "Influx Burdens Venezuela," *The Washington Post*, 1 October 2000.

23. "Cross-Border Terror," *The Economist* (London), 24 May 1997.

24. Estimate by Colombian Consulate at Machiques as reported by Scott Wilson, *Washington Post Foreign Service*, "Influx Burdens Venezuela," *The Washington Post*, 1 October 2000.

25. "UNHCR Country Profiles," September 1999, UNHCR home page, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/world/amer/vnzuela.htm>>, accessed 1 February 2001.

26. "Venezuela Bristles at Border Crossings," *The Washington Times*, 25 October 2000.

27. Barry R. McCaffrey, "ONDCP Director McCaffrey Remarks on Regional Implications of Plan Colombia," US Embassy Bogota, 26 January 2001, US State Department, Washington, DC, <www.embajada-americana.org.br/colombia.html>.

28. "Se busca, Colombia y Estados Unidos van tras el guerrillero que controla la mayor área cocalera del mundo," *Semana*, 4 September 2000, 40.

29. Interview with Colombian army officer (nonattribution), November 2000.

30. Colonel Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro, "Guerrilla in the Brazilian Amazon," *Military Review*, Edição Brasileira, 1st Quarter 1995, 58-79. The combined Brazilian-Colombian operations conducted throughout 1991 were called "Traira" and "Perro Loco."

31. Silvio Ferraz, "O Brasil Mostra As Garras . . . Reagem à Ameaça da Guerrilha Colombiana" ["Brazil Shows Its Claws . . . Reacts to the Threat of the Colombian Guerrilla"], *Veja*, 10 November 1999, 190-93.

32. Amaury Ribeiro Jr., "Security Tightened at Colombian Border to Deter FARC," *O Globo* (Rio de Janeiro) 13 September 1996, 12. Translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), PY1309220896, 13 September 1996. Author's discussions with federal police at post in Tabatinga and at the Anzöl River base on the Rio Solimões, 2 May 1996.

33. Jared Kotler, "Rebels Inflict Heavy Losses in Colombia, 150 Government Fighters Die Taking Jungle Town," Associated Press, *Miami Herald*, 5 November 1998.

34. "El síndrome de Jacobo," *Semana*, 9 November 1998, 50-53; "Colombia Declares Curfew in Amazon Provinces Following Attack," *Bloomberg News*, 5 November 1998; "Colombia Rebels, Anti-Drug Police," *Miami Herald*, 2 November 1998; "Asesina guerrilla a 70 policías," *El Norte*, 3 November 1998. The Brazilian government recalled its ambassador for consultations in a display of pique for Colombia's inadequate coordination with Brazilian authorities.

35. Mauro Sposito, Federal Police Chief and head of Amazonas anti-drug operations, quoted by Kevin G. Hall, "US Fails to Regulate Export of Chemicals Colombians Use to Make Cocaine," *Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service*, 22 November 2000, <www.prairienet.org/clm/>.

36. "FARC: Finance Comes Full Circle for Bartering Revolutionaries," *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor*, 16 January 2001, <www.prairienet.org/clm/>, accessed 17 January 2001.

37. "Investigation Reveals Colombia Drug Trafficking, Guerrilla Ties in Brazil," *Cambio* (Internet Version), 18 December 2000, FBIS, LAP20001218000050.

38. Peter Muello, "Brazil Braces for Colombia Drug Fight," Associated Press, *The Washington Times*, 19 December 2000, 12.

39. Larry Rohter, "Latest Battleground in Latin Drug War: Brazilian Amazon," *The New York Times*, 30 October 2000, 1.

40. Raytheon Electronic Systems, Home Page, 8 March 1999, <www.raytheon.com/sivam>; Alex Bellas, *The Guardian* (15 October 1998).

41. "Peruvian Defense Minister Denies Clashes Occurred Between Troops, FARC Rebels," *Notimex*, Mexico City, 29 November 2000, FBIS, LAP20001130000009, accessed 6 February 2001.

42. Roberto Lamerinhas, "Origin of Peruvian Political Crisis," *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 20 September 2000, FBIS, LAP20000920000043, 6 February 2001; "Reports Say Traffickers Made Five Flights to Deliver Russian Rifles to FARC," *EFE Madrid*, 3 September 2000, FBIS, LAP20000903000017, 6 February 2001.

43. "Further on Weapons for FARC," *Cambio*, 28 August 2000, FBIS, LAP20000828000010, 6 February 2001. For more about "Negro Acacio," see *Semana*, September 2000, 40.

44. "1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices," Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, US Department of State, Washington, DC, 25 February 2000, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1999_hrp_report/peru.html>, accessed 6 February 2001.

45. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999," <<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/latin.html#Peru>>, accessed 7 February 2001.

46. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report*, 1999 (Washington, DC: US Department of State), March 2000.

47. The US Committee for Refugees (USCR), "Peru Country Report," <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer_carib/peru.htm>, accessed 6 February 2001.

48. USCR, "Ecuador Country Report," <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer_carib/ecuador.htm>, accessed 4 February 2001.

49. Sebastian Rotella, "Andean Region Teeters Between Anarchy, Tyranny," *Los Angeles Times* 31 August 2000; Jay Hancock, "US Steps Up Drug War, and Ecuador Quakes," *Baltimore Sun*, 13 August 2000.

50. "Border Situation With Ecuador," *Semana*, Santa Fe de Bogota, FBIS, FTS19991001001777, 27 September 1999.

51. Larry Rohter, "Ecuador Afraid as a Drug War Heads Its Way," *The New York Times*, 8 January 2001.

52. Juan O. Tamayo, "Ecuador Feels Fallout From Colombia's Narcotics War," *Miami Herald*, 18 November 2000.

53. "Ecuador Finds Possible Rebel Camp," *Reuters*, 11 January 2001.

54. "Ecuador," UNHCR, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/world/amer/ecuador.htm>>, accessed 13 February 2001.

55. Jahiro Polo, "Police Confirm Shooting at Colombia-Panama Border," *La Prensa* (Panama City), 23 February 2000, FBIS, LAP20000223000036. In "Panama: In the Jaws of War," *Semana* (Santa Fe de Bogota), 27 September 1999, the military presence on the border was Panama, 1,500 men in five border posts with 1,500 more forthcoming as reinforcements and Colombia, 1,500 to 2,000 men in one navy brigade and three battalions.

56. "Panama: In the Jaws of War."

57. Mark Falcoff, *Panama's Canal* (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1998), 70.

58. "President-Elect, Foreign Minister on Guerrillas's Presence," *ACAN* (Panama City), 3 June 1999, FBIS, FTS19990603001293.

59. Angel Sierra, "The Guerrillas in La Miel," *Telemetro Television Network* (Panama City), report series 31 May-2 June 1999, FBIS, FTS19990605000011.

60. "Panama," *Country Profiles*, UNHCR, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/world/amer/panama.htm>>, 29 March 1999.

61. "Panama: Some Colombians Return," *Refugee NewsNet*, UNHCR, <<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/cgi-bin/news/country.pl?country=panama.htm>>, 29 March 1999.

62. "Panama," *Country Reports*, USCR, <www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/amer_carib/panama.htm>, accessed 29 March 2000.

63. Juan Manuel Diaz, "Ports Said Being Used for Arms Trafficking From Central America," *El Panama America*, 16 November 1996, FBIS, FTS19961116000234; Goris Armando Gomez, "Panama Investigates Gunrunning at Costa Rican Border," *Panama City La Prensa*, 15 December 1999, FBIS, FTS19991215001964.

64. "US Security Assistance to the Andean Region, 2000-2001," Colombia Overview, Center for International Policy, <www.ciponline.org/>, accessed 8 February 2001.

65. Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment 1999* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1999), 179.

66. Michael Radu, "The Perilous Appeasement of Guerrillas," *Orbis*, Summer 2000, 379.

67. Juan O. Tamayo, "TV Show Gives Colombia's Military a Lift," *Miami Herald*, 12 February 2001.

68. Rohter, "Latest Battleground in Latin Drug War: Brazilian Amazon."

69. *Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 con reforma de 1997*, <www.georgetown.edu/LatAm/Political/Constitutions/Colombia/colombia.html>, accessed 28 February 2001.

Colonel William W. Mendel, US Army, Retired, is a senior military analyst, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Virginia Military Institute and an M.A. from the University of Kansas and graduated from Harvard's Kennedy School Program for Senior Officials in National Security. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and US Army War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe, Korea and Vietnam and held the Maxwell B. Taylor Chair of the Profession of Arms at the US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. His article "Under New Ownership: It's Panama's Canal" appeared in the July-August 2000 issue of *Military Review*.

Regional Concerns



US interests abroad seem to shift and expand but never diminish. Grau describes potential oil exports from the Caspian Sea region that bring promises of revenue—and possible threats from Russian nuclear weapons, as Kipp warns. Turbiville reminds us that Mexico's security issues invite greater US attention to its immediate south. Closer than ever before, through trade and modern communications, China explores electronic strategies, which Thomas explains. Although the time for transition in Cuba is not clear, it is closer, and Demarest discusses the three major forces affecting the change. Finally, Sarafian shows how religious forces fill gaps left in the wake of the Soviet Union and create even more fissures in former Soviet Republics.

Hydrocarbons and a New Strategic Region: The Caspian Sea and Central Asia

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired

THE UNITED STATES currently imports 51 percent of its crude oil—19.5 million barrels daily. The Energy Information Administration estimates that by 2020, the United States will import 64 percent of its crude—25.8 million barrels per day.¹ The United States buys much of its oil from Venezuela and the Persian Gulf; Europe buys from the Persian Gulf and the North Sea. For years Europe has bought natural gas from the Soviet Union and Russia, but Eurasian oil has made limited inroads into the European market. This may change. The Caspian Sea appears to be sitting on yet another sea—a sea of hydrocarbons. Western oilmen flocking to the area have signed multibillion-dollar deals. US firms are well-represented in the negotiations, and where US business goes, US national interests follow.

The Caspian Sea basin has long been a source of oil and natural gas. The fire-worshipping Zoroastrian religion was founded on the western shores of the Caspian as Zoroastrians built temples around local pillars of fire fed by escaping natural gas. The two great pre-World War I oil fields were in Texas and the Caspian Sea region of Imperial Russia. After the war, when civil war raged between Russian Whites and Reds, British forces landed in Batumi in a failed attempt to influence the future of Caspian Sea oil. During World War II, Adolph Hitler launched Operation *Blau* to capture the Caspian Sea oil fields.

Now that the Soviet Union has dissolved, Caspian Sea oil draws international attention once again. Western oil companies, hoping to find new reserves at a reasonable cost, have cut deals with Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia. Caspian region oil reserves might be the third largest in the world (following Western Siberia and the Persian Gulf) and, within the next 15 to 20 years, may be large enough to offset Persian Gulf oil. Caspian Sea oil and gas are not the only hydrocarbon deposits in the region. Turkmenistan's Karakum

Various political, economic, sovereignty, military and cultural issues could threaten uninterrupted delivery of oil from the Caspian region. Should the United States continue to play a vigorous role in supporting regional stability, US Armed Forces will need to understand the political, economic and cultural dynamics, as well as US interests in this region.

Desert holds the world's third largest gas reserves—three trillion cubic meters—and has six billion barrels of estimated oil reserves.² Other oil fields in adjacent Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan further increase the known reserves of cheap energy available to oil-dependent economies and are drawing outside investors.

The presence of these oil reserves and the possibility of their export raises new strategic concerns for the United States and other Western industrial powers. As oil companies build oil pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia to supply Japan and the West, these strategic concerns gain military implications. The dominant role of the Middle East energy supply may be offset by new suppliers operating from an even less mature and stable environment. The uninterrupted supply of oil to global markets will continue to be a key factor in international stability.

Various political, economic, sovereignty, military and cultural issues could threaten uninterrupted delivery of oil from the Caspian region. Should the United States continue to play a vigorous role in supporting regional stability, US Armed Forces will need to understand the political, economic and cultural dynamics, as well as US interests in this region where Western oil companies already have

Oil and gas are critical to the struggling Russian economy, in some years constituting 42 to 44 percent of all exports. The Russian government realized \$1.5 billion annually from direct foreign oil sales and raised 21 percent of its revenue from duties on foreign trade—the biggest portion of which comes from oil and gas sales. Russia's neighbors complain that Russia asserts a proprietary interest over all Caspian Sea oil and uses the pipelines as leverage in negotiations.

signed contracts potentially worth more than \$100 billion. Hopefully, US forces will be spared future regional presence beyond advisory and assistance roles since effective military presence would require basing rights and significant investment to develop theater infrastructure and establish forward supply and staging areas.

The Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea, Russia and Central Asia

Petroleum geologists claim to have discovered 17 billion barrels of crude oil in the Caspian Sea, an amount roughly equal to the European North Sea fields and almost one-third of Venezuela's holdings.³ Current estimates indicate that, in addition to huge gas deposits, the Caspian basin may hold as much as 200 billion barrels of oil—33 times the estimated holdings of Alaska's North Slope and a current value of \$4 trillion.⁴ It is enough to meet the United States' energy needs for 30 years or more.⁵ This sizable estimation still does not match the Persian Gulf states' estimated reserves. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Empire, the Caspian region has assumed new global importance. Projected oil reserves for the Iranian, Kazakh, Azeri, Turkmenian and Russian Caspian littoral are 25 billion metric tons—nearly 15 percent of the world's total oil reserves (and 50 percent of its gas reserves).⁶

During the Soviet era, Soviet oilmen extracted Caspian Sea oil mainly for use within the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The known Soviet Caspian Sea oil sites had been producing for a century and were nearing depletion. Soviet oil exploration and exploitation concentrated on sites that were more geographically and technologically accessible. However, recent surveys reveal oil reserves in the Caspian Sea that could significantly boost the economies of its five bordering states—Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

But it takes money to make money; in this case, money to exploit the difficult-to-reach deposits, money to remove the hydrosulfuric and mercaptan contaminants from the east shore oil, money to deal with the region's high geopressures, money to repressurize some of the prematurely abandoned fields and money to move oil to the consumer. Since the Soviet Union did not develop advanced technological solutions to these problems, Western money and technology are now key to exploiting energy in the region. Predictions abound and most are probably overstated. Still, if Western oil companies are able to begin producing oil from fields in the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and Russia, almost five million barrels of oil per day could be pumped from these fields into the open market by 2010.⁷

The Pipeline Blues

Bringing oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia to market is difficult. Pipelines are the only feasible way to move commercial quantities. A major factor in developing Central Asian hydrocarbons and supporting oil and gas pipelines is the price of oil. Recent higher prices raise the prospects for Caspian Sea energy, but they also encourage reopening some closer, already-developed, marginal fields. Transport costs affect oil prices. Transporting Persian Gulf oil costs \$2 to \$5 per ton; North Sea oil costs \$10 per ton; Caspian Sea oil costs \$17 per ton; Siberian oil costs \$35 to \$45 per ton.⁸ Historically, the only pipeline from the Caspian Sea region ran through Chechnya via Baku-Grozny-Novorossiysk. Current uncertainty about political stability is holding back aggressive pipeline development; however, pipelines are being planned, laid and used.

The Russian route. Most Caspian Sea oil and gas are pumped through Russia. The oil flows northwest and eventually reaches Russian and European markets through a well-developed pipeline system. Soon it will again move to the Black Sea, bypassing Chechnya, for transport through the Dardanelles to the Mediterranean. Oil and gas are critical to the struggling Russian economy, in some years constituting 42 to 44 percent of all exports. The Russian government realized \$1.5 billion annually from direct foreign oil sales and raised 21 percent of its revenue from duties on foreign trade—the biggest portion of which comes from oil and gas sales.⁹ Russia's neighbors complain that Russia asserts a proprietary interest over all Caspian Sea oil and uses the pipelines as leverage in negotiations. The Russians, who discovered the oil fields, developed them and built



Well-dressed urbanites pass stores with signs in Russian, English and Azeri in downtown Baku.

Eurasian oil has made limited inroads into the European market. This may change. The Caspian Sea appears to be sitting on yet another sea—a sea of hydrocarbons. Western oilmen flocking to the area have signed multibillion-dollar deals. US firms are well-represented in the negotiations, and where US business goes, US national interests follow.

the transportation and refinery infrastructure, controlled Caspian Sea energy for more than 100 years. The Russians feel entitled to a share and get it by controlling the flow of other nations' oil across Russian territory.

Thus, in spring 1996, Russia reduced the amount of oil it would transport from the huge Tengiz oil field on the northeast Caspian shore. The Russians' reason for reducing the flow was that the Tengiz oil sulfur content was too high and was damaging the pipe. This oil does have a high sulfur content but was shipped from the same field through the same pipe for many years when it belonged to the Soviet Union. Now Chevron and Kazakhstan operate the field on a 50-50 basis. During the Soviet era, no one counted costs. With the reduced flow, Russia attempted to control Kazakhstan's oil industry and economic viability. In 1997 the Caspian Sea consortium of Chevron, Mobil, Russia's Lukoil, Oman and the Kazakh state oil company acceded to Russia's pressure and agreed to build a \$2-billion pipeline from Kazakhstan through Russia to Novorossiysk (Route 1).¹⁰ This route maintains Russian control of oil shipment from the region.

The historic Russian line from Baku through

Chechnya to Novorossiysk (Route 2) was closed because of the Chechens' continuing struggle with Russia. Both sides reportedly hit the pipeline during the wars, and Chechens exploited it as a source of free oil. Reports from the region indicate that Chechens placed more than 100 taps on the line, drawing off oil to their clandestine refineries and selling cheap gasoline in Grozny. Russia has recently completed a bypass around Chechnya and reactivated the pipeline. Russia has proposed exporting oil north to join its existing pipeline system and reach Novorossiysk or Europe (Route 3). This development could further remove the pipeline from Chechnya and maintain Russia's substantial control of Caspian Sea and Kazakh oil.

The Transcaucasus route. The Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) is the first international oil consortium set up in Azerbaijan. US oil companies own 39.9 percent of the consortium—Amoco, 17.0 percent; Unocal, 10.0 percent; Exxon, 8.0 percent; and Pennzoil, 4.8 percent. Other countries in the consortium include Britain, 19.0 percent; Azerbaijan, 10.0 percent; Russia's Lukoil, 10.0 percent; Norway, 8.6 percent; Japan, 3.9 percent; Turkey, 6.8 percent; and Saudi Arabia, 1.7 percent.¹¹



Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Baku in January 2001 to demonstrate that Russia is still a major factor in the area. Putin mounted a political assault on the notion that Azerbaijan could or should link its future to the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) group as a counterweight to Moscow. Putin stressed a broad range of economic benefits Russia could offer Azerbaijan and made it clear that Russian forces compelled to leave Georgia would redeploy to Armenia, having backed Armenia during the Azeri-Armenian war.

This consortium built an initial line from Baku through Georgia to the Georgian port of Supsa on the Black Sea (Route 4). This pipeline has been pumping a limited amount of oil since 1999. While this is a relatively inexpensive option, the oil still has to move from Supsa by oil tanker through the Black Sea and the Bosphorus.¹² Turkey controls the traffic between the Black and Mediterranean Seas and does not want increased oil tanker traffic through the straits because of environmental concerns. Russia objects to this route because none of the pipeline passes through Russia. Further, this pipeline runs through domains of many fractious mountain tribes.

The AIOC is also considering a line to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan (Route 5). This would give Turkey primacy in exporting Caspian gas and oil, and would cut Russia out of pipeline fee profits and port fees from Novorossiysk. However, there are some problems with building a pipeline to Ceyhan. The route runs through Azerbaijan and Armenia, whose war over Nagorno-Karabakh is at a stalemate. Thus, the Baku-Armenia-Ceyhan route is not a near-term option. Should this conflict be settled, the route also passes through the Kurdish part of Turkey where a suppressed insurrection still simmers. The route would cost \$2.9 billion.¹³

The Clinton administration tried to promote a pipeline route from Baku to Tbilisi to Supsa (Route 4) and then underwater from Supsa to Turkey where it would cut across Kurdish Turkey to Ceyhan. An underwater pipeline from Turkmenistan across the Caspian Sea to Baku would back this pipeline. This expensive option required regional political acceptance and oil company backing—neither of which the Clinton administration could obtain.

The Iranian routes. The US government opposes a Baku-Iran-Ceyhan route because of Iran's alleged support of international terrorism. US oil companies are not allowed to ship their oil through Iran, although it is the shortest, cheapest and easiest route to an open port. Iran's preferred route is a pipeline south from the Caspian Sea to the Persian Gulf (Route 7). Iran has an extended pipeline system in place, and Turkmenistan opened a gas pipeline into Iran in December 1997.¹⁴ This comparatively inexpensive option would bring the oil and gas to the troubled Persian Gulf with its easily closed Strait of Hormuz. The United States opposes this pipeline and tries to enforce the sanctions, but other nations' oil firms ignore the sanctions and cut oil deals with Iran. France (Elf Aquitaine and Total SA); Italy (Agip); the Netherlands (Royal Dutch/Shell and Lamaj); Spain (Repsol); India (BHP);



Russia (Lukoil, Zarubezhneft and Mashinoinport); and China (China National) have all completed or are negotiating major oil deals with Iran.¹⁵ US firms also have interests in such a route and have been lobbying in Washington, DC, for improved relations with Iran.

The Afghanistan route. Several major oil companies have investigated building pipelines from Central Asia through Herat and Kandahar, Afghanistan, and on to Quetta and Karachi, Pakistan, (Route 8) at an estimated cost of \$1.9 billion. The distance is relatively short and would bring oil to the Indian subcontinent market. However, Afghanistan is still locked in civil war.¹⁶ Many area residents feel that Unocal backed the Taliban forces financially in return for future pipeline rights in Afghanistan.¹⁷ Unocal and other companies have abandoned attempts at establishing this route since the political situation seems unresolvable.

The China route. China and the Pacific Rim are potentially huge markets for Caspian Sea and Central Asian oil. Oil companies are considering a pipeline from western Kazakhstan through China to the Pacific to serve the Chinese, Japanese and Korean markets (Route 9). The savings realized over current tanker deliveries would have to offset the \$8 to \$12 billion required to build the pipeline. The Chinese have signed a memorandum of understanding to build a shorter \$3.5-billion pipeline that would stop in China proper.¹⁸

The historic Russian line from Baku through Chechnya to Novorossiysk was closed because of the Chechens' continuing struggle with Russia. Both sides reportedly hit the pipeline during the wars. . . . Chechens placed more than 100 taps on the line, drawing off oil to their clandestine refineries and selling cheap gasoline in Grozny. Russia has recently completed a bypass around Chechnya and reactivated the pipeline.

Western Involvement and Concerns in Caspian Sea and Central Asian Energy

More than 40 upstream projects in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan involve 11 US companies, 24 other Western companies and two Russian companies. The total value of these projects exceeds \$100 billion. Companies such as Exxon, Amoco, Mobil and Chevron were negotiating additional contracts in the region and were involved in upstream exploration and production projects as well as various downstream activities—pipeline development, infrastructure development, and environmental restoration and repair. Oil profits represent the likely major revenue for the countries of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia for the next 15 to 20 years. Oil revenue could also attract other Western business to the region, which should help develop infrastructure and diversify their economic base. US

oil companies, smaller oil support and service companies, and engineering and environmental firms would benefit initially, but secondary industry attracted by the region's economic potential could also

Oil revenue could also attract other Western business to the region, which should help develop infrastructure and diversify their economic base. US oil companies, smaller oil support and service companies, and engineering and environmental firms would benefit initially, but secondary industry attracted by the region's economic potential could also benefit.

benefit. However, the region's political instability and US government policies toward Azerbaijan have slowed or stopped many of these projects which peaked in 1998.¹⁹

The US Supreme Court has ruled that a US corporation has the same rights as an individual citizen under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. The US government could reasonably concern itself anywhere US business operates.²⁰ But in this era of multinational firms and joint ventures, what is and is not a US business is open to interpretation. The concerns of business may become the concerns of government and, by extension, military concerns. Oil company concerns in this region include the threat of nationalization; Russia's role in the affairs of its former colonies; the final division of Caspian Sea resources among Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the future of US-Iranian relations with its impact on energy production and distribution; the impact of Western countries and Japan cutting deals with Iran separate from US oil company interests; how far Russia might go to protect its perceived interests; and pipeline security.

Azerbaijan social and security concerns. Oil has not brought national prosperity to this region's people.²¹ Azerbaijan provides a good example. Oil has transformed Baku from a provincial Soviet capital into an international city with a new airport, new hotels and a modern downtown business area.


The transformation from the gray Soviet past is striking. Fountain Square, with its McDonald's, fashionable shops, cafes and new business buildings, speaks of wealth and connections to the developed world. There are many well-dressed young women and no sign of the chador, a large cloth used as a head covering, veil or shawl. But in a city of 1.7 million, the small Western part is surrounded by poverty, unemployment and collapsing infrastruc-

ture. Most citizens shop in open bazaars. The elite have grown richer and left the rest of the city behind. Most common folks respect President Heydar Aliyev because he brought order, but they complain of terrible economic conditions—a teacher makes \$20 per month to support a family, while others cannot find work at all. Bright young entrepreneurs are trying to leave the country. For many, the oil boom seems to have already played out. The litany among older citizens is that life was much better under communism.

International investment connected with Caspian Sea oil has not been as vast or influential as expected. The Azeri national trauma is the Nagorno-Karabakh war, and the one million refugees who live on the margins of society are constant reminders. The national passion is to regain Karabakh. Large numbers of Chechens who fled the Russian-Chechen wars add to the refugee population. Azeri military presence is not conspicuous, but regular and special police are prominent.

Turkey and Iran battle for influence. Turkey's influence is secular and addresses economic, cultural and political transformation. Iran's influence is religious and conservative-reactionary, and speaks to the myth that fundamentalist Shia Islam would rectify the new order's injustices. So far, there seems to be little evidence that Islamic fundamentalism has made any inroads into Baku. Russian presence remains pervasive in terms of speech on the streets and national norms. New Year's is celebrated in traditional Russian manner, with Grandfather Frost and Mickey Mouse thrown in for good measure. Islam is relaxed and alcohol is common. Before the Communist Revolution, Baku was a cosmopolitan city and an oil town. Post-Soviet Baku is still cosmopolitan but would like to become a petroleum giant. Short of that, it will settle for Aliyev's version of order.

Many of Azerbaijan's eight million people live in the country. Many are peasants whose farming and livestock are unaffected by advanced technology. The central part of Azerbaijan is fairly arid, and the north is forested with birch and oak. High-quality apples, melons, nuts, oats and grapes are prominent crops. Main roads are in disrepair, and secondary roads are mud tracks for four-wheel-drive vehicles. Large numbers of unemployed men stand about on workdays. Few young men and women are visible in the countryside, perhaps indicating flight to the cities. Factories closed with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and power outages are so common that people ignore them. The contrast between Baku and



An oil derrick on the Caspian Sea coast with a motorist water point in the foreground. Aging but serviceable oil infrastructure covers the land and sea of Azerbaijan.

The small Western part [of Baku] is surrounded by poverty, unemployment and collapsing infrastructure. Most citizens shop in open bazaars. The elite have grown richer and left the rest of the city behind. Most common folks respect President Heydar Aliyev because he brought order, but they complain of terrible economic conditions—a teacher makes \$20 per month to support a family, while others cannot find work at all. Bright young entrepreneurs are trying to leave the country. . . . The litany among older citizens is that life was much better under communism.



East meets West. A Russian Grandfather Frost and Mickey Mouse greet New Year's crowds in nominally Islamic Baku.

the countryside will continually bring people into the capital where the newcomers will join the displaced refugees from Karabakh. The Azeri government lacks the means and will to provide social services

Military security of the Caspian Sea region is difficult. The various regional militaries are small, underresourced and better designed for theater war than for combating guerrillas, narcotraffickers and gangs who threaten the area. It is difficult for outside forces to access the area. The west-east route from the Black Sea through Georgia to Baku is easily cut and supports a limited line of communications.

for this marginalized population. Whoever organizes those services will have the political leverage to shape Azerbaijan's future.

Azerbaijan is nominally a Shia Islam country, but the call to prayer is not heard in Baku. The proscriptions against alcohol are not observed, and women are not in purdah—secluding them from public observation. However, mosques are reopening, and many new ones are being built as gifts from Iran. Reasonably priced Iranian religious material is sold outside many of these mosques.

Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Baku in January 2001 to demonstrate that Russia is still a major factor in the area. Putin mounted a political assault on the notion that Azerbaijan could or should link its future to the Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova (GUUAM) group as a counterweight to Moscow. Putin stressed a broad range of economic benefits Russia could offer Azerbaijan and made it clear that Russian forces compelled to leave Georgia would redeploy to Armenia, having backed Armenia during the Azeri-Armenian war. Rather than risk heavy Russian pressure, the Aliyev government honored the Russian president. Putin won cooperation on energy rights in the Caspian region and pledged support to Azerbaijan's territorial integrity in settling Karabakh. Putin spoke of a solution to regional problems as a matter for negotiation and cooperation among the Caucasus Four—Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. The Azeri press noted that he did not mention Iran or Turkey as Caucasian states.

The Azeri government seems to have tacked to a Russian line, in part, as a result of Russian hardball regional policies following military intervention in Chechnya. Only days before Putin's arrival in Baku,

Moscow had cut off Georgia's supply of natural gas, plunging the country into the cold and dark. Russia had accused Georgia of allowing Chechnya to use its territory and had threatened to eliminate the Chechen presence forcefully, with or without Georgian cooperation. Aliyev's government has calculated that confronting Putin involves too much risk. Azerbaijan clearly needs Russian economic and technical assistance with its collapsing infrastructure.

Russia also has influence over Karabakh, especially if Azerbaijan sees the West embracing Armenian interests at the expense of Azerbaijan and Turkey—its closest Western friends. Azeris speculate about another rationale for the latest tack toward Russia. Domestic politics in Azerbaijan has been fueled by running speculation about presidential succession after Aliyev, who has been ill. Russian intervention to support some faction could undermine stability, so Azerbaijan needs an early understanding with Russia and its interests. The Azeri press presented the Putin visit as a Russian victory and a US loss.

Operational concerns and pipeline security. Military security of the Caspian Sea region is difficult. The various regional militaries are small, underresourced and better designed for theater war than for combating guerrillas, narcotraffickers and gangs who threaten the area. It is difficult for outside forces to access the area. The west-east route from the Black Sea through Georgia to Baku is easily cut and supports a limited line of communications. Primary access routes into the Baku area for division and larger forces are north and south—through Iran or Russia. These access routes each have two poorly maintained two-lane roads and a set of double railroad tracks. A well-placed battalion could close the access routes indefinitely at some points and could only be dislodged by an amphibious end run.

The region is politically unstable, and most proposed pipeline routes run through areas of current or recent conflict. Who will secure the pipelines and at what price? AIOC representatives have met with Chechen leaders who stated that no oil would flow through any pipeline in Chechnya, Georgia or the Transcaucasus unless they received a share of the consortium. Similar difficulties exist along other proposed pipeline routes. Currently, Russia is losing major quantities of oil and gas in the pipeline that runs through Ukraine into Europe. Despite Russia's best efforts, it cannot negotiate safe passage of energy in a fairly settled region.²²

During the Soviet-Afghan war, the Soviets built tactical pipelines along the eastern (Termez to

A mosque nears completion at the "Five Fingers," a sacred geological site, as vendors wait for customers for their US and regional soft drinks. Neighboring Iran has funded largely Azerbaijan's huge upsurge in mosque construction.



The contrast between Baku and the countryside will continually bring people into the capital where the newcomers will join the displaced refugees from Karabakh. The Azeri government lacks the means and will to provide social services for this marginalized population. . . . Azerbaijan is nominally a Shia Islam country, but the call to prayer is not heard in Baku. The proscriptions against alcohol are not observed, and women are not in purdah—secluding them from public observation. However, mosques are reopening, and many new ones are being built as gifts from Iran.

Bagram) and western corridors (Kushka to Shind-and). Although the Mujahideen preferred more heroic attacks on Soviet convoys and forces to mundane attacks on pipelines, the Mujahideen conducted enough attacks on the Soviet pipelines to tie down a significant number of forces. Sometimes the Soviets lost more than 500 metric tons of petroleum, oils and lubricants (POL) in a day. The average pipeline break cost 20 to 25 tons. The Soviets patrolled pipelines, established security outposts along them in high-risk areas and cut deals with local chieftains to exchange POL for pipeline security. Despite all this, the modern mechanized Soviet force never could guarantee pipeline security.²³

In the next 10 to 15 years, oil and gas exports from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia could possibly match those from the Persian Gulf, although this projection may be based on optimistic estimates. The United States considers the Persian Gulf an area of vital interest. Will the Caspian Sea region also become an area of vital interest? Increased Western commercial activity, US strategic interests and US law point in that direction. If so, the United States should examine its relationship with Russia,

Iran, Turkey and the other regional states. Developing a new market source of inexpensive energy would provide an alternative during tense or crisis situations. Should a rogue power close the Strait of Hormuz or organize a global cut in production, this new region would provide alternatives to armed confrontation or diplomatic capitulation. However, this new region is not easily accessible to the West and will create new security concerns that eventually will affect military planners.

Turkey declined an Azeri government invitation to build a base in Azerbaijan. A Turkish presence in this area could work to US advantage, but Russia is openly opposed to such basing. To date, US attempts at presence have been spectacular but hardly sustainable. In September 1997, 500 soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division flew 12,500 kilometers in 19 hours to conduct an airborne drop in Kazakhstan. Retiring commander in chief, US Atlantic Command, Marine Corps General John J. Sheehan led the drop. Although the paratroopers participated in a regional peacekeeping exercise with troops from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Latvia, Turkey and Russia, many in the

region saw the US move as an advertisement for US power-projection capability. Sheehan stated that "The message, I guess, is that there is no nation on the face of the earth that we cannot get to."²⁴ The fundamental question is whether the United States can maintain a meaningful presence there during a crisis or conflict.

An airhead in an underdeveloped theater thousands of kilometers away from theater logistics stocks is not power projection, nor are 500 paratroopers an operational force. Should the United States decide it needs to get more involved in this region, it should begin with advisory and assistance efforts to promote regional stability. There are have and have-not nations and groups in the region. An agreement with one party will often make an implacable enemy of another. Hopefully, commercial well-being will transfer to national and regional well-being—though this has seldom been the case with oil wealth—and the region will ensure the safe transit of oil and gas without any outside interference.

Should the United States decide to establish a strong presence in the area, it would have to create

US attempts at presence have been spectacular but hardly sustainable. In September 1997, 500 soldiers of the 82d Airborne Division flew 12,500 kilometers in 19 hours to conduct an airborne drop in Kazakhstan. . . . Although the paratroopers participated in a regional peacekeeping exercise with troops from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, Latvia, Turkey and Russia . . . the fundamental question is whether the United States can maintain a meaningful presence there during a crisis or conflict.

the supporting logistics and staging infrastructure in advance. This would be an expensive step, requiring expenditure of domestic and international political capital; approval of local nations; a clear vision of US future strategic interests; and construction and maintenance of a new, large overseas base.²⁵ Perhaps a wiser approach is to promote closer relations and provide additional aid to our long-term regional partner, Turkey. 🇹🇷

NOTES

1. S. Rob Sobhani, "Tapping into a Pipe Dream," *Washington Times*, 1 February 2001, 17. Much of this article is based on Lester W. Grau, "Petroleo y Gas Natural del Mar Caspio, y Asia Central," Spanish-language edition of *Military Review* (March-April 1998), 73-81.
2. Ahmed Rashid, "Power Play," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (10 April 1997), 22.
3. Tyler Marshall, "Caspian Sea: Oil in a Tinderbox," *The Kansas City Star* (8 March 1998), K-6; the oil reserves of Venezuela are some 63.3 billion barrels. See "Venezuela," *Jane's Sentinel* (Jane's Information Group, 1995), 26.
4. Ruth Daniloff, "Waiting for the Oil Boom," *Smithsonian* (January 1998), 26; Extrapolated from Marshall.
5. Stephen Kinzer, "Pipe Dreams: A Perilous New Contest for the Next Oil Prize," *The New York Times* (24 September 1997), IV-1.
6. Discussions with Garrett Fonda and Tom Banks of Foreign Systems Research Center of Greenwood Village, Colorado. The size of the Caspian oil reserves are a matter of continued conjecture. Some sources put it at 10 percent of the world's oil reserves or five times US oil reserves. See Sobhani.
7. Fonda and Banks. Sobhani estimates that the 5-million-daily production will be achieved earlier in 2005.
8. Timothy L. Thomas, "Russian National Interests and the Caspian Sea," *Perceptions* (December 1999-February 2000), 75-96.
9. Leslie Dienes, "The Russian Oil and Gas Sector: Implications of the New Property System," *The National Bureau of Asian Research* (March 1996), 22.
10. "Pipeline Poker," *The Economist*, (7 February 1998), 8; a special Central Asia survey insert. Map is derived from the map used in this article.
11. Carol J. Williams, "Caspian Sea Change: Moscow, Through Oil Giant Lukoil, is Taking a More Pragmatic Approach in the Quest for its Former Colonies' Natural Bounty," *Los Angeles Times* (8 December 1996), extracted from the Internet. The figures have been rounded off.
12. "Pipeline Poker."
13. *Ibid.* Moving oil by supertanker is cheaper than moving oil by pipeline, but supertankers cannot operate in the Dardanelles.
14. *Ibid.*
15. Bhushan Bahree, "Demands for Oil Influence Policy in Gulf," *The Wall Street Journal* (23 February 1998), A17.
16. "Pipeline Poker," 11.
17. Comments to the author during an extended sojourn in Pakistan during fall 1996.

18. "Pipeline Poker."
19. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been fighting over the Nagorno-Karabakh region since 1988. The Soviet Union backed Armenia and invaded Azerbaijan in January 1990—occupying Sumgait and Baku. Armenia now holds 20 to 25 percent of Azeri's territory. Azerbaijan blockaded land-locked Armenia in response. The US Congress imposed Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act on Azerbaijan. This prohibits virtually all US government aid to Azerbaijan. Section 907 stipulates that the United States cannot give assistance until hostilities cease and Azerbaijan halts its blockade of Armenia and the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region. The legislative restrictions assume that Azerbaijan is the aggressor and Azerbaijan is violating norms of international conduct by maintaining a blockade against its neighbor. The blockade has caused hardship to Armenia. US economic and humanitarian aid has supported Armenia. Section 907 hinders the United States' ability to influence Azerbaijan's development, inhibits efforts to diversify the US energy supply and damages US economic interests.
20. In the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration determined that access to international oil was a US strategic concern and that antitrust laws did not apply to international oil corporations. See Burton Ira Kaufman, *The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era*, and *Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961*.
21. The author visited Baku 20 years ago and again in January 2001 with his associate, Dr. Jacob Kipp. Much of this section is based on their impressions from these visits.
22. Discussions the author had with acquaintances in Moscow in December 1997.
23. Boris V. Gromov, *Organichennyy kontingent [Limited Contingent]* (Moscow: Progress, 1994), 289-90.
24. Hugh Pope, "US Plays High-Stakes War Games in Kazakhstan," *The Wall Street Journal* (16 September 1997), A16.
25. For further background, see the following Conflict Studies Research Centre studies: Charles Blandy, "The Caspian: A Sea of Troubles," 1997; "Oil is not the Only Stake," 1997; "The Impact of Baku Oil on Nagorny Karabakh," 1997; and "The Caspian: A Catastrophe in the Making," 1997. Michael Off, "The Regional Military Balance: Conventional and Unconventional Military Forces Around the Caspian," 1995. An excellent history of the region is Dilip Hiro, *Between Marx and Muhammad: The Changing Face of Central Asia* (Glasgow: Harper Collins, 1994). An excellent history of oil is Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the US Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute and the US Air Force War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe and Vietnam, including deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, and chief, Soviet Tactics Instruction Branch, CGSC; political and economic adviser, Headquarters, Allied Forces, Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; and diplomatic courier, Moscow. His article "The Tyranny of Time and Distance: Bridging the Pacific" appeared in the July-August 2000 issue of Military Review.

Russia's Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Jacob W. Kipp

A DECADE AGO it seemed that nonstrategic nuclear weapons were losing their place in superpower arsenals. In fall 1991, the Bush administration announced a series of unilateral moves to reduce, redeploy and abolish certain nonstrategic nuclear weapon systems. A week later Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev pledged that the Soviet Union, in the chaos preceding collapse, would dismantle all atomic land mines by 1998, all nuclear artillery shells by 2000, half of all surface-to-air missile warheads by 1996, half of all tactical naval warheads by 1995 (with the other half stored ashore) and half of the bombs of the nonstrategic air forces by 1996.¹ In January 1992 President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation announced that Gorbachev's initiatives would apply to Russia. Because nonstrategic nuclear weapons were widely deployed among the successor states, bringing them under Russian control proved a challenge.² In 1997 one scholar commented that eliminating nonstrategic nuclear weapons seemed like the logical next step but warned that, in the face of NATO expansion, senior Russian military and political leaders were contemplating reversing the 1991 initiative.³

While US-funded programs brought many nuclear weapons into secure storage facilities, two questions arose regarding Russia's unilateral initiatives. The first concern was weapons security and unauthorized transfers to third parties.⁴ The second concern was Russian military plans for the other half of its surface-to-air missile warheads, tactical naval warheads and bombs.⁵ The emerging answer relates to Russian threat perceptions, national security policy and military doctrine. It also invokes a larger geostrategic issue: was the post-Cold War era of proclaimed strategic partnership ending and a new, interwar era in Russia's relations with the West beginning, in which prevent-

Russian discussions have connected redeployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to NATO enlargement. However, in 1999 military discussion of these weapons concerned their potential role in theater warfighting as a counterweight to Russia's declining conventional capabilities.

ing war gave way to preparing for war?

The NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia sharply deteriorated US-Russian relations. The Russian debate over nonstrategic nuclear weapons shifted from the adequacy of the existing unilateral regimes and prospects for some arms-control and confidence-building measures to the utility of such weapons for theater warfare and conflict management. By early January 2001 the Russian military reportedly had moved tactical nuclear weapons into the Kaliningrad area.⁶ These reports brought a rapid denial from the Russian military.⁷ Nikolai Sokov considered such a deployment unlikely unless triggered by a second round of NATO enlargement. Sokov further proposed new negotiations to transform the unilateral regimes into an arms-control agreement.⁸ Sokov correctly states that Russian discussions have connected redeployment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons to NATO enlargement. However, in 1999 military discussion of these weapons concerned their potential role in theater warfighting as a counterweight to Russia's declining conventional capabilities. Much of that discussion assumes that the United States and NATO represent the probable or eventual enemy. This article addresses the doctrinal debate that has emerged over nonstrategic nuclear weapons' role in theater war and their utility in de-escalating such conflicts.⁹

Strategic deterrence did not translate into political leverage in crisis situations and seemed quite hollow in the face of NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov's efforts at counterleverage against the bombing proved initially self-isolating. Yeltsin found little leverage against the West, and it was easy to blame those who had sold the political utility of extended strategic deterrence.

Strategic Nuclear Forces, Kosovo and Theater Deterrence

In May 1997 Yeltsin fired retired General Igor Rodionov as Minister of Defense. Rodionov had spent a year fighting with civilian leaders over the proper course of military reform. Pressured to confine reform to the armed forces and focus on personnel reductions, Rodionov warned that NATO expansion could cause Russia to increase a nonstrategic nuclear threat on its western frontiers. "We might objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons at our border."¹⁰

Yeltsin replaced Rodionov with General Igor Sergeev, commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF). Unlike Rodionov, who had focused on reforming Russia's conventional forces, Sergeev gave top priority to reorganizing Russia's strategic forces and their command and control. Over the next year and a half, Sergeev obtained Yeltsin's support for a series of moves relating to strategic deterrence, culminating in the concept, "Main Policy Guidelines of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence."¹¹ Yeltsin supported Sergeev's plan to merge the space defense troops, ballistic missile defense troops and missile early warning system with the SRF. In November 1998 Yeltsin established the Strategic Deterrence Force, which included the SRF; naval strategic nuclear forces; long-range aviation; and the 12th Directorate of the Ministry of Defense, which is charged with the design, production and control of all nuclear weapons. Sergeev declared these actions necessary to deter large-scale aggression.¹² In July 1998 the Security Council approved the structure of Russia's nuclear deterrence forces until 2010. In December 1998 Russia adopted major new provisions to its nuclear deterrence policy.

In January 1999 General V.M. Baryn'kin addressed threats confronting Russia and appropriate responses to them. Baryn'kin identified four:

- Threats from long-existing East-West contradictions.
- Threats from traditional military-political contradictions between Russia and the United States, Germany, France, Turkey, Japan, China, Pakistan and Iran.
- New threats from interethnic and religious contradictions, especially Islamic fundamentalism.
- Threats from proliferating weapons of mass destruction, including their deployment on Russia's periphery.¹³

Baryn'kin endorsed strategic arms control and reducing strategic arsenals but also emphasized that "Russia's strategic nuclear triad will serve as a reliable deterrent factor."¹⁴

Sergeev's political victory did not survive long. His emphasis on strategic nuclear deterrence offered political clout since Russia retained its role as a leading nuclear power, but strategic deterrence did not translate into political leverage in crisis situations and seemed quite hollow in the face of NATO's air campaign against Yugoslavia. Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov's efforts at counterleverage against the bombing proved initially self-isolating. Yeltsin found little leverage against the West, and it was easy to blame those who had sold the political utility of extended strategic deterrence.¹⁵ In April 2001, Sergeev was replaced by Sergey Ivanov.

The gap between strategic nuclear deterrence and flexible response to conventional aggression now assumed top priority. During NATO's air campaign the Security Council met to discuss nuclear issues, primarily the condition of nuclear production facilities. However, during the first meeting chaired by new council secretary Vladimir Putin, the discussion shifted to nonstrategic nuclear weapons' role in dealing with intervention threats from modern conventional, precision-strike forces.¹⁶

A month before the meeting, *Military Thought* published an article devoted to nuclear strategy's theoretical foundations. A.V. Nedelin outlined the role of nuclear strategy in re-establishing Russia's place as "a great world power" and called for theory that would consider "constant change in the specter, nature and geography of threats."¹⁷ Nedelin's theory of nuclear strategy included general foundations of nuclear strategy, theory of nuclear deterrence, theory of combat use of nuclear weapons and theory of nuclear armaments. Nedelin's approach to nuclear strategy transcended military and technical issues, introducing ethnogenetic and ethnopsychological subjective factors. He said that maritime powers favor sea-based deterrence while continental states favor land-based systems, and he stressed

A 555th Fighter Squadron weapons loader at Aviano Air Base, Italy, checks a laser-guided bomb prior to air strikes against Serbian targets.

US Air Force

Russia's concept of de-escalation would function only in the face of limited intervention in a local war. Kosovo seemed to confirm the General Staff's assessment of the operational limitations that would apply to US-NATO intervention in local wars on the Russian periphery. The air campaign, precision-strike weapons, information warfare and the US-NATO concern to reduce the risk of casualties would lead to a new form of combat: "contactless warfare."

the importance of national willingness to accept losses in pursuing significant goals. He further stressed expansionist sentiments, aggressiveness, steadfastness in assuming burdens and losses in war, and the means to recover after a national catastrophe.¹⁸ By introducing these subjective factors into the risk assessments, Nedelin consciously moved from military-technical criteria for operational success into political calculation.

The NATO air campaign over Yugoslavia served Sergeev's critics in two ways. First, it underscored the limits of strategic nuclear deterrence when interests beyond Russia's frontiers are not worth major war. Second, the air campaign's precision strikes raised the prospect of a similar NATO intervention strategy against Russia's periphery. Russian public opinion saw NATO's actions against Yugoslavia as morally wrong and an indirect threat to Russia. Given the increasing likelihood of renewed hostilities in the Caucasus and NATO's growing interest in the Caspian as a result of the emerging "great game" for access to oil and gas, a new military priority raised its head: the ability to engage in theater deterrence.

Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons and De-escalation of Local War

"De-escalation of military actions" is the Russian term for employing nuclear forces in a local or regional war. It involves using strategic nuclear forces and operational-tactical nuclear weapons within a theater of military operations (TVD).¹⁹ The concept requires a clear chain of command from the Supreme High Command to theater operations command. Operational-tactical nuclear weapons include "front aviation, naval aviation, air defense aviation, missile and artillery complexes of the ground forces, the missiles, torpedoes of conventional navy, air defense complexes, as well as nuclear mines of the engineering troops, and naval helicopters carrying out antisubmarine warfare missions."²⁰ These forces are the nonstrategic systems covered by the unilateral regime that Gorbachev spelled out and Yeltsin confirmed in the early 1990s. De-escalation assumes the actual use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve. This task can be performed by employing nonstrategic nuclear weapons, which can exclude an "avalanche-like escalation of the use of nuclear

weapons up to the very exchange of massive nuclear strikes with strategic nuclear systems. In this case, it seems to us, that it will be more advantageous to the enemy to stop military actions.”²¹

Here de-escalation includes a nuclear escalation ladder from single nuclear strike, group nuclear

There are risks associated with too great an inferiority in conventional weapons. Given asymmetry in conventional forces, the threshold for using nuclear weapons is determined by the potential of one side's conventional forces relative to the opposing side's potential. Hence, a high degree of conventional forces' asymmetry lowers the declared threshold for using nuclear weapons and raises the danger that nuclear weapons will be used, even in low-level conflicts.

strike, concentrated nuclear strike, to mass nuclear strike. Each type of strike is associated with a specific escalation concept: demonstration, deterrence-demonstration, deterrence, deterrence-retaliation and retaliation.²² Each step reflects distinct assumptions about the military situation. Thus, a demonstration would involve attacks on isolated areas and secondary military targets and would seek to inflict minimal casualties. Each succeeding step uses larger forces against more valuable military targets to influence the course and outcome of combat within the TVD and beyond. Deterrence-retaliation would involve coordinated strikes against enemy forces in a TVD. In an unfavorable defensive operation, it could deter the threat to destroy defenders, decisively change the correlation of forces on the operational direction (directions) and liquidate any enemy breakthrough. Retaliation-deterrence would involve mass strikes to destroy enemy forces throughout the TVD and create a fundamental change in the correlation of forces. Retaliation, the final stage before general strategic exchange, involves mass strikes throughout the entire theater of war to destroy the enemy's military-economic infrastructure.²³

The Supreme High Command would plan and authorize such strikes; the TVD commander would execute them. The TVD commander could have at his disposal “two to six air regiments of frontal aviation and three to five missile brigades.”²⁴ Such forces are a necessary component of conflict prevention and termination. Only the rational calculation regarding the composition of nuclear strike forces of

operational-tactical formations (armed forces in the TVD) of aircraft and missile complexes (missile and artillery forces of the ground forces) will permit effective nuclear destruction in an operation under any circumstances such as guaranteeing deterrence and de-escalation of military actions in a major regional war.²⁵ Deterrence here embraced a direct link between the escalated employment of nonstrategic nuclear forces and the will to use strategic nuclear forces up to the point of “mutual destruction.”²⁶

ZAPAD-99 and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

De-escalation was practiced during ZAPAD-99, a theater exercise held during June 1999. ZAPAD-99, the largest Russian military exercise, involved the headquarters and command structures of five military districts (Leningrad, Moscow, Caucasus, Trans-Volga and Volga) and three fleets (the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea)—about 50,000 command and staff personnel. Set in the Baltic, the scenario envisioned NATO-launched “aggression against Russia and its allies,” including 450 aircraft of the enemy's tactical and strategic aviation and 120 guided missiles striking Belarus. With Kaliningrad's conventional defenses weakened under the impact of these precision strikes, Russia responded with limited nuclear strikes by cruise missiles launched from Tu-95 and Tu-160 bombers “against the countries from whose territories the offensive was launched.”²⁷ The timing of the exercise—the eve of the 48th anniversary of the *Wehrmacht's* launching of Operation *Barbarossa*—was intentional. Only days before 200 Russian airborne troops assigned to Bosnia as part of the stabilization force had driven to Pristina to pre-empt deployment of NATO's Kosovo peacekeeping force into Kosovo's northern region.

Immediately after the exercise, Yeltsin visited senior government and military leaders and congratulated them on a successful exercise but declared that the threat of large-scale military aggression against Russia “is something for sci-fi books.”²⁸ This could be interpreted as a rejection of the exercise's basic premise. Another interpretation is that Russia's concept of de-escalation would function only in the face of limited intervention in a local war. Kosovo seemed to confirm the General Staff's assessment of the operational limitations that would apply to US-NATO intervention in local wars on the Russian periphery. The air campaign, precision-strike weapons, information warfare and the US-NATO concern to reduce the risk of casualties would lead

to a new form of combat: "contactless warfare."²⁹

Immediately after the NATO military intervention in Kosovo, General Mahmut Gareev, as president of the Academy of Military Sciences (a non-government organization closely linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense and General Staff), hosted a conference on the role of military science in determining national defense requirements. In his remarks to the conference, Sergeev explicitly linked studying past military experience to formulating new concepts of military art. He stressed the need to "analyze the forms and means of use of armed forces of the United States and NATO against independent Yugoslavia."³⁰ Sergeev had observed specific shortcomings in operational and combat training during ZAPAD-99. The exercise employed Russian nuclear forces in a pre-emptive strike against an aggressor using advanced conventional forces, underscoring one of Gareev's major points. Nuclear forces would retain their deterrence capabilities and preclude their massed employment, but they could not exclude using advanced conventional weapons in a local armed conflict.³¹ What emerged was a focus on the impact of precision-strike systems on local wars and the employment of nonstrategic nuclear weapons in deterring such attacks.

Since *Desert Storm*, US analysts have been developing new roles and concepts for high-tech non-nuclear weapons that can destroy strategic targets on the first strike. Thus, the United States can assert the deterrent capabilities of these nonnuclear weapons and has affirmed the plausibility of causing unacceptable damage.³² The overwhelming US lead in this area suggests that the only effective Russian response is asymmetric deterrence based on conventional and nuclear forces. But there are risks associated with too great an inferiority in conventional weapons. Given asymmetry in conventional forces, the threshold for using nuclear weapons is determined by the potential of one side's conventional forces relative to the opposing side's potential. Hence, a high degree of conventional forces' asymmetry lowers the declared threshold for using nuclear weapons and raises the danger that nuclear weapons will be used, even in low-level conflicts.³³

Further development of US deep-strike precision systems risks the security and stability of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. One Russian response would be investing in precision, long-range, non-nuclear weapons to prevent nuclear weapons use, increase effectiveness of deterrence and perform important missions in local conflicts.³⁴ Budgetary constraints might force Russia to rely temporarily



Then Minister of Defense General Igor Sergeev with President Vladimir Putin.

While senior Russian political and military leaders might denounce withdrawing from the ABM Treaty as a blow to global political stability and a cause for a new arms race, they support developing nonstrategic theater missile defense systems or defend extended nuclear deterrence as the appropriate response to US efforts to achieve nuclear hegemony as it denuclearized Russia.

on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, but this is not a long-term solution, given the pace and scope of developing deep-strike, precision systems in the United States.

Budgetary priorities (funding to research and develop conventional deep-strike systems versus maintaining nonstrategic nuclear weapons) involve assessing imminent US-NATO intervention in local wars on Russia's periphery. The threat was high in late summer and early fall 1999 as the situation in the Caucasus deteriorated with open combat in Dagestan and Chechnya. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons were seen as a vital element in deterring such intervention and "preventing aggression or the transition of a local war into a large-scale [war]."³⁵ Others disagreed with relying on nonstrategic nuclear weapons, placed first priority on assuring the deterrence potential of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and were uneasy with the discussion of first-use options.³⁶ Author Sergey Brezkun proposed breaking out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (US and Soviet treaty eliminating their intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles) and deploying a new SS-20 *Pioner* missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. This was

his response to NATO's continued preparations for using tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. At the same time he warned that tactical nuclear weapons should not be considered a "means of conducting actual combat operations."³⁷

The Putin Era and Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

In fall 1999 the Russian government embarked on renewed hostilities in Chechnya. Secretary of the Security Council Vladimir Putin replaced Sergei Stepashin as prime minister. Putin endorsed a major campaign in Chechnya to break resistance and reincorporate it into the Russian Federation. In a matter of months Putin parleyed the war in Chechnya into national popularity and electoral success. His Unity Party won the December parliamentary elections, and he replaced Yeltsin as president after Yeltsin resigned. In spring 2000 Putin was elected president in his own right. Finally, Russia seemed to enjoy an effective national leader who could coordinate coherent state policy. Defense and military policy, although dominated by events in

Sixth-generation warfare involves advanced conventional weapons, incorporating automated control systems, radio-electronic combat, precision-strike capabilities and weapons based on new physical principles. Slipchenko argues that the Gulf War was both the end of an era and the harbinger of sixth-generation warfare.

Chechnya, enjoyed a high priority. Nuclear deterrence remained a major theme of policy discussions.

In October the Ministry of Defense published a draft military doctrine for discussion and consideration. The draft stressed the threat posed by hegemonic forces in the international system and posited fostering a multipolar world. The draft doctrine contained an extended discussion of nuclear weapons' deterrence and use. Should deterrence fail, Russia will use nuclear weapons to inflict sufficient damage upon its aggressor or coalition of aggressors. Russia pledges not to use nuclear weapons against states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that do not possess nuclear weapons. This pledge, however, is qualified in the case of a direct invasion of Russia, an attack on the Russian armed forces or other troops, an attack on an allied state that does not possess nuclear weapons or an attack on a nuclear state allied with Rus-

sia. The draft specifies that Russia retains the right to use nuclear weapons to counter use of weapons of mass destruction against Russia and to counter conventional forces' large-scale aggression in "situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies."³⁸

The debate over the draft military doctrine proved protracted, with nuclear deterrence and the role of nonstrategic nuclear forces as core topics. Critics of the draft included many senior officers who questioned the draft's response to events in Kosovo and Iraq. Retired General-Colonel Viktor Kopylov questioned the draft's threat assessment as insufficient for not considering the increased risk of nuclear war. Kopylov blamed such a risk on NATO and stated that the alliance had shifted from a policy of a "concealed (creeping) nature" to one of a direct approach to war, an "open phase" of "violent excess, when the end justifies any means."³⁹ Retired General-Major Stepan Tyushkevich, a leading military theorist, stated that the proposed doctrine did not consider the most recent military experience, including Operation *Desert Fox* and the air campaign over Yugoslavia in which one side used advanced weaponry to engage in "no-contact warfare." According to Tyushkevich, declining quality in Russian military theory and military science resulted directly from failing to account for recent experience.⁴⁰

Some analysts proposed that military doctrine consider the reality of contactless warfare and discussed the utility of de-escalation, employing nonstrategic nuclear weapons.⁴¹ Taking issue with the views of Stanislav Voronin and Brezkun, Vladimir Sivolob and Mikhail Sosnovskiy asserted "that a definition of conditions for use of nuclear weapons is by no means a secondary issue, but a very important problem."⁴² The authors developed algorithms for nuclear use to reinterpret the quantitative and qualitative ratios of strategic and nonstrategic conventional and nuclear arms and to improve performance in nuclear destruction missions. They identified three situations for employing nuclear weapons:

- Enemy use of weapons of mass destruction or evidence of immediate preparations to do so.
- Enemy effect against strategic (not just military) installations, even by conventional weapons.
- A threat to disrupt stability of a strategic defense.⁴³

While the authors noted the role of strategic nuclear forces in deterrence, including mass retaliatory strikes, they warned that: "it is far from always advisable to perform missions of deterring and



Tu-22M *Backfire* is a medium range bomber, capable of carrying gravity bombs and cruise missiles. Unilateral Soviet declaration of 31 July 1991, limited total holdings to 300 planes, of which 200 could be assigned to naval aviation. In this photo the *Backfire* is armed with the AS-4 Kitchen long-range, air-launched, cruise missile, capable of carrying either a 1,000-kilogram conventional or 350-kiloton nuclear warhead.

Strategic nuclear forces remain the main means of deterrence, but the presence of nonstrategic nuclear weapons offers a chance (although fragile) to prevent the avalanche-like transformation of a regional conflict into an unlimited global use of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, nonstrategic nuclear weapons can be employed to destroy military targets in the region. However, if the enemy does not halt aggression, then the target set shifts to “counter-value targets to be attacked by long-range aviation of strategic nuclear forces.”

repelling aggression using only strategic nuclear weapons. Under certain conditions the most effective regional deterrence can be ensured by means which on the one hand would be powerful enough to inflict significant damage on the aggressor and thereby to carry out the real threat, and on the other hand not so powerful that the effect of self-deterrence and of their nonuse arises.⁷⁴

The Russian debate over the response to US proposals on the National Missile Defense Program quickly became entangled in the issue of nonstrategic nuclear weapons. While in early 2000 there appeared to be little room for maneuver between the Clinton and Putin administrations, two contrasting articles appeared in *Voeynnaya mysl'* on responses to the US proposals: V.N. Tsygichko and A.A. Piontkovsky propose seeking a cooperative solution, and Colonel S.V. Kreydin rejects any cooperation. The journal's editors invited readers to discuss the issue. Tygichko and Piontkovsky made a strong case supporting negotiated revision of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in Russia's interests such as guaranteeing openness, assuring cooperation, limiting any prospect for breakout and preventing robust strategic ballistic missile defense (BMD). They noted that Russian and US cooperation in creating a theater ballistic system for Europe could be the

basis for modifying the ABM Treaty.⁴⁵ Kreydin, however, depicted the Clinton administration's limited BMD as the camel nose under the tent—the first step to a strategic breakout and undermined nuclear stability.

Yet Kreydin notes that such a policy faces serious military-technical hurdles since modernized offensive nuclear forces can greatly complicate the defender's tasks. Kreydin concludes that Russia should not construct a modernized, limited BMD system but should put its limited resources into supporting its nuclear potential, which can deter nuclear as well as major conventional threats.⁴⁶ While senior Russian political and military leaders might denounce withdrawing from the ABM Treaty as a blow to global political stability and a cause for a new arms race, they support developing nonstrategic theater missile defense systems or defend extended nuclear deterrence as the appropriate response to US efforts to achieve nuclear hegemony as it denuclearized Russia.⁴⁷

Kreydin proposes a fundamental shift in the combat role of nuclear weapons and rejects the basic assumption that the stability of nuclear deterrence depends on the arsenal's survivability. Instead, he introduces the concept of troops' combat stability—their ability to perform the mission under enemy

attacks. Citing the emerging realities of deep-precision strikes with conventional forces, Kreydin rejects the notion that Russia can engage in a protracted war of attrition. The only effective counter is nuclear: "Modern day long-range, including non-

Because of uneven economic, scientific and technological development, some states will make the leap to sixth-generation warfare immediately; less-developed states will take longer; and, for some, sixth-generation warfare will be possible only in the distant future, if at all. For the most advanced states, including the United States, there will be a window when sixth-generation warfare will allow war to once again become an instrument of policy.

nuclear, strike resources of the eventual enemy allow him to effectively accomplish a sufficiently wide range of offensive missions, including those like complete isolation of the theater of war, combating the second strategic echelon, disorganizing and disrupting military production. Under these conditions, our natural argument in the battle for strategic initiative is still nuclear weaponry.⁷⁴⁸

Kreydin's concept for the combat stability of nuclear forces in theater operations did not go unchallenged. His critics accused him of misrepresenting the situation under which nonstrategic nuclear forces might be employed. They said that by emphasizing combat stability, he underestimated the problem of controlling the nature and scale of nuclear exchanges. They remind us that "controlled, limited nuclear war is not one-sided"; enemy response does matter, and with that goes the risk that escalation will lead to radical and unanticipated changes in the conflict's scale.⁴⁹ The authors noted that NATO's superiority in conventional and nonstrategic nuclear systems was beyond doubt. NATO would enjoy a 2-1 advantage in nuclear-capable aircraft. Applying existing combat-modeling techniques the authors asserted, "With conventional superiority in the initial phase of war one can expect increasing superiority including nonstrategic nuclear systems as the conflict goes on."⁵⁰

Under such circumstances Russian nonstrategic nuclear systems might be placed in a use or lose situation. Russia will not be able to guide or control such a conflict to a successful military or political conclusion. The only salvation for Kreydin's approach is to assume that nonstrategic nuclear

strikes could impose a level of losses the enemy could not accept. This subjective factor cannot be effectively modeled because "the search for a norm of unacceptable losses will not be profitable."⁵¹ Invoking chaos theory and the theory of complex systems, the authors return to the centrality of strategic deterrence and affirm that "nonstrategic nuclear weapons are only a 'supporting deterrence factor.'"⁵² Investing in their development will only undercut strategic nuclear and conventional forces.


Strategic nuclear forces remain the main means of deterrence, but the presence of nonstrategic nuclear weapons offers a chance (although fragile) to prevent the avalanche-like transformation of a regional conflict into an unlimited global use of nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, nonstrategic nuclear weapons can be employed to destroy military targets in the region. However, if the enemy does not halt aggression, then the target set shifts to "counter-value targets to be attacked by long-range aviation of strategic nuclear forces."⁵³ The target set becomes nuclear power stations with the threat of inflicting asymmetric damage upon NATO member countries. The addition of more targets only makes equating a sufficient nonstrategic nuclear force more complex under these dynamic circumstances.

Looming behind these discussions of nonstrategic nuclear weapons was the warning of an even more dramatic transformation of warfare with the development of precision-strike weapons; information warfare; and advanced command, control, communications and intelligence. Proponents of this transformation labeled it "sixth-generation warfare" and associated its appearance with the end of the hegemony of nuclear weapons and deterrence. Retired General-Major Vladimir Ivanovich Slipchenko, one of the most active military theorists in Russia, emerged as one of the chief advocates of sixth-generation warfare.⁵⁴ A specialist in radio-electronic warfare and air defense, Slipchenko graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff in 1988 and then served there as a professor, directing graduate research. Slipchenko viewed applying deep-strike precision weapons during the Gulf War as only a harbinger of a more fundamental revolution in military art.⁵⁵ Slipchenko expects sixth-generation warfare to reach maturity between 2007 and 2030.

Slipchenko underscores the radical changes advanced technology has brought to societies, and the ways and means that such societies engage in wars and armed conflicts. However, the impact of new technologies on military art is delayed and uneven.




DOD



DOD

(Clockwise from above) The **SS-21 Scarab** short-range nuclear missile has nearly replaced the remaining Frog-7s in Russian formations. The nose cone of an **SS-24 Scalpel** containing multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). An **SS-23 Spider** short-to-medium range, nuclear-capable ballistic missile. Two views of the **SS-20 Saber**, an intermediate-range ballistic missile with three MIRVs. Some 654 SS-20s were destroyed as part of the INF Treaty. The **Iskander-A** short-range nuclear missile is being prepared for service with Russian formations and has not yet received a NATO designation.



Red Star



DOD



Volkensk Plant State Production Association



[Zhikharskiy maintains that] in a future regional war, there is no reason to exclude the use of nuclear weapons or suppose ground forces will disappear. What will change are their respective roles. In no case will such a conflict be a bloodless technological contest decided by advanced weapons. The human factor inherent to the practice of the military art will be more and not less important in such conflicts.

Some states could embrace the new innovations and adopt new forms and methods of armed struggle, while others find themselves responding to changes shaped by the more advanced states. The tendency toward conservatively interpreting such changes has led armies to prepare for past wars rather than to define the nature of and prepare for future armed

The renewed emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons in theater warfare [is] the result of factors shaping Russian military doctrine over the past four years. Primary importance must go to the perceived decline in conventional military capabilities, which is a function of Russia's economic crisis and the increasing obsolescence of many weapon systems created for mechanized theater war. Equally important has been the perception of Russia's vulnerability to US-NATO intervention in local armed conflicts on its periphery.

conflict. Slipchenko's treatment of the first four generations of war is quite short—only enough to show the evolution from iron weapons and close combat through the gunpowder revolution through industrialization to mechanized warfare.⁵⁶

This sets the stage for what he calls the anomaly of fifth-generation warfare—nuclear weapons, the destructive power that broke the link between political ends and military means. If the first four generations of warfare were evolutionary, growing out of one into another and gradually transforming battlefield tactics, the fifth generation's leap in destructive power broke the Clausewitzian logic of war as a continuation of politics. Deterrence replaced warfighting as the core of fifth-generation warfare since actual use of such weapons was confined to the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sixth-generation warfare involves advanced conventional weapons, incorporating automated control systems, radio-electronic combat, precision-strike capabilities and weapons based on new physical principles. Slipchenko argues that the Gulf War was both the end of an era and the harbinger of sixth-generation warfare.⁵⁷

True sixth-generation warfare will involve systematic attacks on opposing sides' economic potential and infrastructure using precision and information strikes in contactless warfare. Ground forces will lose their traditional role of defeating enemy field forces and occupying enemy territory. The capabilities inherent in advanced conventional systems

have undermined the deterrent capacity of nuclear weapons since their very destructive power would be difficult to control and would risk uncontrolled escalation that would be lethal to the belligerents and the rest of humanity. This condition Slipchenko describes as "nuclear helplessness."⁵⁸

Under this different conceptual position on nuclear weapons, Slipchenko discusses the end of extended deterrence for Russia. Possessing nuclear parity in strategic arsenals did not prevent NATO's expansion or preclude its military interventions in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Strategic nuclear forces cannot sustain Russia during general economic decline and social crisis. Indeed, sustaining a nuclear arsenal diverts resources from developing advanced conventional weapons for sixth-generation warfare.

Nuclear weapons will not deter wars of the sixth generation but will render the civil economy and infrastructure vulnerable targets, the destruction of which would be horrendous. Sixth-generation warfare will recast military art, introduce new means and methods of conducting contactless warfare and bring a radical armed forces reorganization.

Slipchenko makes a capital observation regarding using such warfare to achieve political objectives. Because of uneven economic, scientific and technological development, some states will make the leap to sixth-generation warfare immediately; less-developed states will take longer; and, for some, sixth-generation warfare will be possible only in the distant future, if at all. For the most advanced states, including the United States, there will be a window when sixth-generation warfare will allow war to once again become an instrument of policy. Sixth-generation warfare's main goal will be to destroy economic potential and change political regimes. Given Russia's current inferiority in conventional forces and its slow conventional modernization, Slipchenko's concept leaves significant residual utility to non-strategic nuclear weapons as a temporary counter, while fourth-generation nuclear weapons can be integrated into sixth-generation warfare. Slipchenko notes that tendency and warns of the grave risks associated with deterrence by first use, which will bring with it more uncertainty than utility.⁵⁹

Critics have accused Slipchenko of being a "technological determinist" who makes a fetish out of a weapon system without examining the problem dialectically—in its totality and interconnections. Like Giulio Douhet for air power and J.F.C. Fuller for mechanization during the interwar years, Slipchenko

extrapolates on the Gulf War and Kosovo. However, he ignores the fact that one side enjoyed overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority. What would be the result of a major conflict if both sides possessed such weapons? Analyzing both conflicts, Slipchenko's critics emphasize the disconnect between the success of advanced weapons in combat and their impact on the political outcome of the conflicts. In neither conflict did NATO achieve its goal to destroy the state's economic potential and change the political regime.⁶⁰ In a future regional war, there is no reason to exclude the use of nuclear weapons or suppose ground forces will disappear. What will change are their respective roles. In no case will such a conflict be a bloodless technological contest decided by advanced weapons. The human factor inherent to the practice of military art will be more and not less important in such conflicts.⁶¹

Debate on using nonstrategic nuclear systems seems to have been part of a power struggle between Sergeev and Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin. The struggle became public in July 2000 with a series of official leaks regarding Kvashnin's proposals to "denuclearize" Russian strategy, subordinate the SRF as a component of the air force and dramatically shift toward improving conventional armaments.⁶² Debate on this issue within the collegium of the Ministry of Defense proved stormy, and the bureaucratic conflict moved to the Security Council to resolve.

Kvashnin's initiative in forcing the matter raised serious questions about the military chain of command such as the relationship between the minister and his nominal subordinate, the chief of the General Staff. One critic, noting Kvashnin's pretensions to serve as military commander in chief, questioned the need for Russia to retain its General Staff, which he compared unfavorably with the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The author argued for civilianizing the post of Minister of Defense to ensure civilians control any decision to use the military.⁶³ The outcome of the debate appears to have been a bureaucratic compromise.⁶⁴ Both Sergeev and Kvashnin retained their respective positions. Strategic nuclear forces were not going to be abandoned. Russia would pursue reductions and sustain its arsenal by extending the warranty on some systems. Conventional forces would receive additional funding for their modernization. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons will have an expanded role in theater warfare, emphasizing their use as a means of conflict de-escalation.

The renewed emphasis on nonstrategic nuclear weapons in theater warfare should be seen as the

result of factors shaping Russian military doctrine over the past four years. Primary importance must go to the perceived decline in conventional military capabilities, which is a function of Russia's economic crisis and the increasing obsolescence of many weapon systems created for mechanized theater war. Equally important has been the perception of Russia's vulnerability to US-NATO intervention in local armed conflicts on its periphery. Russian doctrine emphasizes using nonstrategic nuclear weapons to deter intervention and de-escalate conflict by air or with precision deep-strike systems.

The Kosovo syndrome has far deeper roots than the actual NATO campaign. NATO's use of military power against Yugoslavia served as a water-

Russian military and civilian leaders now seem dominated by self-perceptions of weakness and vulnerability, and have embraced nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a temporary solution, a fourth-generation augmentation of combat power to support sixth-generation warfare. But there are solid grounds for doubting these scenarios that stress the dominance of the offense, the bloodless nature of such conflicts and their short duration. Faulty forecasts about threats and warfare can lead to profound and costly miscalculations.

shed among Russian political and military elites in popularizing the perception of NATO as the eventual enemy. Some Russian analysts are concerned about what lies beyond the threshold of actually using nuclear weapons. Others, however, believe that the nuclear genie has become powerless to deter conflicts that will be increasingly dominated by the revolution in military affairs.

Jan de Bloch's insights a century ago on the supposed dominance of the offense proved an illusion in large-scale warfare. Russian military and civilian leaders now seem dominated by self-perceptions of weakness and vulnerability, and have embraced nonstrategic nuclear weapons as a temporary solution, a fourth-generation augmentation of combat power to support sixth-generation warfare. But there are solid grounds for doubting these scenarios that stress the dominance of the offense, the bloodless nature of such conflicts and their short duration. Faulty forecasts about threats and warfare can lead to profound and costly miscalculations.

Russia has good reason to abandon the existing unilateral regime for nonstrategic nuclear weapons

and will not likely embrace a formal bilateral or multilateral version of it without concessions from the United States and NATO on other arms-control issues. This is largely a direct consequence of the leadership's perception that the post-Cold War period has ended, and the world has entered another interwar period. As Aleksei Arbatov stated, "The

bombing of Yugoslavia revived the worst instincts of the Cold War" among the Russian civil and military leaders.⁶⁵ More exactly, Russia's isolation and NATO's willful disregard of its interests confirmed the assumptions of NATO hostility that only a few years before had been confined to the extreme nationalist and communist circles.⁶⁶ 🐼

NOTES

1. Robert S. Norris and William M. Arkin, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2000," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, July/August 2000, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/ja00nukenote.html>.
2. Thomas Wuchte, "Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: A Cause for Alarm?" *European Security*, Summer 1996, 240-55.
3. Nikolai Sokov, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons Elimination: Next Step for Arms Control," *The Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1997.
4. Stephen Lambert and David A. Miller, *Russia's Crumbling Tactical Nuclear Weapons Complex: An Opportunity for Arms Control* (Colorado Springs, CO: US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, 1997).
5. "Estimated Russian Stockpile, End of 1996," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, May/June 1997, <www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/mj97nukenote.html>.
6. Bill Gertz, "U.S. Yet To Query Moscow On Nukes," *The Washington Times*, 4 January 2001.
7. "Russia Denies Moving Nuclear Arms," *The Associated Press*, Moscow, 4 January 2001.
8. Nikolai Sokov, "The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 31 January 2001.
9. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons refers to any warhead and delivery system with a range of less than 5,500 kilometers or systems not covered by the existing strategic arms agreements between Russia and the United States. Nonstrategic nuclear weapons were initially envisioned as integral parts of theater-strategic operations, although there was intense debate about their utility in offensive operations because their employment could reduce attacking forces' rate of advance and lead to unanticipated consequences, including strategic escalation. Aleksei Arbatov has estimated the size of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the early 1980s at more than 10,000 strategic warheads and approximately 30,000 tactical warheads. Aleksei Arbatov, "The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo and Chechnya," in *The Marshall Center Papers*, No. 2 (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, GE: The George C. Marshall Center, 2000), 4. Estimates of the size of Russia's contemporary arsenal vary widely. Nikolai Sokov, who analyzes this issue, recently sized the arsenal at 8,000 warheads, admitting that, "In the absence of hard data, analysts are reduced to guesswork. In the absence of official figures on this arsenal, assessments of Russia's stockpile vary between 2,000 and 18,000 warheads. A more realistic estimate is in the middle: about 8,000 warheads early last year, when implementation of the 1991-92 unilateral statements was almost complete." Sokov, "The Tactical Nuclear Weapons Controversy."
10. Igor Rodionov, "Neobkhidno reformirovat' ne chasti sistemy voyennoy bezopasnosti gosudarstva, a vsyu ee v tselom," *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, November 1996.
11. Frank Umbach, "Russia as a 'Virtual Great Power': Implications for its Declining Role in European and Eurasian Security," *European Security*, No. 3, 1999.
12. Russian Public Television First Channel Network, 1500 GMT, 3 November 1998.
13. V.M. Baryn'kin, "Voyennye ugrozy Rossii i problemy razvitiya ee Vooruzhennykh Sil," *Voyennaya mysl'*, No. 1, January-February 1999, 2-3.
14. Ibid., 5.
15. Mikhail Tsygichko, "Military Reform and Strategic Nuclear Forces of the Russian Federation," *European Security*, Spring 2000, 36-38.
16. Aleksandr Gol'ts, "Nekhoroshaya doktrina pri plokhoy igre," *Itogi*, 18 May 1999, 28-29; Nikolai Sokov, "Overview: The April 1999 Russian Federation Security Council Meeting on Nuclear Weapons" (Newly Independent States [NIS] Nuclear Profiles Database, Nonproliferation Studies Center, Monterey Institute of International Studies, 29 June 1999).
17. A.V. Nedelin, "O teoreticheskikh osnovakh yadernoy strategii," *Voyennaya mysl'*, March-April 1999, 36-41.
18. Ibid., 39; Aleksandr Dugin, "Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii, in the series," *Bol'shoe prostranstvo*, (Moscow: Arkotgaja, 1997), 263-71 and 299.
19. V.I. Levshin, A.V. Nedelin and M.E. Sosnovskiy, "O primeneni yadernogo oruzhiya dlya deeskalatsii voyennykh deystviy," *Voyennaya mysl'*, May-June 1999, 34-37.
20. Ibid., 34-35.
21. Ibid., 35.
22. Ibid., 35-36.
23. Ibid., 36.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., 37.
27. Igor Korotchenko and Vladimir Mukhin, *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 June 1999, 2; Aleksander Babakin, *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, 26 June 1999, 2; Yuriy Golotyuk, "Zapad-99 Said to Have Rehearsed Nuclear Strike," *Izvestiya*, 29 June 99, 2; Dmitri Litovkin and Roman Fomicenko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, 13 July 1999, 2; Aleksander

28. Ilya Bulavinov, *Kommersant-daily*, 3 July 1999, 1-2.
29. For US military experience in recent operations and its doctrinal foundations, see A.N. Zakharov, "Operatsiya 'Lisa pustyni': Razvitiye strategii i operativnogo iskusstva," *Voyennaya mysl'*, September-October 1999, 67-70; A.V. Krasnov, "Aviatsiya v yugoslavskom konflikte," *Voyennaya mysl'*, September-October 1999, 71-74; G.A. Mikhaylov, "Amerikanskoe vzglyady na problemy vedeniya boevykh deystviy na TVD (Moscow: Institut Soedinennykh Shtatov Ameriki i Kanady, Rossiyskaya Akademiya Nauk, 2000).
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., 5.
32. Evgeniy Fedosov and Igor Spasskiy, "Precision Weapons Have Taken the Place of the God in War," *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, 23-29 July 1999, 6.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. V.A. Vakhrushev, "Lokal'nye voyny i vooruzhennyye konflikty: Kharakter i vliyaniye na voyennoye iskusstvo," *Voyennaya mysl'*, July-August 1999, 28.
36. Stanislav Voronin and Sergey Brezkun, "A Strategically Beneficial Asymmetry," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 17 September 1999.
37. Sergey Tarasovich Brezkun, "Pioners' Must Be Revived: Russia Needs a New 'European,'" *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 13-19 August 1999, 4.
38. "Voyennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 9 October 1999, 4.
39. Viktor Kopylov, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voennoy doktriny. Otvetstvennost' dolzhna byt' konkretnoy," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 16 November 1999.
40. Stepan Tyushkevich, "Obsuzhdaem proekt Voennoy doktriny. Tol'ko na nauchnoy osnove," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 23 November 1999.
41. Vladimir Sivolob and Mikhail Sosnovskiy, "A Reality of Deterrence: Algorithms for Nuclear Use Should Become a Component Part of Military Doctrine," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 22 October 1999, 4.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. V.I. Tsygichko and A.A. Piontkovsky, "The ABM Treaty: Current and Future," *Voyennaya mysl'*, January-February 2000, 10-13.
46. S.V. Kreydin, "Limited ABM Defense: Elimination of Weakness or Reinforcement of Strength?" *Voyennaya mysl'*, January-February 2000, 14-18.
47. Leonid Ivashov, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Strengthening Strategic Stability or a New Spiral of the Arms Race?" *Krasnaya zvezda*, 29 June 2000, 1 and 3; Valeriy Aleksin, "There are Responses to America's Calls—So Feels the Director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies Vladimir Belous," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 14 July 2000, 1-2; Mikhail Musatov, "The Right to a First Strike," *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, June 2000.
48. S.V. Kreydin, "Problemy yadernogo sderzhivaniya: boevaya ustoychost' yadernogo potentsiala," *Voyennaya mysl'*, July-August 2000, 71.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 75.
51. Ibid., 76.
52. Ibid., 77.
53. Ibid.
54. V.I. Slipchenko, *Voyna budushchego in Nauchnye doklady*, No. 88. (Moscow: Moskovskiy Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyy Fond, 1999).
55. Vladimir I. Slipchenko, "Russian Analysis of Warfare Leading to the Sixth Generation," *Field Artillery*, October 1993, 38-41.
56. Slipchenko, *Voyna budushchego*, 16 and 21.
57. Ibid., 27.
58. Ibid., 157.
59. Ibid., 178.
60. V.V. Zhikharskiy, "K voprosu o voynakh budushchego," *Voyennaya mysl'*, July-August 2000, 78.
61. Ibid., 78-79.
62. Andrey Smirnov, "Genshtab primenil yadernoye oruzhie v kadrovoy voyne," *Ssegodnya*, 13 July 2000; "Ofitsial'no. Zasedanie Kollegii Ministerstva oborony RF," *Krasnaya zvezda*, 14 July 2000, 1.
63. Vitaliy Vasil'evich Shlykov, "Nuzhen li Rossii General'nyy shtab?" *Voyennyy Vestnik*, No. 7, 2000.
64. Pavel Fel'gengaur, "Politika. Sergeev - Kvashnin: Boevaya nich'ya," *Moskovskie novosti*, 15 August 2000, 7.
65. Arbatov, *The Transformation of Russian Military Doctrine: Lessons Learned From Kosovo and Chechnya*, 9.
66. Ibid.

Jacob W. Kipp is a senior analyst with the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He graduated from Shippensburg State College and received a Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University. He has been published extensively in the fields of Russian and Soviet military history and serves as the American editor of the journal, European Security. He is an adjunct professor of history with the University of Kansas and teaches in the Soviet and European Studies Program. His article "The Tyranny of Time and Distance: Bridging the Pacific" appeared in the July-August 2000 edition of Military Review.

Mexico's Evolving Security Posture

Graham H. Turbiville Jr.

We are declaring a war without quarter against the drug traffickers and the pernicious criminal Mafias.

— President Vicente Fox

MEXICO'S presidential election in July 2000 constituted one of the country's most important political developments since the Mexican Revolution early in the 20th century. Voters' selection of President Vicente Fox ended more than seven decades of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) control and brought in an energetic, forward-thinking head of state to run a country facing a host of challenges and opportunities. Among the many dimensions of Fox's victory was the potential for profound change in Mexico's military and law enforcement establishments as new leaders formulated programs to deal with enduring and evolving security problems.

These problems are not Mexico's alone but the joint concern of the United States and other nations in the region. Mexico's new administration and security institutions face daunting challenges:

- Mexico's central role as a drug-transiting route and home to powerful trafficking cartels.
- Festering insurgencies in several Mexican states.
- Continued immigration flows and alien smuggling northward.
- Endemic corruption in key institutions.
- Other transnational or public-safety threats ranging from international arms trafficking to violent street crime.

In January 2001 Fox inaugurated a program that had implications for all of Mexico's security agencies and forces. On 25 January 2001 Fox announced the new "National Crusade Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime" in Sinaloa, a prominent center of drug trafficking and violence. During the

announcement, his new military, law enforcement and prosecutorial agency heads accompanied him.¹

As the Fox government formulates its policies, the extent and nature of US-Mexican cooperation will be an important component. The issues noted above affect US interests in various ways, particularly along the 2,000 miles of shared border, and Fox has been a strong advocate of closer ties with the

Over the past half decade many Mexican internal commentators—including many of Fox's National Action Party associates—voiced strong opposition to militarizing Mexico's law enforcement and its military presence in every dimension of public safety and internal security. The Fox administration aims to reduce military presence in many of these areas. The evolving role of Mexico's armed forces bears an especially close look in the early post-PRI era.

United States. Past cooperative efforts—particularly in the military-to-military sphere—have ranged from distant to promising. The past several years, in particular, have been characterized by advances such as the growing rapport among top officers on both sides of the border and cooperation in the counterdrug arena. There have also been setbacks fostered by uneven US security-assistance programs, perceived meddling in Mexico's internal affairs and Mexico's lingering suspicions about US intentions.² Nevertheless, military cooperation on serious transnational security issues has improved in many ways.

The new administration's main effort in dealing with Mexico's security problems has focused on initial changes to military and security policies, especially military and law enforcement employment

General Cervantes with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Henry H. Shelton. Cervantes helped foster unprecedented interaction and cooperation with the United States.



Proceso

From 1994 to December 2000 when Fox took office, the Secretary of Defense was General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre. His tenure and legacy continue to influence the nearly 200,000-man military institution that he directed. His legacy is replete with positive accomplishments. He created additional housing for enlisted personnel, facilitated badly needed pay raises and worked hard on professionalizing his forces overall.

and current threats. In particular, over the past half decade many Mexican internal commentators—including many of Fox's National Action Party associates—voiced strong opposition to militarizing Mexico's law enforcement and its military presence in every dimension of public safety and internal security. The Fox administration aims to reduce military presence in many of these areas. The evolving role of Mexico's armed forces bears an especially close look in the early post-PRI era.

Army and Defense Establishment Under President Fox

Mexico's armed forces consist of the Defense Secretariat (*Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional* or Sedena, comprising the army and air force) and the

Marine Secretariat (*Secretaría de la Marina*—the navy and amphibious elements). From 1994 to December 2000 when Fox took office, the Secretary of Defense was General Enrique Cervantes Aguirre. His tenure and legacy continue to influence the nearly 200,000-man military institution that he directed. His legacy is replete with positive accomplishments. He created additional housing for enlisted personnel, facilitated badly needed pay raises and worked hard on professionalizing his forces overall. Cervantes helped foster interaction and cooperation with the United States to a greater extent than had been present in the past.

Mexican security specialist Jorge Luis Sierra points out that Cervantes employed 25,000 mobilized personnel throughout the military regions in the counterdrug struggle—more than previous secretaries of defense. The new kinds of units Cervantes created are also impressive, and include airborne special forces groups and the army's new amphibious special forces groups for riverine operations. He also prosecuted corrupt officers—including very senior ones.³ This campaign included arresting Generals Mario Arturo Acosta Chaparro and Francisco Humberto Quiros Hermosillo on 31 August 2000 during the waning days of his tenure.

The arrest of these two officers was an event of some note, given their prominence in the Army. Since 1998 the press has publicized the two generals' long-standing ties to drug traffickers, specifically to the Juarez cartel. These relationships may have gone back many years, according to Mexican reports.⁴ Both generals had been associated with the counterinsurgency campaigns against guerrillas in the state of Guerrero in the 1970s and had held a number of important posts since then.⁵ Acosta, in particular, had become well known as a counterinsurgency specialist with the revelation and partial publication of a Defense Secretariat study on Mexico's continuing insurgency dangers. He and Quiros had reportedly both been associated with the formation and activities of "White Brigade" paramilitary forces that conducted anti-insurgency operations during this period.⁶

It appears that the military is making serious efforts to reduce corruption throughout the ranks, which with military professionalization, may promise continued reforms and effectiveness. However, critics point to many other senior officers of the Defense Secretariat, including Cervantes, who have been accused of corruption and complicity with top Mexican narcotraffickers. These allegations will continue to form a backdrop for assessing


Mexico's military development.⁷

Fox's choice to head the Defense Secretariat was General Clemente Vega Garcia.⁸ The choice was welcomed from most quarters, with Mexico's National Security Adviser, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, underscoring the official view that Vega was "without a doubt the best choice."⁹ Vega commanded Military Region I, which includes the Mexican capital, federal district and Morelos state. He is regarded as having a strong academic background and intellectual bent, with a good grasp of national security issues. In particular, Vega is viewed as an excellent choice to facilitate interaction and exchanges between Mexico's military and civilian sectors, a substantial shortfall in the past, given the guarded, closed nature of Mexico's military institution. Fox clearly intends to seek and consider military views on key security decisions and develop a joint approach to problems. Close interaction and cooperation among the military, Attorney General's Office (PGR), and new Secretariat for Public Security and its police units will be critical.

Despite his earlier views, Fox intends for the Defense Secretariat to continue its major counterdrug role. However desirable it may be to turn the role over entirely to law enforcement, Fox, like his predecessor, has determined that only the military possesses the manpower, equipment and relative institutional integrity to carry out these operations. Fox made this explicit in August 2000—news welcomed by US officials, including then director of the Office of National Drug Control Strategy Barry MacCaffrey.¹⁰ Most Mexican specialists agree that this decision does not constitute abandoning the plan to withdraw the military (as many as 34,000 personnel) from these roles but a desire to further develop the police forces needed to perform the tasks adequately.¹¹

The much smaller Maritime Secretariat directs the Mexican navy and is headed by Fox appointee Vice Admiral Marco Antonio Peyrot Gonzalez. Like other Fox choices, he expresses a measure of flexibility over the roles that might be asked of him. Peyrot spoke about possible participation in UN peacekeeping operations, a role quickly rejected by past administrations and senior armed forces leaders. The admiral said the navy would do whatever the president or congress ordered, even if it required additional equipment or preparation. He rejected the idea that Mexico might ever accept UN troops on its territory and indicated that the navy was acquiring ships and developing tactics needed to continue counterdrug operations.¹²

Photo from Mexican television



Members of the ERP receiving basic weapons training.

The Fox regime appears to be moving in promising directions on immigration, crime, human rights, US-Mexico military cooperation and engagement. Two early developments deserve continued attention as Mexico deals with a shifting security environment: Mexico's changed attitude toward insurgencies centered largely to the south and a new development in international drug traffic.

As the new year began, the continued joint anti-drug and crime role of the military and the police was evident in the Fox administration statistics. An announcement on 7 January by the PGR and Defense Secretariat—specifically the Defense General Staff's Section 10 (S-10) responsible for military counterdrug operations—revealed that in the first 38 days "joint operations of both agencies have led to the seizure of 3.4 metric tons of cocaine, 133 metric tons of marijuana, 69 kilos of opium gum, and 5.4 kilos of heroin, and the arrest of 624 people suspected of crimes against health."¹³ S-10 chief General Roberto Garcia Vergara indicated further that the military's goal was to destroy 3.3 thousand hectares of marijuana and 2.2 hectares of opium poppies within the first 100 days, thus preventing substantial quantities of marijuana and heroin from reaching drug markets.¹⁴ The institutional military has the explicit mandate to continue its role in this important dimension of Mexican national—and international—security.

Changes in Law Enforcement

Fox's frequently stated intentions to reduce the militarization of the nation's law enforcement meant not only withdrawing institutional armed forces



Under President Fox, the army has withdrawn from a number of areas it had occupied after the surprise emergence of the EZLN in 1994.

The most well-known of Mexico's guerrilla problems is centered in the southern state of Chiapas, where on 1 January 1994, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) surprised Mexico's government and the world by temporarily taking over several Chiapas towns and raising the specter of a broadly based and effective insurgency. Negotiations stalled, leaving an uneasy standoff in Chiapas between the Zapatistas and the army, police and government.

from policing duties but also removing thousands of officers and men from temporary assignment to law enforcement duties, especially with federal and state police forces. Even before taking office, however, he determined that this, too, was not a prospect for early execution. Difficulties meeting Mexico's public safety and overlapping national security requirements greatly exceeded capabilities of corrupt and inefficient law enforcement agencies. Instead, Fox has embarked on a gradual approach in which the Mexican military continues to play major law enforcement roles while police forces are professionalized. The previous administration had articulated a similar approach, but the new president is moving with more vigor and focus.

Underscoring Fox's reliance on key officers, one of his first and most controversial moves was to name an army brigadier general as PGR. Brigadier General Macedo de la Concha had previously been the chief military prosecutor, and his appointment constitutes the first time in the Republic's history

that a serving officer has been named as the nation's chief law enforcement officer. Opposition to the appointment came from human rights groups and others who based their opposition on the army's alleged legal and human rights violations and the fear that this posting accelerated—not reduced—militarization.¹⁵

According to Mexican reports, substantial reorganizations are expected under the PGR. Three especially prominent organizations may be marked for early abolishment—the Federal Judicial Police (PJF), whose members have frequently been found guilty of crimes themselves; the Special Unit for Combating Organized Crime, also noted for corruption; and the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Dealing With Crimes Against Health, a direct successor to the organization once headed by drug-trafficking army General Jesus Gutierrez Rebollo. Mexican authorities have judged all three organizations to be so corrupt and inefficient that they need total restructuring. Reports indicate that their vetted



The AFO's Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix is extremely violent and shares a place opposite terrorist Osama bin Ladin on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List. (Right) A year-long wiretap investigation led to the arrest of Jorge Castro, a high-ranking member of the AFO, and three others in 1998. Federal agents also seized nearly four tons of cocaine and \$15 million in cash.

[Tijuana's Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO) is] "one of the most powerful, violent, and aggressive trafficking groups in the world." ... Mexican law enforcement officials discovered that this violent drug-trafficking group and one of

Colombia's largest and most successful insurgent organizations had joined together in a drug, arms and money venture. ... The FARC proposed to send cocaine to the AFO in return for arms and money as early as December 1999, and the undertaking apparently began in 2000.



remnants will be incorporated into a new PGR ministerial police. Whatever the final form, much emphasis is being put on a newly structured organization and additional police forces outside the PGR.

Alejandro Gertz Manero heads this new organization—the Secretariat of Public Safety and Services to Justice (SSP).¹⁶ Gertz Manero had served earlier as Mexico City's chief law enforcement officer, but the new position gives him nationwide responsibilities and control of powerful police units. Specifically, the SSP must undertake an intense, decisive assault on drug trafficking and organized crime.¹⁷ To do this, Gertz Manero has received control of the Federal Preventative Police (PFP) that former President Ernesto Zedillo provisionally created. The PFP is now formalized under new legislation and characterized by some as the "super police" because of its sweeping mission and planned development.¹⁸ Fox had actually discussed dissolving or relocating this organization before the election but subsequently changed his mind. The PFP is to expand rapidly and target major drug-trafficking and organized crime areas along the US-Mexican border and other areas of Mexico. It will work closely with the PGR, the military, and other security and law enforcement organizations.

In the area of policy, the SSP is charged with developing public safety policies on federal crimes; coordinating consistent crime policy among federal agencies; proposing actions and strategies for crime prevention; incorporating public participation in crime prevention programs and engaging in other actions. One of the most demanding tasks will be

the SSP's duty "to organize, direct, administer and supervise the PFP, as well as to guarantee the honest performance of their personnel and to apply their disciplinary system."¹⁹ To oversee that process, SSP Secretary Gertz Manero appointed Francisco Arellano Noblecia as PFP commissioner general.

There are a number of security issues of common importance to the United States and Mexico. In the early days of the administration, the Fox regime appears to be moving in promising directions on immigration, crime, human rights, US-Mexico military cooperation and engagement. Two early developments deserve continued attention as Mexico's government deals with a shifting security environment: Mexico's changed attitude toward insurgencies centered largely to the south and a new development in international drug traffic.

Insurgency

The most well-known of Mexico's guerrilla problems is centered in the southern state of Chiapas, where on 1 January 1994, the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) surprised Mexico's government and the world by temporarily taking over several Chiapas towns and raising the specter of a broadly based and effective insurgency. Negotiations stalled, leaving an uneasy standoff in Chiapas between the Zapatistas and the army, police and government. Occasional violence, particularly among EZLN supporters and local paramilitaries, shows that the situation is unresolved and still threatens to become more acute.

The Fox administration has insisted that the EZLN constitutes no threat to Mexico's national

The PFP—now in the process of professionalizing its components—is a visible presence in many parts of Mexico.



Rodolfo Zepeda, Proceso

Fox has embarked on a gradual approach in which the Mexican military continues to play major law enforcement roles while police forces are professionalized. The previous administration had articulated a similar approach, but the new president is moving with more vigor and focus.

security. As the president's national security adviser put it, "On the contrary, it is the Zapatistas and their supporters who have been threatened, who have lost the most people since 1994. It is their communities that have been in danger. . . . War was not declared against us but against a regime that is now over and done with. We have come to make peace, and we are not going to operate with the same standards as the former administration against whom the EZLN declared war."²⁰

Since taking office, Fox and his top spokesmen have emphasized that Chiapas is not a military or national security problem but a problem arising from poverty and marginalized people, particularly the indigenous population upon which the EZLN is so heavily based. As a consequence, the Fox administration believes that the measures needed are primarily social and economic rather than military—follow-ups to the unratified San Andres Larrainzar peace accords that have formed a backdrop to the settlement. Fox has ordered the army, which has had a heavy presence in Chiapas, to close down some military camps and provide more uncontrolled space. He has also initiated programs to bring more jobs to the area and raise living standards. Congress will take the next step to revisit provisions of the

San Andres Larrainzar accords and other associated issues.

But Chiapas is not Mexico's only insurgency. In Guerrero, Oaxaca and other states, far more dangerous groups have been operating for several decades, despite army successes in killing or capturing key leaders and destroying larger bands. Their resurgence since the mid-1990s has been remarkable, and attacks, including multistate armed actions, against army and police units have resulted in government casualties, intensified army and police counter-insurgency efforts, and a greatly increased military presence in affected areas. In particular, the People's Revolutionary Army (EPR); the Revolutionary Army of Insurgent Peoples (ERPI); the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARP); the Villist Revolutionary Army of the People; and the Clandestine Revolutionary Army of the Poor have been visible over the past year or so and, in some cases, have common origins or other mutual affiliations.²¹ Fears that one or more of these armed groups would interfere with the July presidential elections were never realized, however, despite early indications to the contrary.

Fox has sought to deal with these groups peacefully, despite their assertions that his July 2000 victory meant nothing. He announced an amnesty for the EPR shortly after taking office and at least limited demilitarization in an area of Oaxaca. Through his interior minister Fox said that "The new government is open to dialogue with all the armed organizations. The important thing now is to seal dialogue and to carry out action that will make it possible to solve the problems in the southern part of the country."²²

At least one armed group had a more or less neutral response. The FARP's "Major Vinicio" indicated a willingness to talk but also indicated that the government would have to meet certain unstated conditions. Shortly after the Fox election, the ERPI indicated its intention not to renounce armed struggle, and its reaction to subsequent events, including offers of dialogue or amnesty, is unknown.²³ How the Fox regime deals with the southern states and fulfills development promises will shape any guerrilla-government dialogue. The groups and populace of the regions themselves have heard a host of government promises that were never realized.

Drug Trafficking and Insurgency

US government statistics identify Mexico as the source of about one-half of the cocaine coming into

the United States, and Mexico stands as the second largest supplier of heroin. Other drugs, such as methamphetamines and marijuana, are dispatched over distribution routes that now extend across the United States. Allegations of insurgent involvement in Mexico's profitable drug trade had been limited and far from conclusive. That changed in fall 2000 but not as a consequence of Mexico's guerrilla activity. Rather, the Colombian guerilla conflict and its clear intersection with international drug trafficking have spilled into Mexico.

Regional spillover from this conflict has long concerned states in the region, particularly Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Brazil, that directly border Colombia. Most recently, the largest Colombian insurgent group—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—has directly involved itself with one of the largest Mexican drug-trafficking organizations, the Tijuana cartel or Arellano-Felix Organization (AFO), as it is also called. The AFO is based in Tijuana, Mexico, across the border from San Diego, California. The Drug Enforcement Administration describes it as “one of the most powerful, violent, and aggressive trafficking groups in the world.”²⁴ The AFO has been extraordinarily successful at bribing and infiltrating law enforcement organizations and is reputed to be advanced in acquiring and applying new technologies. It is a multicommodity-trafficking organization, handling all major drugs. One of the family's four brothers—the extremely violent Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix—is on the FBI's Ten Most Wanted List, sharing a place opposite terrorist Usama bin Ladin.

In fall 2000 Mexican law enforcement officials discovered that this violent drug-trafficking group and one of Colombia's largest and most successful insurgent organizations had joined together in a drug, arms and money venture. Mexican law enforcement agencies reported that the FARC proposed to send cocaine to the AFO in return for arms and money as early as December 1999, and the undertaking apparently began in 2000.²⁵ Mexican authorities have made arrests and substantially detailed the developing FARC-AFO trafficking arrangements. For its part, the FARC adamantly denies the charges and asserts that it has never been involved in trafficking activities. Evidence cited by Mexican authorities, however, is far more compelling, and the PGR hopes that the arrests made during this operation have disrupted the FARC-Mexican trafficker ties for at least the present.

Fox intends for the Defense Secretariat to continue its major counterdrug role. However desirable it may be to turn the role over entirely to law enforcement, Fox, like his predecessor, has determined that only the military possesses the manpower, equipment and relative institutional integrity to carry out these operations. Fox made this explicit in August 2000—news welcomed by US officials, including then director of the Office of National Drug Control Strategy Barry MacCaffrey.

Meanwhile, Fox has targeted the AFO for destruction, one of the most serious efforts Mexico's government has made against a major drug cartel. After announcing FARC complicity in Mexican drug trafficking in December 2000, the government announced its intent to flood the violent AFO headquarters in Tijuana with 2,000 PFP officers, along with state and metropolitan police and army units. As Fox himself announced, “We are going to concentrate everything in this place for a long period of time and I am sure that within six months we will be able to clean Tijuana up and restore peace. This truly is an in-depth job that needs to be done. . . . There is no doubt at all that we are going to be able to destroy their power.”²⁶


Fox's announcement also came as a dozen people were executed in Tijuana in just a few hours. Tijuana was the first of several targeted areas, including subsequently Mexicali in Baja California opposite Calexico, California; Ciudad Juarez opposite El Paso, Texas; and Sinaloa State, notorious for its drugs and violent crime. Fox endorsed attention to these areas in his January National Crusade Against Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime, which called upon the PFP, state and local police, and the army to attack, in order of priority, drug trafficking, rampant kidnapping and organized automobile theft.²⁷ Even as the initial operations of the crusade were unfolding, Fox and other officials emphasized the need to add more trained police. The results of these efforts will signal the future direction and effectiveness of Mexico's new joint military and law enforcement operations against growing public safety, national security and transnational threats.

Electing Vicente Fox was a benchmark in Mexico's modern history, with profound implications for

The election of Vicente Fox was a benchmark in Mexico's modern history, with profound implications for the United States and regional security. Fox and his military and law enforcement teams appear to be addressing Mexican and US security problems with energy and realism, recognizing that approaches might have to change, even fundamentally, to be effective.

the United States and regional security. Fox and his military and law enforcement teams appear to be addressing Mexican and US security problems with energy and realism, recognizing that approaches might have to change, even fundamentally, to be effective. In particular, during the initial phases of his administration, Fox seems to be advancing US-

Mexican security cooperation while insisting on essentially Mexican approaches and solutions. Attacks on drug trafficking and crime are particularly welcome north of the border, although Mexican and US observers note that many other programs and crusades have failed in the past.

Fox seems interested in applying military experience to support civil authorities in disaster response, complex military and law enforcement interaction, and regional peacekeeping. He is also attacking endemic corruption—the “hole in the bottom of the bucket” that could make all other reforms and initiatives fruitless. There will certainly be disagreements and problems between the United States and Mexico in such areas as immigration and human rights compliance, but for the present, the new age in Mexican politics offers far more encouragement to bilateral and regional progress against common problems. 

NOTES

1. “Fox: será ‘amarga’ la guerra antinarco,” *La Jornada*, 25 January 2001. The program is designated “Cruzada Nacional contra el Narcotráfico y el Crimen Organizado” (National Crusade Against Narcotraficking and Organized Crime) and has goals similar to former Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo’s program.

2. High-level exchanges, such as those involving former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Mexican Secretary of National Defense General Enrique Cervantes, were important benchmarks, as have been the annual US-Mexican Border Commanders’ Conferences. On the other hand, one of the most publicized US military-assistance efforts was plagued by problems from the onset. This undertaking involved the 1996 US decision to send 73 Vietnam-era UH-1 helicopters to Mexico for counterdrug operations. While public statements on both sides of the border lauded the effort, Mexican generals privately expressed disdain for the old equipment. US congressional allegations about the use of the aircraft in counterinsurgency operations also irritated Mexican officers. The eventual transfer of the refurbished aircraft in 1997 presented the Mexican military with continuing maintenance problems and limited helicopter usefulness. In early October 1999, despite US efforts to resolve the problems, all but one of the helicopters (which had crashed) were returned unceremoniously to the United States by truck.

3. Sierra, “La cúpula militar, infectada por narcotráfico y corrupción,” *Proceso*, 10 September 2000, 10.

4. “Generals’ Property Unsearched, Unattached,” *Reforma*, 15 September 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP 20000915000056.

5. “El narcoestado, desafío para Fox,” *Proceso*, 3 December 2000 (translation from the French book, *The Lost Battle Against Drugs*), received via Internet.

6. Both officers had played a role in recovering ransom money from Mexico’s most famous historic guerrilla of the 1960s and 1970s, Lucio Cabañas, who had kidnapped the notoriously repressive Guerrero State Governor Figueroa Figueroa and demanded payment for his release. One account has it that “Acosta Chaparro dressed up as a woman for this mission.” See Tomas Tenorio Galindo, “Military Intelligence Document: An Old View of the Guerrillas,” *Reforma*, 16 July 1996, as translated in FBIS-LAT-96-188.

7. Sierra, 10.

8. Luis Alegres, “Sedena Studies Top Post Contenders,” *Reforma*, 24 September 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP20000925000077.

9. Statements by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, “Adviser’s Upbeat View of Defense Chief,” *El Universal*, 14 December 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP200012-15000086.

10. “Mexican Army to Maintain Anti-Drug Role,” *El Universal*, 9 August 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP20000809000076.

11. “Armed Forces Anti-Narcotics Role Termed ‘Positive,’” *El Universal*, 10 August 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP20000810000069.

12. Gustavo Castillo Garcia, “La Armada, sin equipo para integrarse a una fuerza de paz: Peyrot,” *La Jornada*, 7 January 2001.

13. *Reforma*, 8 January 2001, as translated in FBIS LAP20010108000069.

14. *Ibid.*

15. See, for example, Ricardo Ravelo, “Militares en tareas de seguridad y justicia: de fracaso en fracaso,” *Proceso*, 10 December 2000.

16. David Vicenteño, “Propone Fox crear Secretaría de Seguridad Pública,” *Reforma*, 8 March 2000. Fox had proposed the organization before the election. Both Fox and former president Zedillo evidently worked on details of the structure before Fox took office.

17. Rubén Torres, “Nace la Secretaría de Seguridad Pública,” *La Economista*, 15 January 2001.

18. For a discussion of the Federal Preventative Police (PFP), see Graham H. Turbiville Jr., “Mexico’s Multimission Force for Internal Security,” *Military Review*, July-August 2000, 41-49.

19. Torres.

20. Zinser.

21. For a discussion of Mexican armed groups, see Turbiville, “Mexico’s Multimission Force,” *Military Review*, July-August 1999, 41; Turbiville, “Mexico’s Other Insurgents,” *Military Review*, May-June 1997, 81-89.

22. Daniel Moreno, “Anuncia Fox amnistía para el EPR,” *Reforma*, 2 December 2000.

23. “ERPI Calls for Building of ‘People’s Power,’” *Reforma*, 17 August 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP20000817000082.

24. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Congressional Testimony by Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, DEA, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism, “International Organized Crime Syndicates and Their Impact on the United States,” 26 February 1998.

25. José Galá, “Roto, el vínculo entre el cártel de los Arellano Félix y las FARC: PGR,” *La Jornada*, 24 November 2000.

26. José Luis Ruiz, “Fox Announces Plan to Stop Arellano Felix Cartel,” *El Universal*, 22 December 2000, as translated in FBIS LAP20001222000041.

27. *Ibid.*

Graham H. Turbiville Jr. is the director, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from Southern Illinois University, an M.A. from George Washington University and a Ph.D. from the University of Montana. He formerly served as chief of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact Strategic Operations Branch, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC. His previous *Military Review* articles include “Operations Other Than War: Organized Crime Dimension,” January 1994; “The Chechen Ethno-Religious Conflict, Terrorism and Crime,” March 1994; “OOTW in the Asia-Pacific Theater,” April 1994; “The Changing Security Environment” and “Mexico’s Other Insurgents,” May-June 1997; and “US-Mexican Border Security: Civil-Military Cooperation,” July-August 1999. His most recent *Military Review* article, “Mexico’s Multimission Force for Internal Security,” appeared in the July-August 2000 issue.

China's Electronic Strategies

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, US Army, Retired

MAJOR GENERAL Dai Qingmin, director of the Chinese People's Liberation Army's (PLA's) Communications Department of the General Staff responsible for information warfare (IW) and information operations (IO), wrote that "new technologies are likely to find material expression in informationalized arms and equipment which will, together with information systems, sound, light, electronics, magnetism, heat and so on, turn into a carrier of strategies."¹ Chinese strategies rely on electrons in unanticipated ways to fulfill stratagems such as "kill with a borrowed sword" or "exhaust the enemy at the gate and attack him at your ease."

The Chinese believe that superior strategies can help overcome technological deficiencies. A comparable equivalent to this theoretical development in military art would be a Russian virtual operational maneuver group of electron forces or a US air-land electron battle group.


Dai's article is an important benchmark in PLA military philosophy. First, he is a very credible and responsible figure. Before his present job, Dai commanded the PLA's Information Warfare Center in Wuhan. Second, he defines IW and IO with Chinese characteristics that are different from US definitions. Third, Dai broke tradition and advocated pre-emptive attack to gain the initiative and seize information superiority. This offensive emphasis contradicts China's military strategy of active defense. Finally, he noted that integrated and joint IO gives more scope and purpose to a people's war. Dai's article also indicates that China is clearly developing strategies to implement IW with Chinese characteristics. Other writers support his view with their own approaches to strategic IW.

The Fiscal Year 2000 report on China from the US Secretary of Defense to Congress (mandated by the National Defense Authorization Act) indicated growth in Chinese theory and capability. The report

The Chinese believe that superior strategies can help overcome technological deficiencies. A comparable equivalent to this theoretical development in military art would be a Russian virtual operational maneuver group of electron forces, or a US air-land electron battle group.

noted that since NATO air forces inadvertently bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on 7 May 1999, Chinese leaders have accelerated military modernization, pursued strategic cooperation with Russia and increased proliferation activities. In particular, China focused on fighting adversaries that had advanced information technologies and long-range precision weapons. The "active-defense" doctrine focuses on "People's War under modern conditions," which the secretary's report termed "local wars under high-tech conditions."² Released on 16 October 2000, the Chinese Defense White Paper also emphasized China's people's war tradition, an emphasis that surprised many Western followers of China who thought the idea had lost relevance in the information age. In fact, its importance has grown.

In September 2000, two weeks before the White Paper was released, the *PLA Daily* released an article on China's military telecommunications (telecom) developments. The article noted that in 1991 Chairman Jiang Zemin called for building common telecom systems for military and civilian use to meet peacetime and wartime needs.³ Only in such fashion could military telecom catch up with its civilian counterpart. One way to do this was to create reserve forces (a key component uniting civilian and military sectors in a people's war) with telecom and IW/IO missions. The paper noted, "We have built a reserve telecom force structure with a



Major General Dai Qingmin: “Informationized arms . . . together with information systems, sound, light, electronics, magnetism, heat and so on, turn into a carrier of strategies.”

The journal *China Military Science* is produced by the Academy of Military Science and approximates *Joint Force Quarterly*. It carries articles on a variety of current topics of interest to the PLA, to include information and psychological operations.

Dai's article . . . broke tradition and advocated pre-emptive attack to gain the initiative and seize information superiority. This offensive emphasis contradicts China's military strategy of active defense. Finally, he noted that integrated and joint IO gives more scope and purpose to a people's war. Dai's article also indicates that China is clearly developing strategies to implement IW with Chinese characteristics. Other writers support his view with their own approaches to strategic IW.

reserve telecom regiment as the backbone, with an information industrial department as the base . . . have built a reserve contingent of qualified high-tech telecom and transmission personnel with those specializing in satellite telecom, relay telecom, digital telecom, telegraph (telephone) telecom, and optical-fiber telecom as the main force . . . and have built a contingent of highly qualified personnel with computer experts, network monitoring experts, as well as radio telecom units serving as the backbone.”⁴

China's reserve forces are now being armed with IW/IO missions and have become the high-tech link in the country's people's war theory. In the past, reserve forces' planned role in a people's war was supporting PLA forces defending against foreign intervention. Today's reserve forces can do something even the PLA could not for many years—reach out and touch someone continents away with electronic and information weapons. Properly targeted electronic attacks could be as devastating to a country's economy as damage inflicted by an intercontinental missile.

China's defense industrial complex lags in developing high-technology equipment; therefore, China must find “selective pockets of excellence” according to the late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping. One of these pockets appears to be internal telecom. The Secretary of Defense's report noted that military and civilian communications networks might be linked to help China in a crisis. The September *PLA Daily* report indicates that a civil-military telecom system is more likely. The military communications system is carried over multiple transmission lines to make it survivable, secure, flexible, mobile and less vulnerable to exploitation, destruction or electronic attack. The command automation data network can reportedly support limited preplanned conventional attack options along China's periphery.⁵

The reserve forces also reportedly have their own websites and simulation centers. China now has 400 military websites, according to one report.⁶ On 7 January 2001 several unidentified companies agreed to form the China C-Net Strategic Alliance, a second-generation Internet-like network for

China's government and industry. No start dates for construction or completion were offered. The Xinhua News Agency release noted that "the current one [Internet] has too many faults and is incapable of satisfying the needs of the Chinese government and companies as they enter the digital age. It is unknown whether foreigners will have access to the net, or if it will be compatible with the existing net."⁷

IW/O Strategy in China Military Science

The journal *China Military Science*, which approximates *Joint Force Quarterly*, has provided a limited forum for IW/O articles over the past year. However, the April 2000 issue was an exception. The journal contains three articles on IO subjects, and all three are important. One article is titled "The Current Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Asia-Pacific Security," by Senior Colonel Wang Baocun. Wang is a well-respected author on IO subjects and works in the Foreign Military Studies Department of the Academy of Military Science, which publishes *China Military Science*. Wang's article is the only one in the issue in English and reflects a Western view of IW and the Revolution in Military Affairs. For example, Wang defines IW as "a form of combat actions which attacks the information and information systems of the enemy while protecting the information and information systems of one's own side. The contents of IW are military security, military deception, physical attack, electronic warfare, psychological warfare and net warfare, and its basic purpose is to seize and maintain information dominance."⁸

Wang provided a very different definition of IW when writing for the same journal in 1997. His description of IW contained the elements of Soviet/Russian military science, covering the nature, forms, levels, distinctions, features and principles of IW. Wang listed forms of IW as peacetime, crisis and wartime; the nature of IW as reflected in offensive and defensive operations; levels of IW as national, strategic, theater and tactical; and other distinctions of IW as command and control, intelligence, electronic-psychological, cyberspace, hackers, virtual, economics, strategy and precision. He listed features of IW as complexity, limited goals, short duration, less damage, larger battle space and less troop density, transparency, intense struggle for information superiority, increased integration, increased demand on command, new aspects of massing forces and the fact that effective strength may not be the main target. He stated that principles of IW include decapitation, blinding, transparency, quick response and survival.⁹


[One of the "36 stratagems"] is "besiege Wei to rescue Zhao": when the enemy is too strong to attack directly, attack something he holds dear. Today's IW implication is that if you cannot hit someone with nuclear weapons because of catastrophic effects on your own country, then attack the servers and nets responsible for Western financial, power, political and other systems' stability with electrons.

The two definitions Wang offered reflect two ways of viewing IW in China. The first definition is through the prism of Western theory, and the second is through the prism of Soviet/Russian military science, which was used extensively from the 1950s to the early 1990s. In recent lectures, Wang spoke of "informationalized warfare," a concept Dai used quite often in his article.¹⁰

"On Information Warfare Strategies," by Major General Niu Li, Colonel Li Jiangzhou and Major Xu Dehui at the Communications and Command Institute, appeared in the same April 2000 issue. The authors define IW stratagems as "schemes and methods devised and used by commanders and commanding bodies to seize and maintain information supremacy on the basis of using clever methods to prevail at a relatively small cost in information warfare."¹¹ Chinese leaders believe that stratagems to technological inferiority can be achieved by combining human qualitative thinking with computer-assisted quantitative calculations. The authors suggest devising stratagems that are based on cognition and technology (information acquisition and processing).

Asians and Occidentals view combining stratagems with technology differently. The authors note that, "Traditionally, Oriental people emphasize stratagems and Occidental people emphasize technology . . . Occidental soldiers would seek technological means when encountering a difficulty, while Oriental soldiers would seek to use stratagems to make up for technological deficiencies without changing the technological conditions. Oriental soldiers' traditional way of thinking is not conducive to technological development, but can still serve as an effective way of seeking survival in a situation of danger."¹² IW stratagems can:

- Direct commanders' thinking and force them to make errors by attacking cognitive and belief systems.
- Generate heavy psychological pressure by using intimidation to signal inevitable victory



Civil-military cooperation and integration are growing in China in the information age, just as it is in the United States. Chairman Jiang Zemin (third from left) has called for building common telecom systems for military and civilian needs. One way to do this is to create reserve forces—a key component uniting civilian and military sectors in a people's war—with telecom and IW/IO missions.

China's reserve forces are now being armed with IW/IO missions and have become the high-tech link in the country's people's war theory. In the past, reserve forces' planned role in a people's war was supporting PLA forces. . . . Today's reserve forces can do something even the PLA could not for many years—reach out and touch someone continents away with electronic and information weapons. Properly targeted electronic attacks could be as devastating to a country's economy as damage inflicted by an intercontinental missile.

concentrating forces and coordinating information networks.

- Intimidate by demonstrating capabilities.
- Adopt active and effective measures to generate surprise, and use decisive technical equipment and IW means.
- Develop and hide IW “killer weapons.”
- Hide reality by creating a fictitious reality.
- Apply deceptive schemes simultaneously or consecutively.
- Use all IW means to maintain supremacy.
- Mislead the enemy by pretending to follow his wishes.
- Release viruses to contaminate information flows.
- Control time elements by conducting information “inducement,” “deception,” “concealment” and “containment.”¹³

These strategies are designed to force cognitive errors in the enemy and create a multidimensional threat with which the enemy must contend.

Dai on Information Operation Strategies and a People's War

A third article in the April 2000 issue is Dai's “Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations.” Dai defines an information operation as “a series of operations with an information environment as the basic battlefield condition, with military information and an information system as the direct operational target, and with electronic warfare and a computer network war as the principal form.”¹⁴ Since these operations are trials of strength focusing on knowledge and strategies, Dai recommends a “focus on strategies.”

Scientific and technological developments have given strategies a new playing field. A strategy may carry different contents under different technological conditions, allowing room for traditional strategies, and new ones mapped out by new technological means. Options include new information-confrontation strategies, adding strategic wings to technology or applying strategies in light of tech-

Military Regions and Reserve IW Exercises and Missions



Ideas for uniting a people's war with IW are finding fertile ground in China's 1.5-million reserve force. Several IW reserve forces have already been formed in the cities of Datong, Xiamen, Shanghai, Echeng and Xian. Each is developing its own specialty as well. For example, Shanghai reserve forces focus on wireless telecom networks and double-encryption passwords.


nology.¹⁵ If technology finds expression in arms and equipment, then information systems and even electrons can be strategy carriers. A good strategy can "serve as a type of invisible fighting capacity; may make up inadequate material conditions to a certain extent; may narrow a technological or equipment gap between an army and its enemy; and may make up for a shortage of information, fighting forces or poor information operational means."¹⁶ Some of these strategies include:

- Jamming or sabotaging an enemy's information or information system.
- Sabotaging an enemy's overall information operational structure.
- Weakening an enemy's information fighting capacity.
- Dispersing enemy forces, arms and fires while concentrating its own forces, arms and fire.
- Confusing or diverting an enemy and creating an excellent combat opportunity for itself.
- Diverting an enemy's reconnaissance attempt and making sufficient preparations for itself.
- Giving an enemy a false impression and launching a surprise information attack on him at the same time.

- Blinding or deafening an enemy with false impressions.
- Confusing an enemy or disrupting his thinking.
- Making an enemy believe that what is true is false and what is false is true.
- Causing an enemy to make a wrong judgment or take wrong action.¹⁷

Dai also emphasizes that future operations must be integrated. One such concept will be integrating military and civilian information fighting forces. Dai believes that information systems offer more modes for people to take part in IO and serve as a major auxiliary information fighting force in a future information war.¹⁸ Integrating civilian and military specialists will breathe new life into Mao Zedong's theory of people's war. Chinese IW specialist General Wang Pufeng first noted this condition in 1995.¹⁹

Ideas for uniting a people's war with IW are finding fertile ground in China's 1.5-million reserve force. Several IW reserve forces have already been formed in the cities of Datong, Xiamen, Shanghai, Echeng and Xian. Each is developing its own specialty as well. For example, Shanghai reserve forces focus on wireless telecom networks



Senior Colonel Wang Baocun of the PLA's Academy of Military Sciences lecturing at the US Army Command and General Staff College in January 2001 on "Informationalized War," a concept that Major General Dai also addresses.

The [China Military Science] authors define IW stratagems as "schemes and methods devised and used by commanders and commanding bodies to seize and maintain information supremacy on the basis of using clever methods to prevail at a relatively small cost in information warfare." Chinese leaders believe that stratagems to technological inferiority can be achieved by combining human qualitative thinking with computer-assisted quantitative calculations.

and double-encryption passwords.

In Xian, the People's Armed Forces Department reportedly is working with several strategies that resemble Dai's idea of turning light, sound and electronics into strategy carriers. IW Fenduis (divisions) acted as opposing forces for a military district exercise in Jilin Province (Shenyang Military Region). Ten IO methods, which could also be considered as electronic strategies, follow:

- Planting information mines.
- Conducting information reconnaissance.
- Changing network data.
- Releasing information bombs.
- Dumping information garbage.
- Disseminating propaganda.
- Applying information deception.
- Releasing clone information.
- Organizing information defense.
- Establishing network spy stations.²⁰

Whether these strategies are used in external reconnaissance of foreign operating systems today is unknown.

A third, significant way the information age has affected China's attitude toward warfare is that China's 36 stratagems may find new meaning and application. Some 300 years ago an unknown scholar decided to collect and record China's stratagems. *The Thirty-Six Stratagems: The Secret Art of War* emphasizes deception as a military art that can achieve military objectives.²¹ In the information age, which is characterized by anonymous attacks and uncertainty, the stratagem just might be revitalized as a tactic. It should be easier to deceive or inflict perception-management injuries (guidance injuries in Chinese) as a result. The information age is developing into the anonymous persuaders' age.

Some argue that in today's high-tech world, these ancient stratagems no longer apply. However, a look at just the first five stratagems shows otherwise. Strategy one is "fool the emperor to cross the sea."²² Lowering an enemy's guard must be an open act, hiding true intentions under the guise of everyday activities. An IW application would be using regular e-mail services or Internet business links to mask insertions of malicious code or viruses. Strategy two is "besiege Wei to rescue Zhao": when the enemy is too strong to attack directly, attack something he holds dear. Today's IW implication is that if you cannot hit someone with nuclear weapons because of catastrophic effects on your own country, then attack the servers and nets responsible for Western financial, power, political and other systems' stability with electrons. Strategy three is "kill with a borrowed sword": when you do not have the means to attack the enemy directly, attack using another's strength. The IW application is simple—send viruses or malicious codes through a cutout or another country.

Strategy four is "await the exhausted enemy at your ease": choosing the time and place for battle is an advantage. Encourage the enemy to expend his energy in futile quests while you conserve your strength. When he is exhausted and confused, attack with energy and purpose. The IW application here is to use the people's war theory to send out multiple attacks while saving the significant attack until all the West's computer emergency response teams (CERTs) are engaged. Finally, strategy five is "loot a burning house": when a country is beset by internal conflicts, it will be unable to deal with an outside threat. The IW application is to put hack-

ers inside the West under the guise of a student or business and attack from the inside. While chaos reigns, steal from information resources.

Integration also implies networking. In the August 2000 newspaper article "PRC Army Pays Attention to the Role of Network Warfare," a people's war received as much attention as networking. The author stated that *Jiefangjun Bao* [the Chinese armed forces newspaper] maintains that it is necessary to formulate rules and regulations regarding mobilization and preparation for "modern People's War," as well as information gathering and processing; online offensives and defense; and network technology research and exchanges, to provide norms for preparing and building a "network People's War."²³

Attaining information superiority (Dai uses the term 32 times and the concept "information control" 11 times in his article) is crucial to using these strategies in a people's war and requires several steps. First, Dai notes that professional forces (perhaps the PLA) would obtain, transmit and process war information, and jam or sabotage enemy information or information systems. Nonprofessional forces (perhaps the reserves) protect specific targets and injure the enemy's effective fighting strength. Second, electronic warfare means (designed to sabotage information gathering and transmission) and network warfare means (designed to sabotage information processing and use) must be integrated. Third, "soft and hard" are to be used for forces and offensive and defensive operations.²⁴ The offensive includes electronic, network and other units to destroy enemy electronic systems; and the defense consists of telecom, technical reconnaissance, radar and other units. Fourth, integrated, joint, all-dimensional operations must cover ground, sea, air and space.²⁵

Dai remarks that to contend for information superiority requires viewing IO as an "active offensive." This viewpoint appears strongly to contradict the viewpoint expressed in China's subsequent White Paper that stressed China's adherence to an active defense posture. However, Dai notes that for defense to be positive, it must be an "active offensive defense," while a negative information defense will be passive. This word game appears designed to keep the "information active offense" in line with the White Paper.²⁶ In this sense, Dai recommends the Kosovo model of the Serbs, who actively responded, over the Gulf War model of the Iraqis, who passively waited for the coalition's next step.

Knowledge and psychological factors must be evaluated as components of the correlation of forces. Knowledge war entails calculating significant changes to people, weaponry and military systems. The impact of a knowledge differential was obvious between US soldiers in the Gulf and Iraq. The high-tech coalition weaponry would have been practically useless to Iraqi soldiers, many of whom were illiterate.

Other Information Strategies

A 1996 article notes that information technology is the core and foundation of the military revolution. Information and knowledge have changed the previous practice of measuring military strength, which was calculated by counting the number of armored divisions, air force wings and aircraft carrier battle groups. Invisible forces must be considered in calculating the correlation of forces today. These include:

- Computing capabilities, to include capacity.
- Communications capacity/volume.
- System reliability.
- Ability of reconnaissance systems.²⁷

Each element could affect the information strategy employed by or against adversaries. These strategies also possess global reach, speed-of-light transmission and comprehensive integration.

In addition, knowledge and psychological factors must be evaluated as components of the correlation of forces. Knowledge war entails calculating significant changes to people, weaponry and military systems. The impact of a knowledge differential was obvious between US soldiers in the Gulf and Iraq. The high-tech coalition weaponry would have been practically useless to Iraqi soldiers, many of whom were illiterate. Future war, characterized by chessboard-type competition and high-tech knowledge embedded into weapon circuitry, will be "directed by master's degree holders, commanded by university students and conducted by experts."²⁷ In addition, turning knowledge into weapons will occur more quickly. Networking competence, automation and real-time systems for early warning, reconnaissance, control and guidance, and attack will improve, enabling weapons to identify, differentiate and analyze targets automatically. Military systems will replace quantity and scale with quality and effectiveness.²⁸ Knowledge war also includes developing superior strategies based on superior knowledge.

[Chinese] strategy, the military art and science of conducting campaigns on a broad scale, has undergone a transformation. Concentrations of forces will be replaced by striking efficacy with information and energy, and lines between front and rear will blur. Operations will switch from firepower to detecting, concealing, searching and avoiding, making long-range combat replace hand-to-hand fighting. A core issue will be the fight for network supremacy, which will be necessary to win in strategy and battle simultaneously.

The primary conclusion from a review of Chinese IW stratagems is that strategy, the military art and science of conducting campaigns on a broad scale, has undergone a transformation. Concentrations of forces will be replaced by striking efficacy with information and energy, and lines between front and rear will blur. Operations will switch from firepower to detecting, concealing, searching and avoiding, making long-range combat replace hand-to-hand fighting. A core issue will be the fight for network supremacy, which will be necessary to win in strategy and battle simultaneously.

In a revolutionary development, clouds of electrons will be able to disable and destroy countries (usually via economic destruction but also via information-psychological attacks) where once large armies were required. Electrons and information technologies are the new formations of 21st-century armed forces in China and other countries. Electrons in combat require focus on operational effectiveness instead of concentrating military strength. Building systems for soft destruction (signal deception or interference) will become as important as firepower, according to some Chinese analysts. The West should look to the East to explain these stratagems. As the Chinese note, they allow more time for strategic thinking than their Occidental counterparts.

A few new areas of emphasis support these strategies. They include the new criteria for figuring correlation of forces and the new emphasis on cognitive factors, especially psychological. For China, the information revolution has also breathed new life into an old yet timely Chinese strategy—people's war. The country can unite around this concept with its reserve forces and anyone with a laptop computer. For Western audiences, it is time to study these changes closely, and to adapt some into our way of conducting IW. 🐼

NOTES

1. Qingmin Dai, "Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations," Beijing *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, 20 August 2000, 72-77. Translated and downloaded from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 9 November 2000, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.
2. The Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, <www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm>.
3. Zhang Fuyou, "With Joint Efforts Made by Army and People, Military Telecommunications Makes Leap Forward," *Beijing Jiefangjun Bao*, September 2000, 9. Translated and downloaded from FBIS, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.
4. Ibid.
5. The Report to Congress.
6. Wei Kaqing, "On the Sudden Emergence of Military Websites," Beijing *Zhongguo Guofang Bao*, 6 November 2000, 4. Translated and downloaded from FBIS, 14 December 2000, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.
7. Beijing, *The Associated Press*, 8 January 2001.
8. Wang Baocun, "The Current Revolution in Military Affairs and its Impact on Asia-Pacific Security," *China Military Science*, April 2000, 139.
9. Baocun, "A Preliminary Analysis of IW," Beijing *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, 20 November 1997, 102-11. Translated and downloaded from FBIS, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.
10. Ibid.
11. Niu Li, Li Jiangzhou, and Xu Dehui, "On Information Warfare Stratagems," Beijing *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue*, 12 January 2001, 115-22. Translated and downloaded from FBIS, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Dai, "Innovating and Developing Views on Information Operations."

15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Wang Pufeng, "Meeting the Challenge of Information Warfare," *Zhongguo Junshi Kexue (China Military Science)*, 20 February 1995, 8-18. Translated and reported in FBIS-CHI-95-129, 6 July 1995, 29 and 30.
20. *Xianjin Bao*, 10 December 1999, provided by Mr. William Belk to the author via e-mail.
21. Wang Xuanming, *The Thirty-Six Stratagems: The Secret Art of War* (China Books and Periodicals, December 1992).
22. These strategies and their meaning were downloaded from <http://www.chinastategies.com>; the information-age interpretation is the author's.
23. "PRC Army Pays Attention to the Role of Network Warfare," Hong Kong *Zhongguo Tonnun She*, 6 August 2000, translated and downloaded from FBIS, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.
24. Dai. "Soft" means temporary sabotage or deception using electronic jamming, computer virus attacks, network infiltration, carbonized-fiber bombs, virtual reality attacks and psychological attacks. "Hard" means permanent sabotage, weakening an enemy's overall fighting capacity, and includes conventional arms, sabotage attacks with forces, attacks with electromagnetic pulses and attacks with arms-carrying direction finders.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Hai Lung and Chang Feng, "Chinese Military Studies Information Warfare," *Kuang Chiao Ching*, 16 January 1996, 22 and 23. Translated in FBIS-CHI-96-035, 21 February 1996, 33 and 34.
28. Jia Xi and Shi Hongju, "Analysis on Key Elements of Knowledge Warfare," Beijing *Jiefangjun Bao*, 18 September 2000. Translated and downloaded from FBIS, <http://sun3.lib/uci.edu/~slca/microform/resources/f-g/f_049.htm>.

Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Thomas, US Army, Retired, is an analyst with the US Army Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and is an adjunct professor at the US Army's Eurasian Institute, Garmisch, Germany. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.A. from the University of Southern California and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army Russian Institute (USARI). He held various command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including director, Soviet Studies, USARI, Garmisch; inspector of Soviet tactical operations, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Eurasian Institute, Garmisch; and S2, 2d Brigade, and commander, Company C, 313th Military Intelligence Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He is the assistant editor of the journal European Security. His article "Grozy 2000: Urban Combat Lessons Learned" appeared in the July-August 2000 issue of Military Review.

Cuba's Transition

Lieutenant Colonel Geoff Demarest, US Army, Retired

THE CASTRO REVOLUTION is a survivor. A decade ago history had seemingly caught up with perennial predictions of the regime's imminent collapse. Its hero was long in the tooth, and its geostrategic godfather was dead. Nevertheless, Fidel Castro and Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) chief Raul Castro remained in power. The Castro brothers' role as impudent David to Uncle Sam's ambiguous Goliath subdued the kind of international rejection that might have rendered communist Cuba a pariah state. Solidarity with the dictatorship has been as great, if not greater, than solidarity among those who wish to see it fall. Analysts who had relegated any Cuban contingency to a back burner among national strategic concerns were correct. Castro was not going to be overthrown from within and, therefore, not at all. Still, someday Cuba's opening will occur, and the possibility of violence keeps it worthy of our military attention.¹

US policy objectives and events on the island will define Cuban-related US military missions once Fidel Castro is no longer dictator. The US Army role, if any, could center around stability and support operations on behalf of law enforcement and aid agencies. Current scholarship regarding the probable face of post-Castro Cuba lends hope that changes there will be peaceful. However, even a peaceful transition could include dysfunction and unrest—a Cuban *Sturm und Drang* marked by corruption, street crime, economic tumult and the potential for even more serious instability. There are too many ingredients that promote civil violence to expect trouble-free transition to a free society. Whatever the level of unrest, however, and almost regardless of the objectives pursued, rational transition in Cuba will involve three centers of gravity: property rights, the FAR and the Internet.

These three things, if not mastered, can threaten the achievement of US policy objectives. Each re-

The descendant of the Rebel Army, today's FAR has a tradition of civic soldiering, and the population considers it an efficient, productive, organized and qualified landlord. The FAR has participated in little direct repression, is not associated with the collapse of communism and is considered less corrupt than other institutions.

sides on a distinct conceptual plane. One, property is the key to realizing long-term social and economic goals. The FAR, on the other hand, is an institutional, political center of gravity. Finally, the Internet (as shorthand for new information technologies generally) is the linchpin to argument and perception. Only in light of these three central subjects can the US military determine its optimal role in what may be one of the most broadly engaging interagency campaigns ever undertaken. The Army may be called upon to reach out to its Cuban counterpart with an open hand rather than a closed fist.

Center of Gravity I: Property Rights

Real estate is not the only kind of property that will be hotly contested in Cuba. Utility concessions, contracts, bandwidth, overflight and regulatory controls—all property interests—will be disputed. In addition to these tangible slices of property, another property rights question clearly ties property to ideology and describes why the possibility of gradual reform is slight and why changes in Cuban society will be rapid.



From bicycles and Studebakers to the Internet.

Public Internet use is closely monitored, service providers few.... Cuban Law 88, enacted in March 2000, provides a penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment for offenses, including providing information to the US government; owning, distributing or reproducing material produced by the US government or any other foreign entity; and collaborating, by any means, with foreign radio, television, press or other media,

to destabilize the country and destroy the socialist state. The Cuban government gladly accepted extensive foreign aid to improve infrastructure but has tightened information access and expression.

Property is quickly becoming the key word in international-development theory. In 2000, Hernando deSoto's *The Mystery of Capital* exposed a lost fact of economic development.² DeSoto concluded that widespread material well-being occurs only if a formal property system defines and protects ownership. A stable property regime properly identifies and titles property, has a credible system of peaceably quitting titles, makes title insurance available, and has a transparent and responsive market.³ Unless the poor can generate the intangible quantity called capital, their economic progress will be stunted.⁴

The deSoto theory is an important milestone paralleled by other works that identify property at the base of most conflicts.⁵ For many decades, US developmental and stability efforts have emphasized forming political parties, unions and cooperatives or introducing new methods of production and marketing. The United States has spent enormously on building political identities but almost nothing on solidifying how property is owned. Bilateral relationships with developing countries have not emphasized improvements in property law or records. This relative indifference to property rights is rapidly changing. As a response to the Summit of the Americas, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) is experimenting with the Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative. Part of that initiative, the USAID Property Registration Project, is now active in several countries.⁶ International organizations and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are likewise adopting the formalization of property rights as a central strategy for sustainable development.

This approach to property was made possible, in part, by the collapse of the Soviet socialist model and a new academic willingness to use the word property without apology. It will affect Cuba's transition in two ways. First, the economic development model that will be applied in Cuba, whether by domestic actors, the Organization of American States (OAS), the United Nations or by some yet undefined amalgam including civil society participants, will embrace the deSoto theory as the surviving truth of economic history. New land reform will be capital-oriented. Responsible quarters will try to give Cuba high-technology surveying; computerized, transparent land registry; impartial property courts; and Internet-based market exposure. Second, property rights that fuel the engine of capital formation cannot exist within a socialist legal framework. A movement that promotes systems of law and bureaucracy designed to protect property and attract capital will be immediately at odds with the Cuban socialist experiment. Among other things, the existing *Constitución de la República de Cuba* (Cuban constitution) specifically prohibits mortgages on small landholdings.⁷

New recognition of the nature of property and capital bodes well for Cuba's accelerated return to material prosperity. The existence of capital evokes

Property rights that fuel the engine of capital formation cannot exist within a socialist legal framework. A movement that promotes systems of law and bureaucracy designed to protect property and attract capital will be immediately at odds with the Cuban socialist experiment... New recognition of the nature of property and capital bodes well for Cuba's accelerated return to material prosperity. The existence of capital evokes sources of capital, and an abundant flow of capital to the island will come from the United States.



If nothing else, the dollar will outlive the dictator.

Fred den Blanken

sources of capital, and an abundant flow of capital to the island will come from the United States. Cuban-American money will be a powerful, unspoken argument in favor of a market-oriented economy. Among the forces standing in the way is Cuban law. Although the current *Constitución* contains a set of paragraphs designed to reassure foreign investors, it fundamentally rejects capitalism. It explicitly denies peasants the possibility of capital accumulation or attraction and is anathema to the deSoto model.⁸

The *Constitución* is also a road map for corruption. Article 23 allows foreign investors to acquire and hold rights, pursuant to Article 15, to assets forming part of the "socialist state patrimony" but in each case only upon prior and specific approval of the council of ministers or its executive committee. Article 15 broadly defines "socialist state patrimony" to include "all lands not owned by small agricultural producers or cooperatives formed by small agricultural producers, the subsoil, mines, living and nonliving natural resources located within the economic maritime zone of the Republic, forests, waters, roads, sugar mills, factories, fundamental means of transportation, and all enterprises, banks and installations which have been nationalized and expropriated from the imperialists, large landowners and bourgeois, as well as the factories, enterprises and economic installations and scientific, social, cultural and sports centers constructed, developed or acquired by the State, and those which

it may construct, develop or acquire in the future."⁹

As long as the current constitution remains in effect, the council of ministers or its executive committee will be the most important purchase that foreign investors can make. The peasant, meanwhile, stays on the farm, gains no equity and at death may pass the property only to a relative who also intends to farm it.

US policy and new developmental theory are diametrically at odds with existing Cuban property law. For Cuba to liberalize the economy and give broad economic meaning to the eventual lifting of the US embargo, the *Constitución* and the revolution it codifies will have to go. Meanwhile, many Cuban insiders will resist that radical change, at least until they are positioned to succeed in free-market capitalism.¹⁰

Critics of free-market capitalism complain that the market undervalues externalities or public goods such as the environment. According to this view, the environment inevitably suffers under pure capitalism because the demand for a rich and healthy environment is not expressed in market activities. The market mechanism, according to this view, prefers exchanges that destroy nature. One of the supposed advantages of socialism was greater ease in recognizing and valuing the environment, and in making economic decisions accordingly. Now, after inventory was taken of abysmal socialist environmental performance in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, few voices risk suggesting environmental



Fidel Castro and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez embrace during Castro's visit to Caracas, Venezuela.

Regional issues present another dimension. Populist Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez styles himself as the next Castro.... Both Venezuela and Cuba have been flirting with Colombia's communist insurgents. The mix is troubling. It would be disheartening to see another anemic socialist-styled dictatorship emerge in Venezuela just as Cuba began its recovery.

remedial action. The number of international environmental protection treaties is growing, and while Cuba currently is party to only a few, a transition government's reaction to these international agreements may be of some consequence to the United States. Any sympathies that the activist environmental protection community might have harbored for the socialist regime will, in any event, be weakened.¹²

Center of Gravity II: The FAR

Cuba's communist party will not be out front in a post-Castro race to control

responsibility as a validator of the Castro regime. Exactly what we will find on the island is unknown, but there are some hints.

A 1998 report by the Center for a Free Cuba lists a variety of environmental concerns: "[T]he intensive deforestation carried out in the Sierra Maestra (63 percent since 1992) has caused the Cauto River, the country's largest, to shrink to nothing more than a trickle during the dry season. This impoverishment of the river flow reduces the water going into the wetlands where salinization has begun to increase alarmingly. Thus, the nutrients upon which many microorganisms, crustaceans, fishes and birds depend have all but disappeared. The inert necks of the Double-Crested Cormorant chicks that have starved to death can be found hanging over the rims of their nests. During 1991 the lakeshore was covered with dead fish. These are only a few of the innumerable symptoms, albeit ignored, indicative of serious dysfunction in the ecological equilibrium of the Leonero biotope."¹¹

Some of the decline in agricultural production in Cuba during the 1990s appears related to broad-scale environmental degradation, including soil erosion, compaction and salinity. The value and economic performance of agricultural holdings may depend on strategic-level environmental fixes and land-use planning. The actual extent of alleged environmental degradations will only be known when foreign scientists are free to travel inside Cuba. If the damage is as great as feared, interest groups will translate concern into both direct action and international lobbying for governmental and multilateral

Cuba's most important property holdings and the revenues that flow from them. The Cuban Revolution was not won by the communist party but, rather, by the *Ejército Rebelde* (Rebel Army) that threw out the Batista government in 1959.¹³ The party was created later within the armed forces. The descendant of the Rebel Army, today's FAR has a tradition of civic soldiering, and the population considers it an efficient, productive, organized and qualified landlord.¹⁴

The FAR has participated in little direct repression, is not associated with the collapse of communism and is considered less corrupt than other institutions. Moreover, the FAR's noncombat strength is reflected in the portfolio of state institutions it effectively controls: the Ministry of Sugar Industry; National State Reserve Institute; Ministry of Fisheries and Merchant Marine; Ministry of Transport and Ports; Cuban Civil Aviation Corporation Inc.; National Institute of State Reserves; Ministry of Information Technology and Communications; *Grupo Electrónica de Cuba*, which includes COPEXTEL telecoms; Cuban Civil Aviation Corporation; Habanos, S.A. (tobacco products); Gaviota Inc. (tourist enterprise); Metropolitan Bank; GeoCuba Entrepreneurial Group (land concessions and leases); TECNOTEC (high-tech importer/exporter); Industrial Military Union (12 major industries, 16 factories, 230 facilities); Plan-Turquino-Manati (a funded developmental plan covering 20 municipalities); Plan for Entrepreneurial Redesign; CIMEX (import/export, free-trade zones, tourism, transportation, digital communications equipment,

The FAR will prefer that targets of indictment and litigation come out of its institutional competitors, and it could prove slow in coming to their defense. Having the option to choose in favor of proletariat support and against tainted parts of the vanguard could turn out to be a major consequence of the FAR's entrepreneurial strength.



The militarized proletariat listens to Party functionary.

car rentals and audiovisual publicity); CUBANACAN (similar to CIMEX); Citrus (agricultural and industrial processing); State Commission for Entrepreneurial Perfection; and Ideological Department of the Central Committee.¹⁵

Domingo Amuchastegui notes that the FAR is "much more than a simple institution of the state, isolated as a segment, confined to certain quarters and under 'civilian' control. The FAR were, and remain, the backbone of the existing power structure."¹⁶ The power implied in controlling most property and all major weapon systems is obvious. It is difficult to tell what kind of organizational integrity the FAR will keep or what kind of reception the FAR will give to deSoto's view of poverty and wealth, but there may be some positive surprises. The Cuban military does not appear to be especially ideological and has already steered the Cuban economy through substantial changes. As Amuchastegui suggests, the FAR is the protector of the "Revolution," which is not the same as the typical army mission to protect national sovereignty. Is socialism the revolution to be defended or just the advantage of the established elite, which includes FAR leaders? The FAR, or parts of it, may purposefully demonstrate an ability and willingness to use force to preserve elite power or some of its remnants. It may, in so doing, assert its mythical, socialist revolutionary identity. Preferably, given its popular respect, advantage over other state institutions and experience with capitalism, the FAR will drift from its socialist heritage and allow radical changes in land tenure and property ownership.

John P. Powelson, in an exhaustive survey of the

history of land ownership and reform, concluded that formalized practices of land ownership are a central determinant of social peace.¹⁷ He pointed out, however, that "The most disheartening conclusion [regarding changes in property regimes] . . . may be that whenever a reformer (such as a king, a government or a revolutionary junta) has changed the land tenure system by fiat, he, she or it has retained a substantial portion of the rights instead of yielding them to the peasant."¹⁸ This generalization applies to the 1959 Castro revolution, to the Cuban government's 1990s market-oriented changes and will likely apply to changes during a post-Castro transition. The FAR, as Cuba's principal landlord, appears less strident and more receptive than Castro to radical transformation.¹⁹ As a corporate body, it may be able to steer the decisions of remnant senior leadership. Of the existing Cuban institutions, the FAR appears to be the likely catalyst and steward of change. Powelson's warning must be heeded. Still, with few alternatives, the FAR rises above other organs of the Cuban state as a target, not for destruction, but for interaction.

Any future FAR role in repression and human rights abuse will be critical during the transition. Human rights questions are embedded everywhere, and the human rights situation, as reported by rights advocacy groups, defines the potential for violence in a post-Castro Cuba.²⁰

A 1999 Human Rights Watch World Report states that the Cuban government has legally silenced opponents, rejecting "pleas to repeal offensive provisions such as the crime of enemy propaganda and spreading false news, which criminalized



Piet den Bieman

There could be more traffic in this policeman's future.

Members of the current regime at all levels will be dragged into court, if not in the first moments of political and social loosening, then as soon as sufficient discovery is accomplished. The FAR has been able to keep its distance, or the perception of distance, from repressive activities. This would seem to promise a critical competitive advantage when institutional denunciations are finally given voice.

dissent and independent reporting. Cuban law broadly defined sedition as including nonviolent opposition that ‘perturb[ed] the socialist order.’”²¹

This assessment reflects widespread frustration and disappointment regarding the Castro regime’s human rights practices. Some had hoped that Fidel Castro would loosen repressive controls after Pope John Paul’s 1998 visit to the island. It did not happen, and any post-Castro transition government will face a human rights dilemma. Clamping down further on free expression risks turning off international support when it is most needed. On the other hand, releasing hundreds of political prisoners to express their views publicly or allowing international human rights organizations to operate on the island invites civil conflict. Many of the newly expressed views will kindle violence. For example, Dr. Oscar Biscet was convicted, in part, for protests outside an abortion clinic that led to a spontaneous near-riot. In Cuba, abortion is violently controversial—free speech should not, in the short run, be thought of as a peacemaker.

Furthermore, decades of repression will undoubtedly lead to lawsuits and indictments. Members of the current regime will be dragged into court, if not in the first moments of political and social loosening, then as soon as sufficient discovery is accomplished. The FAR has been able to keep its distance, or the perception of distance, from repressive activities. This would seem to promise a critical competitive advantage when institutional denunciations

are finally given voice. Incidents in the towns of Cojima and Regla in 1993 are emblematic.²² Cubans attempting to escape in rafts were shot in one instance and beaten to death by border police in another. Major riots ensued. FAR leaders, including Raul Castro, noted the potential for mass uprising and determined that the FAR would not become involved in any Tienamen-type situation.²³ FAR leaders understand that its health as an institution depends on the people’s positive perception.

External influences, such as the new reach of international law, will influence the FAR’s relationship with the Cuban people. Pursuing and prosecuting perpetrators of gross human rights violations have been important dimensions of the global movement to extend the reach of humanitarian law. Recent results are startling. Public and private international law are commingling, and private claims are finding new avenues for litigation. In Latin America, the most vocal plaintiffs have been decidedly leftist and the defendants overwhelmingly on the right. Whether Guatemalan Generals Rios Montt or Alejandro Gramajo, Paraguay’s General Alfredo Stroesner or Chilean General Augusto Pinochet, it is government military figures who have suffered the effects of newly accepted extraterritoriality. Expansion of international law and enthusiastic application of private legal strategies have given the political far left great traction during the 1990s. Now communist leaders in Cuba might be prosecuted under the same international system.

As that possibility becomes reality, promoters of international criminal law who have been sympathetic toward the Cuban revolution may push less forcefully.

In the face of new legal consequences of human rights abuse, Cuban leaders will probably remain adamant in their totalitarianism to postpone judgment day. Meanwhile, the combination of fact and law may force governments like those in Canada and Spain to cease giving the Cuban leadership a pass on human rights. Paradoxically, the growth of international law may not help make the Cuban transition more peaceful. It may instead encourage abuse as the regime seeks ways to resist historical review. The FAR will prefer that targets of indictment and litigation come out of its institutional competitors, and it could prove slow in coming to their defense. Having the option to choose in favor of proletariat support and against tainted parts of the vanguard could turn out to be a major consequence of the FAR's entrepreneurial strength.

Center of Gravity III: The Internet

While existence of the Internet might affect the ways a contingency operation would be mounted in response to a Cuban crisis, its real significance lies in the promise to help avoid such a contingency. A 1996 RAND study on Cuba and information technology made the following recommendations:

- Encourage Cuban Internet connectivity.
- Reduce administrative bottlenecks regarding bidirectional travel for technicians and new communication offerings.
- Avoid posting blatant propaganda on the Internet.
- Use the Internet to communicate balanced news and analysis.
- Avoid legislative restrictions on telecommunications.
- Permit direct investment in Cuban telecommunications and computer networks by US firms.
- Foster Internet use by Cuban NGOs, universities and other users.²⁴

Four years later, mainstream advice had not changed. The US Association of Former Members of Congress sent a seven-member delegation to Cuba in 1999 to assess political, economic and social conditions. The delegation recommended that "breakthroughs in the telecommunications industry should be explored to increase information links to Cuba. Internet, e-mail, cell phones and other state-

Many people admire Castro's boisterous defiance of the United States. Others willingly overlook realities of Cuban life to satisfy an idealistic desire for a successful socialist experiment. Together these conceptual quantities—Castro as American headache and Cuba as ideological pet—constitute a reservoir on which the Cuban regime draws to deflect scrutiny.

of-the-art communications slowly are bringing information and ideas to the country. It is recommended that the US government and Congress consider authorizing US telecommunications companies to explore possibilities for establishing more open and diverse communications between the United States and Cuba."²⁵

If the thinking was to speed Cuba's transition to liberty, it did not work. The electronic revolution has so far proven no threat to the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban regime approached the web as a neutral environment that it could control internally and simultaneously apply for propagandistic advantage. Cuban leaders confounded arguments that greater access to cell phones and the Internet would subvert the dictatorship. Public Internet use is closely monitored, service providers few. Since the Cold War, the United States has tried to advance Cuban democracy "by technological means. Since the passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, international telecommunications have been strategically exempted from the US embargo, and the US policy has attempted to engage the Cuban people through greater information flow. . . . the Internet has brought no political change to Cuba, and it is unlikely to do so anytime soon."²⁶ Cuban Law 88, enacted in March 2000, provides a penalty of up to 20 years' imprisonment for offenses, including providing information to the US government; owning, distributing or reproducing material produced by the US government or any other foreign entity; and collaborating, by any means, with foreign radio, television, press or other media, to destabilize the country and destroy the socialist state.²⁷ The Cuban government

These three things, if not mastered, can threaten the achievement of US policy objectives. Each resides on a distinct conceptual plane. One, property, is the key to realizing long-term social and economic goals. The FAR, on the other hand, is an institutional, political center of gravity. Finally, the Internet (as shorthand for new information technologies generally) is the linchpin to argument and perception.

gladly accepted extensive foreign aid to improve infrastructure but has tightened information access and expression.

The electronic-engagement strategy does not seem to have had the desired effect. Nevertheless, a strong information-technology base may ultimately favor transition toward a free society. There are apparently only six Internet service providers. Access is tightly controlled and only made available to approved government employees and academics.²⁸ Even so, computer literacy is widespread, and given a loosening of repression, the pace of participation in Internet communication will accelerate.

Law 209 of Cuba's Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers regulates use and development of information networks and Internet service in Cuba. The distribution of competencies follows:

- The Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA) issues licenses and accounts for information distribution.
- The Ministry of Communications (MINCONS) operates telecommunications hardware.
- The MININT establishes technical security procedures.
- The Ministry of Justice is responsible for the legal framework of the entire operation, including preparing new legislation.
- The Ministry of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (MINFAR) ensures that the Internet will not weaken state security.²⁹

Cuba and its leader play unique roles. Many people admire Castro's boisterous defiance of the United States. Others willingly overlook realities of Cuban life to satisfy an idealistic desire for a successful socialist experiment. Together these concep-

tual quantities—Castro as American headache and Cuba as ideological pet—constitute a reservoir on which the Cuban regime draws to deflect scrutiny. A countervailing body invokes globalized law and imperatives of capital creation. The Cubans' struggle will feature a titanic war of ideas, and the Internet is its major battlefield. Of the institutions on the island, the FAR has the dominant position for information operations, wielding veto power over any development in the information field and having a FAR officer as MINCONS head.

AUS Army Role?

Cuba's challenge is complex. Migration to and from the island, arsenals of weapons (including hundreds of thousands of small arms with ammunition), the enormous electronic intelligence-gathering site at Lourdes, allegations of drug trading by members of the Castro regime and an alleged Cuban biological warfare research and development program are just a few issues likely to complicate a transition.³⁰ Regional issues present another dimension. Populist Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez styles himself as the next Castro. Chavez has energetically courted Castro and helps the Cuban regime through favorable petroleum agreements.³¹ Meanwhile, both Venezuela and Cuba have been flirting with Colombia's communist insurgents.³² The mix is troubling. It would be disheartening to see another anemic socialist-styled dictatorship emerge in Venezuela just as Cuba began its recovery. None of these problems alters the point that favorable outcomes from Cuba's transition depend on control of three things: property, the Internet and the FAR. Of these three, the flesh-and-bone FAR holds the greatest degree of practical control over the other two.³³

For the US Army the message is clear. At the core of the Cuban conundrum is a national army, the FAR. It is landowner and landlord and has the physical potential to be a dangerous military foe. Short of that it holds the keys to a favorable transition. Whatever the mix of interagency responsibilities and subobjectives in a campaign to influence Cuba's future, the US Army could be as useful for its potential to interact with the Cuban military as for its ability to threaten the Cuban military.³⁴

The FAR's role as landlord and potential steward of change has a caveat. Property discussions have assumed the power of academic theory turned policy. Another academic theory turned policy has

guided US thinking and counseling toward Latin America for decades—that civilians must control the military. In Cuba the United States might decide to cultivate the FAR as the most advantageous

institutional vehicle for limiting violence while achieving liberation, a decision that would have to be weighed against our long-standing commitment to civilian control. 🍷

NOTES

1. Geoffrey Demarest, "The Cuba Contingency," *Military Review* (January 1994).

2. Hernando deSoto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2000).

3. In a dispute over real property ownership, the lawsuit is called a "quiet title" case, reflecting one of the earliest functions of formal law.

4. The problem of capital formation is a problem of the poor. "Today, the difference between advanced nations and the rest of the world is that between countries where formal property is widespread and countries where classes are divided into those who can fix property rights and produce capital and those who cannot." DeSoto, *Ibid.*, 212.

5. See, for instance, John P. Powelson, *The Story of Land: A World History of Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform* (Cambridge, MA: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1988); Geoffrey Demarest, *Geoproperty: Foreign Affairs, National Security and Property Rights* (London: Frank Cass, 1998).

6. The Summit initiative on property registry also calls for the governments of the Americas to incorporate alternative property dispute resolution mechanisms into their plans. See Virtual Office for the Inter-Summit Property Systems Initiative, <www.property-registration.org/Land-links.htm>; Land Tenure section of Sustainable Development Dimensions, a service of the Sustainable Development Department of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, <www.fao.org/sd/tdirect/default.htm>; Land and Real Estate Initiative of the World Bank, <www.worldbank.org/html/pd/private/sector/land-re.htm>; The Report of the United Nations Meeting of Cadastral Experts, sponsored by the International Federation of Surveyors <www.fig7.org.uk/publications/Bogor/BogorReport.html>; Brian Trackman, William Fisher and Luis Salas, *The Reform of Property Registration Systems in Guatemala: A Status Report*, 11 June 1999, <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/prs/Guate.html>.

7. *Constitución de la República de Cuba*, Article 19, <www.georgetown.edu/LatAm/Political/Constitutions/Cuba/cuba1992.html>.

8. *Ibid.*, Articles 14-25.

9. *Ibid.*, Article 15.

10. One of the key findings of the 1998 RAND Forum on Cuba was that Cuban leaders are not committed to fundamental system change, even though concessions have been made to attract foreign investment. See Edward Gonzalez and Richard A. Nuccio, "The Cuban Conundrum," *Conference Proceedings, The RAND Forum on Cuba* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 31-53.

11. Carlos Wotzkow, "S.O.S. for Cuba's natural environment," <www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oaqgw032.html>, originally published in *Cuba Brief, Report of the Center for a Free Cuba* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, Winter 1998), 19-24; Eudel Eduardo Cepero, "La Situación Ambiental de Cuba al Finalizar El Siglo CC," *Cuba in Transition: Volume 10, Papers and Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE)*, 162-169.

12. On the subject of socialist environmental performance, see Sergio Diaz-Briquets and Jorge Perez-Lopez, "Socialism and Environmental Disruption: Implications for Cuba," *Proceedings of the 8th Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE)* (Miami, FL: 6-8 August 1998), <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba8>.

13. Domingo Amuchastegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces: Power and Reforms," in *Cuba in Transition: Volume 9, Papers and Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE)*, 109, <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba9>; "FAR: Mastering Reforms," *Cuba in Transition: Volume 10, Papers and Proceedings of the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE)*, 433-44.

14. For general information on the Cuban armed forces, see *The Cuban Armed Forces Review*, <http://www.cubapolidata.com/cafr/cafr.html#information>; Defensa Nacional de Cuba (official website of the Cuban armed forces), <www.cubagob.cu/otras_info/minfar/default.htm>.

15. Amuchastegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces: Power and Reform," 110.

16. *Ibid.*, 111.

17. Powelson, *The Story of Land*.

18. *Ibid.*, x.

19. In this vein of FAR as landlord, it is interesting to note that there are apparently numerous property registries in Cuba, most designed to allow orderly inspection and census. One of them, the national "Cadastral," registers parcel plans that predate the revolutionary government and has been under the control of the FAR's Institute of Cartography and Geodesy since 1977 (an informative detail regarding the FAR's administrative advantage when it comes time to argue the claims of Cuban exiles whose properties were expropriated). See Oscar A. Salas, Esq., "The Registry of [Real] Property in the Castro Regime," <http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba3/salas.html>.

20. Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2000, Cuba*, <www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf>.

21. *Human Rights Watch World Report/Americas/Cuba*, <www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/americas/cuba.html>. The repression laws are being applied. According to Freedom House, another major rights advocacy organization, the Cuban government recently arrested two prominent Czechs after they met with Cuban democratic activists. See <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>.

22. US Department of State, "Cuba Human Rights Practices, 1993" (31 January 1994), <www.cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/international/country_reports/1993_us_state_dept_human_rights_guide/cuba.txt>.

23. Amuchastegui, "Cuba's Armed Forces: Power and Reform," 113.

24. Larry Press, *Cuban Telecommunications, Computer Networking, and US Policy Implications, DRU-1330-1-OSD*, Abstract (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999).

25. Congressional Record: 13 May 1999 (House DOCID: cr13may99-28), H3091-H3109, <wais.access.gpo.gov>.

26. Taylor C. Boas, "The Dictator's Dilemma? The Internet and US Policy Toward Cuba," *Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2000), 58, 59; Andrew Cawthorne, "CIA Whistle-Blower Launches Cuba Internet Service," Reuters (Havana), <www.infomanage.com/caribbean/cuba/cia_cuba_1.html>.

27. Amnesty International, *Annual Report 2000, Cuba*.

28. Andy Williamson, "The Impact of the Internet on the Politics of Cuba," Wairu Consulting, <www.wairu.com/pubs/cuba.html>.

29. Nelson Valdes, "Cuba, the Internet and US Policy," <www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Caribe/bp13.html>. According to this article, there are now thousands of individual e-mail accounts on 32 domestic computer networks in Cuba.

30. On the intelligence facility at Lourdes, see Federation of American Scientists, Project on Intelligence Reform, "Lourdes [Cuba], Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) facility, 23°00'01"N 82°28'56"W," <www.fas.org/index.html>; Pablo Alfonso, "China Installs Communication Bases in Cuba," *El Nuevo Herald* (24 June 1999), <www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3772adce31bc.htm>. On regime drug trafficking, see Jeff Leen, "Traffickers tie Castro to Drug Ring," *Miami Herald* (5 July 1996), <www.hermanos.org/docs/tmh2725.html>; Juan O. Tamayo, "US Re-examines Cuban Connections to Illegal Drug Smugglers," *Miami Herald* (23 July 1999), published on Cubanet/Cubanews, <www.64.21.33.164/CNews/y99/jul99/23e10.htm>. On biological warfare labs, see Martin Arostegui, "Fidel Castro's Deadly Secret," *Washington Times Insight Magazine* (20 July 1998), <www.insightmag.com>.

31. Alexandra Olson, "Cuba, Venezuela Sign Oil Deal," *Associated Press* (30 October 2000), <www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/cuba/US-Cuba/ap103000.html>.

32. Diario Las Américas, "Alianza entre Castro, Chávez y la FARC según la prensa colombiana" ("Alliance Among Castro, Chavez and the FARC According to Colombian Press") (26 August 1999), <http://64.21.33.164/CNews/y99/ago99/27o5.htm>; Diario Las Américas, "Gobierno niega alianza Cuba-Venezuela-FARC" ("Government Denies Cuba-Venezuela-FARC Alliance") (30 August 1999), <http://64.21.33.164/CNews/y99/ago99/31o5.htm>.

33. For strategy purists uncomfortable with three centers of gravity, the FAR is the center of gravity.

34. Section 201 (11) of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad) of 1996, P.L. 104-114 states, "it is the policy of the United States 'To assist a transition government in Cuba and a democratically elected government in Cuba to prepare the Cuban military for an appropriate role in a democracy.'"

Lieutenant Colonel Geoff Demarest, US Army, Retired, is a Latin America analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Colorado, an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Denver Graduate School of International Studies, and a J.D. from the Denver University School of Law. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Latin America, including commander, 12th Training Battalion, Fort Sheridan, Illinois; and assistant Army attache, Guatemala City. Before accepting a position at FMSO, he maintained a private law practice in Loveland, Colorado. He is the author of Geoproperty: Foreign Affairs, National Strategy and Property Rights and numerous articles on defense and security topics.

Islamic Extremism in Former Soviet Republics

Major Gregory R. Sarafian, US Army

SINCE THE FORMER Central Asian Soviet Republics—Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—gained independence, there has been a revival of Central Asian Islamic roots. Within this revival, certain areas have turned to Islamic fundamentalism, and incidents of Islamic extremism have multiplied. This trend helped fuel a civil war in Tajikistan and caused recent terrorist acts in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. An extremist group, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), has committed most of the armed activity and receives support from inside and outside the country. Playing a pivotal role in these proceedings is Afghanistan, where the Taliban now control nearly the entire country and export not only narcotics but also their militant brand of extremism. A survey of the IMU, the region and other contributing factors, such as Caspian Sea oil, illustrates the depth of this problem and its connections to transnational issues affecting both the region and the world.

Genesis of the Islamic Extremist Movement

Extremist problems in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have surfaced for many reasons. Although none was strong enough to bring about this movement alone, the synergism led to the current, dangerous state of affairs.

Ideology vacuum. The extinction of Marxism-Leninism as the official state ideology a decade ago created a vacuum, which “was quickly filled in with all sorts of ideologies wrapped in Islamic ideas.”¹ Both local and established Muslim-state religious leaders began to preach tenets of the new thinking. Extremists among them narrowly interpreted the Koran’s words “listen not to the unbelievers” and “strive against them with the utmost strenuousness” as a clear message that faithful believers of Islam cannot exist fruitfully under any non-Islamic government.² One new ideology that began to gain power and influence was Wahhabism, which concerns the idea of jihad, or holy war, against infidels. The teachers of Wahhabism “preach *ibahit* as the central point of their religious ideas, which is a permission to murder those who violate the purity of Islam.”³

The relative decline in regional living standards has disaffected the population with ruling secular powers. Ordinary citizens are gradually recognizing the fact that the social and economic reforms failed. An Islamic state dictates societal norms and economic structures, so the disaffected population can see Islam as an alternative to the current situation.

Economic factors. The relative decline in regional living standards has disaffected the population with ruling secular powers. Ordinary citizens are gradually recognizing the fact that the “social and economic reforms failed.”⁴ An Islamic state dictates societal norms and economic structures, so the disaffected population can see Islam “as an alternative to the current situation in which . . . the states have failed to deliver the expected results [and] democracy is seen as a by-product of Western pop-culture.”⁵ This dynamic could logically lead to fundamentalism, but it does not necessarily lead to militant extremism. However, extremist leaders and propagandists use a state’s poor performance to help convince citizens that overthrowing the established government is the only recourse. Extremists know that “living amid economic crises and being exposed to social stratification and corruption, people begin to doubt the political future of democracy in their countries.”⁶ If extremist leaders can show that only through force and militant activity will the government adjust, its support increases.

Fergana Valley. One area in this region has been a political powder keg—the Fergana Valley. Although historically a politically unified area, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan now claim various parts, thanks to Soviet cartographers who drew complicated republic boundaries.⁷ As a result, large pockets of ethnic Uzbeks live in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and a concentration of ethnic Kyrgyz live in Uzbekistan. This dispersion becomes problematic when, for example, Uzbekistan tightens borders after a militant extremist

attack emanating from Tajikistan.

Although surrounded by forbidding mountainous terrain, its own area is extremely trafficable and has served as a natural rest and transfer point for ancient trade routes and today's drug routes. Its high population density and high unemployment ensures a ready pool of manpower for any movement, religious or otherwise. Much of the Islamic movement's local ideological leadership is based in the Fergana Valley.

Even before the Soviet Union dissolved, during the perceived loosening of control under Mikhail Gorbachev, the number of mosques in Namangan, Uzbek, rose from two to 26.⁸ During December 1991 members of different Islamic organizations, to include Wahhabis, organized a rally and "captured a Communist Party building with the intention of establishing an Islamic center."⁹ What later emerged was an actual "movement for Muslim self-government in Namangan."¹⁰ Tahir Yuldosh led this movement and would become the future political leader of the IMU. The event was significant because it highlighted the role the valley would play in the next 10 years of religious movements. Until 1993 the greater region experienced an initial explosion of Islamic thought, preachings and organized movements. During the middle of the decade, governments began suppressing this activity. The current phase began in the final years of the decade, during which extremism has played a growing role in pursuing Islamic goals.¹¹ At each phase of this process, the Fergana Valley has been at the forefront of all related activities.

Repressive government. The Uzbek government, in particular, has exercised extremely repressive tactics. In the Fergana Valley more than 900 mosques have been shut down.¹² Many men shave their beards for fear of being labeled extremist; many arbitrary arrests occur. During Ramadan, the government recently "banned broadcasts of the call to prayer from mosques by loudspeakers."¹³ In 1998 nongovernment organization Human Rights Watch accused Uzbek President Islam Karimov of "carrying out unchecked repression."¹⁴ Intended to target extremists, these government policies have repressed innocents as well, resulting in the accelerated growth of extremism.

External assistance. Tajikistan provides assistance to extremists in the region, and the Taliban assists locally. The two states play a critical role in the continuing armed struggle in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Tajikistan. After the Soviet Union fell, the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan emerged as the focal point of anti-government sentiment. It radicalized its methods of opposition, provoked a costly civil war and founded the United Tajik Opposition (UTO). Following the movement for Muslim self-

government in Namangan in December 1991, many members of the involved organizations fled south, joined the UTO and fought as separate armed detachments during the Tajik civil war.¹⁵ Thus began the connection to the militant groups that would rise years later. At the end of the civil war, under the

Russia's problems with regional Islamic extremism relate to decades-old issues with Afghanistan. . . . The Taliban continue to offer bases for various extremist groups. In May 2000 during large-scale military operations in Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned that Russia might launch air strikes against Afghanistan for assisting the Chechen rebels.

provisions of a national truce, the opposition received "30 percent of the leading posts in executive structures."¹⁶ The government's official recognition of the opposition was a tremendous lesson for extremist organizations to the north.

Finally, there is the issue of the Karategin Valley of Tajikistan, which runs north to south in the middle of Tajikistan and connects northern Afghanistan to the Fergana Valley. It is a natural funnel for protected movement and has been out of Tajik government control since 1992. Controlled by the opposition during the civil war, it is the site of militant extremist bases.¹⁷ Karategin Valley is a frequently used invasion route north for extremists. Although the civil war is over, Tajikistan has not effectively interdicted this route, and several armed incursions have recently and repeatedly passed through it. This questions whether the war's end and the signed treaty have actually changed control of the area. It serves UTO interest to have a similarly recognized political brother across the border. If armed incursions will foster eventual recognition and an ensuing political power base of northern extremist groups, the UTO should want to limit the Tajik government's interference with the IMU.

Afghanistan. The Taliban currently control most of Afghanistan and have allowed not only extremists from the north to train on its territory but also armed groups from regions such as Chechnya. It is also the home base of Osama bin Laden, the wealthy Saudi citizen who has conducted and supported numerous terrorist acts in the name of Islam. Afghanistan supports northern-based militant extremism for several reasons. First, the Taliban understand the benefits from the Tajik opposition's official political status and power, and want to encourage this process in Uzbekistan. Second, it would be far easier for the Taliban to have a locally initiated movement topple an unfriendly secular government in the region than

for the Taliban to have to eventually move north. As the most powerful political and military force in the region, Uzbekistan also assumes the role of “the main obstacle to the expansion of radical Islam in the region.”¹⁸ Finally, the lingering anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan—termed the Northern Alliance—would receive less concentrated support

Islamic extremism, emanating from Kazakhstan's Uighur diaspora or from a northward expansion of the IMU's area of operations, threatens the interests of all three external powers. Kazakhstan understands too well the competing goals of Russia, China and the United States for its oil. Each country maintains close ties, military and otherwise, to Kazakhstan, and it is in Kazakhstan's interest not to jeopardize any of the relationships.

from northern secular governments if these governments were forced to concentrate their efforts internally.¹⁹ By eliminating Central Asian countries' efforts, the Taliban gain another opportunity to consolidate power.

Recent Militant Activities

On 16 February 1999 Tashkent, Uzbekistan's capital, suffered a series of car bomb attacks that left 16 dead and 100 injured. One of the bombs was detonated in a large square, shortly before the arrival of Karimov. In the immediate aftermath, the Uzbek government accused foreign powers of involvement; many foreign nationals, including Turkish citizens, were expelled from the country. Early that summer, Turkey recalled its ambassador from Tashkent, as the Uzbek government “accused elements in Turkey, most notably Erbakan's Islamist Welfare Party, of supporting the terrorism.”²⁰ However, during their trial, the accused bombers specifically referred to the IMU and its military leader, Juma Namangani. The defendants stated that support for the IMU comes, in part, from a “fund of Islamic Extremists . . . whose headquarters is in Afghanistan.”²¹

During August 1999 a group of several hundred militants of Namangani's IMU moved into the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, along the Tajikistan border, and took 13 hostages. Among the hostages were four Japanese mining engineers and the commander of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry troops. In the opinion of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, the militants' goal was to restore the Kokand Khanate, an Islamic state. The resurrected Khanate would include three provinces in the Fergana Valley—Kyrgyzstan's Osh province, Tajikistan's Leninobod province and Uzbekistan's Fergana province.²² Af-

ter two months of combat operations, the militants escaped to Tajikistan where they began to negotiate the return of the Japanese hostages for a \$2-million ransom.²³

During August 2000 IMU militants again launched a three-pronged attack into Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, and one group emerged only 60 miles from Tashkent.²⁴ Rebels announced their goal to replace the secular Uzbek government with an Islamic state—a goal similar to the 1999 incursion's. After two months, both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan had expelled the militants, who retreated to the mountainous border areas from which they had launched their attack. Namangani reportedly has bases in Afghanistan and a force of more than 1,000 personnel in Tajikistan, of whom roughly half are Tajiks who “were part of the UTO during the civil war but did not accept the peace process.”²⁵ Significantly small groups of Chechens, Arabs sent by bin Laden and Pakistanis have recently joined this group.²⁶

External Connections to Regional Extremism

The scope of the extremist movement and the area's strategic location have generated much attention from regional and world powers. The following topics outline the security agreements among groups of countries that have been signed; the efficacy of such agreements; and the issues that are specific to Russia, China and the United States:

Security pacts. A security agreement signed in April 2000 by the presidents of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan “aimed at coordinating intelligence and security agencies, and pledging joint military action if any come under attack.”²⁷ A second security agreement, called the “Shanghai Five,” includes China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan. This group already existed when its members met in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, on 5 July 2000. The summit focused on the “joint struggle against international terrorism, religious extremism, separatism and other types of transborder crime.” Notable decisions included setting up an antiterrorist center in Bishkek, capital of Kyrgyzstan; permitting Uzbekistan to join the group as an observer; and changing the group's name to the “Shanghai Forum.”²⁸ In addition, an existing alliance—the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—has begun to play a larger role. At a June 2000 meeting, the CIS created a joint anti-terrorist center in Moscow which is led by a general from Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB)—successor to the KGB.²⁹

Analysis of the pacts. The pacts, which were all in place during the August 2000 armed incursion, have not been very effective. For example, the members' militaries have standardized command and control systems; yet, loud pronouncements of new security pacts demonstrate to in-country organiza-

tions that the local government is taking steps to prevent regional destabilization. These organizations bring aid into the country, and it is important to convince them to stay. Fledgling countries must also demonstrate proactive steps to resolve domestic issues and prevent their spread.

Russia. Russia's problems with regional Islamic extremism relate to decades-old issues with Afghanistan. The Taliban continue to consolidate military gains achieved during fall 2000 against the Northern Alliance. The Taliban continue to offer bases for various extremist groups. In May 2000 during large-scale military operations in Chechnya, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned that Russia might launch air strikes against Afghanistan for assisting the Chechen rebels (according to Russian intelligence).³⁰ Russian soldiers currently guard the Tajik/Afghan border. On 20 November 2000 Colonel General Nikolai Reznichenko, the first deputy director of Russia's Federal Border Service, stated the Russian soldiers would remain and "be put on full alert to prevent any spillover into Tajikistan from the current conflict in Afghanistan."³¹

Russia is justifiably concerned about Islamic extremism moving north from the Afghan border. After the civil war in Tajikistan, extremist bases began to operate from that country. The next logical move for base formation would be within the critical Fergana Valley. During a Shanghai Five meeting, Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo

Recent Uighur extremist activities have been linked to the extremist movement in the former Soviet Central Asian Republics where a 400,000-member diaspora of ethnic Uighurs lives. In 1997 a Saudi citizen and ethnic Uighur donated a large sum to Tahir Yuldosh, half of which was relayed to Uighur militants from China. Uighur extremists also use the diaspora to collect "funds for the fight against the Chinese authorities back home."

stated, "we have to join forces to combat the activities of terrorists, armed separatists and international extremist organizations that give them financial support."³² Russia's strategic interests in this region are great, including using the Baikonur Cosmodrome, an international space station, in Kazakhstan and the southern countries' buffer role against a Taliban-dominated Afghanistan. Furthermore, Russia desires secular, cooperative regional governments to address transnational narcotics trading and exploiting fossil fuels from the Caspian Sea.

A number of Russia's indigenous people are Muslim. A Russian worst-case scenario would be



for them to adopt, through carefully loaned guidance from imported ideologues, extremism. Even if some Muslims were unwilling to adopt extremism, they might see the movement as future independence. Russian intelligence believes that a portion of the militants who took part in the August 1999 incursion "had been trained at terrorist bases in Chechnya."³³ Although the Chechens have already established contact with the region's extremist movement, Russia will not permit further moves toward independence.

China. In northwest China is the country's largest internal autonomous region, the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Composed of 47 ethnic groups, approximately one-half of XUAR's population is Muslim Uighurs. Furthermore, most Uighurs live in the southern regions of XUAR, adjacent to the region of extremist activity. The Uighurs have embarked on an extremist path toward a united Uighur state, Uighuristan, which would include XUAR; the Seven Rivers area of Kazakhstan; the Osh region of Kyrgyzstan; and the Fergana province of Uzbekistan in the Fergana Valley.³⁴

Recent Uighur extremist activities have been linked to the extremist movement in the former Soviet Central Asian Republics where a 400,000-member diaspora of ethnic Uighurs lives. In December 1997 a Saudi citizen and ethnic Uighur donated a large sum to Tahir Yuldosh, half of which was relayed to Uighur militants from China. Uighur extremists also use the diaspora to collect "funds for the fight against the Chinese authorities back home."³⁵ Kyrgyz authorities arrested an armed group that included Chinese citizens whose aim was to establish

Civil Affairs soldiers participate in refurbishing an orphanage in a former Soviet Republic.



US Army

This region has always been historically significant. The ancient Silk Road passes through here [and] planning is under way for modern transportation routes and oil pipelines through the region. . . . US interest in this region checks Russia's aggressive policies. Russia seeks to use the extremist threat as a means for drawing the former Republics closer to its fold, both militarily and politically. Strong US involvement can thwart these plans.

an independent Uighur state in China.³⁶ Some Uighur extremists have acquired combat experience in other theaters. In March 2000 during combat operations in Chechnya, Russian fighters took several prisoners of war who were ethnic Uighurs from China.³⁷ Recently, Chinese authorities arrested heavily armed militants along the Pakistani border who allegedly trained in Afghanistan to support Muslim separatists in XUAR.³⁸

China has an interest in stabilizing the region. One of the quickest means is to support military and security forces of the countries in question. China sent \$450,000 worth of equipment to Tajikistan's airborne forces and to a Tajik border guards hospital.³⁹ China pledged \$600,000 worth of military aid to Uzbekistan and has offered to assist in training the Uzbek military.⁴⁰ This offer was made after the most recent incursion of IMU-led militants into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in August 2000. Additionally, China must lower the threat from militants without disturbing already-established strategic relationships. The incident in which militants were arrested along the Pakistani border offers an excellent example of the conflicting issues. China has a good relationship with Pakistan and has supported its efforts as a counterweight to Indian influence in the region. China, therefore, must pressure Pakistan—which supports the Taliban—to diminish its assistance to Uighur separatists but not jeopardize this strategic partnership against India.

United States. The United States, like Russia, has its own problems within the region. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, the United States was obliged to support the opposition mujaheddin. Pakistan was the setting for a number of cross-border operations involving arming and training mujaheddin. Many Arab-speaking freedom fighters supplemented US assistance. On one level, it was a fight for the Islamic way of life against communist forces that professed no religion. With the Soviet Union's demise and the end of the Cold War, an interesting phenomenon emerged: the rise of the local Taliban extremists still relied on foreign Islamic extremists' patronage. Now, however, the United States finds itself on the enemy side of militant Islamic extremism.

Following the 2000 armed incursions, the United States acknowledged that the IMU may be linked to bin Laden.⁴¹ Strengthening security structures in the troubled region's countries has become an indirect means to thwart bin Laden's plans. This process becomes especially critical now, as "reports from Afghanistan say he [bin Laden] sees the fragile Central Asian States as a potential and vulnerable arena to bring about an Islamic revolution."⁴² After the militant incursion in 2000, the United States sent military equipment for Kyrgyz border guards as part of a comprehensive US equipment and training support package—a \$3-million allocation.⁴³ US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright articulated the initial aid promise during an April 2000 visit to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Albright also pledged similar support for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. At the same time, leaders from the FBI and CIA also visited this region. CIA Director George J. Tenet met with his Uzbek counterpart in Tashkent to "discuss American aid with satellite intelligence information and other special equipment to combat terrorism."⁴⁴

The region's strategic location offers another incentive for US involvement. Situated among Russia, China and the Middle East, this region has always been historically significant. The ancient Silk Road passes through here. Planning is under way for modern transportation routes and oil pipelines through the region. Kyrgyzstan and China have already designed a railway connecting Osh, Kyrgyzstan and Kashgar, China.⁴⁵ Interestingly, this line would connect two areas of strong Islamic extremism. US interest in this region checks Russia's aggressive policies. Russia seeks to use the extremist threat as a means for drawing the former Republics closer to its fold, both militarily and politically. Strong US involvement can thwart these plans.

The Narcotics Trade

The quantity of drugs flowing out of Afghanistan, their destabilizing effect in Russia and Europe, and

their accompanying profits are central to regional security and stability. The opium poppy is harvested in Afghanistan and transported over portions of the ancient Silk Road to Europe and China as opium or processed heroin. More narcotics travel through this region than through even Southeast Asia's "Golden Triangle"—Myanmar (formerly Burma), Laos and Thailand.⁴⁶ At the UN Millennium Summit, Ivanov said that Afghanistan's drug trafficking concerns both Russia and the United States.⁴⁷

The Fergana Valley plays a large role in this issue. In the Kyrgyz portion of the valley, Osh has become a major "transshipping point for drugs and weapons."⁴⁸ A portion of the drug route begins in Afghanistan, continues through the forbidding passes of the Pamir Mountains and descends to Osh. Given the Fergana Valley's characteristics, it is no surprise that armed groups have begun to exploit this trade for income. Kyrgyz government officials claim that Namangani controls 70 percent of the heroin-trafficking business in the region.⁴⁹

A vicious cycle emerges in this region. One socioeconomic factor feeds another, which in turn, accelerates existing problems such as the drug trade. For example, high unemployment in the valley offers potential recruits for armed groups and leads others into the drug trade as an alternative form of income. The absence of effective, comprehensive government programs to assist unemployed people makes the decision to work in the narcotics trade all the more easy. Nearly all of Osh's factories are closed, so for the four million residents in the city and surrounding villages, "the drug trade is the only viable business left."⁵⁰ Drug-trade profits help fund the destabilizing militant extremist groups, forcing even more government outlays to combat the problem. Funds that could be focused on the underlying problems in the valley, which would inevitably marginalize the support of the armed groups, are squandered in the ongoing struggle against the end product of this cycle—an extremist armed incursion or other terrorist act. As long as the conditions in the valley remain the same, funds flow to armed groups undisturbed, and support continues to flow from local Muslims who might not profess such a militant brand of Islam but who have no other viable course.

Role of Caspian Sea Oil and Natural Gas

During the post-Cold War period, western oil companies have converged on countries surrounding the Caspian Sea to capitalize on the huge potential profits from extracting and transporting fuel. Regional politics and national strategies influence decisions about future pipeline locations and routes. One US interest is limiting Iran's role, and the United States scored a victory at the November 1999 European Security Summit in Istanbul, Turkey. The

presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan agreed to begin work on pipelines from Baku, Azerbaijan, across Georgia and Turkey, to the Mediterranean (Turkish) port of Ceyhan, avoiding Iran.⁵¹ Given current oil availability, however, the Baku pipeline is not commercially viable; it requires more oil. Thus far, oil exploration in Azerbaijan's portion of the Caspian Sea has "yielded disappointing results."⁵²

The answer to the Baku pipeline appeared in May 2000 when a new, enormous oil field was discovered in Kazakhstan's portion of the Caspian Sea. Named the Kashangan field, it was the largest find

*A vicious cycle emerges in this region. . . .
High unemployment in the valley offers potential recruits for armed groups and leads others into the drug trade as an alternative form of income. The absence of effective, comprehensive government programs to assist unemployed people makes the decision to work in the narcotics trade all the more easy.*

in 20 years; "so large as to surpass even the size of the North Sea oil reserves."⁵³ The United States wants enough of this oil to be shipped across the Caspian to the Baku pipeline to ensure the pipeline's economic viability. Russia, however, would like to see most Kazakh oil shipped through pipelines across Russian territory, leading to a Russian port such as Novorossisk on the Black Sea.⁵⁴ The November 1999 Istanbul Summit agreement made this goal all the more critical. Until the agreement, Russia pressed for a Baku-Novorossisk pipeline; China had pushed for a pipeline from Kazakhstan to its resource-poor XUAR.

Islamic extremism, emanating from Kazakhstan's Uighur diaspora or from a northward expansion of the IMU's area of operations, threatens the interests of all three external powers. Kazakhstan understands too well the competing goals of Russia, China and the United States for its oil. Each country maintains close ties, military and otherwise, to Kazakhstan, and it is in Kazakhstan's interest not to jeopardize any of the relationships. Above all, Kazakhstan must keep regional extremist problems from intensifying, spreading to its territory and interfering with its oil industry.


Realpolitik and the IMU

The opposition party in Tajikistan and the Taliban in Afghanistan have much to gain from the IMU's successful operations. Other countries might also gain from a strong extremist threat. For example, a strong IMU equates to acquiescence by former Soviet Republics to participate in Russian-led

security arrangements. The extremist threat requires continued military integration and future dependence on Russian-produced arms. If the extremist threat were to threaten oil shipments from Kazakhstan to China, Russia would benefit in at least two ways: the amount of Kazakh oil shipped north and west through Russia would increase, and Chinese influence in the region could decrease as a necessary result of a large, bilateral pipeline project. Russian military commanders have approached the IMU in Tajikistan and offered assistance, according to unconfirmed reports.⁵⁵

Extremist problems in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have not led to an all-out civil war like the one that ravaged Tajikistan in the past decade. Preventing such conflict is in the interest of regional political leaders and the world community, for ensuing infrastructure breakdown would favor organized criminal elements that transport narcotics out of Afghanistan. In addition, movement of extremist bases north to the Fergana Valley and beyond would threaten the development and exploitation of Caspian Sea oil. Finally, lost investment represents

tremendous hidden cost to the countries in this region. Japanese geologists who were taken hostage in Kyrgyzstan, for example, had been investigating sites for mining gold. Each militant action causes more foreign firms to abstain from investing in these nascent market economies. This isolation contributes to the poor economic realities of the Fergana Valley, which play into the hands of extremist movements seeking unemployed recruits.

In January 2001 regional governments met in response to reports that Namangani had crossed from Afghanistan into Tajikistan and was preparing for combat.⁵⁶ Another armed incursion could occur when the weather improves. This latest movement occurred just before the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Afghanistan because of its role in the drug trade. In addition, the United States is continuing to press for bin Laden's extradition. The US response to these regional issues must weigh all factors outlined here and offer the Taliban a political out. Only with its assistance can the United States be relatively assured of removing bin Laden's dangerous, direct threat to US interests. 

NOTES

1. Bahodir Sidikov, "Religious Context in Uzbekistan: Roots and Sources," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, 57.
2. Orobek Moldaliev, "Islamic Extremism in Central Asia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, 35.
3. Alexander Kniazev, "Afghanistan. Religious Extremism and Terrorism. The Year 2000," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, 81.
4. Sidikov, 56.
5. Elvira Mamytova, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Extremism in Central Asia," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, 51.
6. Moldaliev, 41.
7. Nargis Kassenova, "Religious Extremism in Central Asia—Self-Fulfilling Prophecy in the Making?" *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, 48.
8. Dilip Hiro, "Uzbekistan's Islamists Prove Hard to Repress," *Inter Press Service*, 26 January 1998; *Global NewsBank*, 2 February 2001.
9. Kassenova.
10. Ibid.
11. Mamytova, 52.
12. David Filipov, "Islamic Rebels Thrive in Central Asia," *The Boston Globe*, 31 December 2000; *Global NewsBank*, 2 February 2001.
13. Sergei Blagov, "Ever Deeper Embroiled in Islamist Row," *Inter Press Service*, 29 May 1998; and *Global NewsBank*, 2 February 2001.
14. Ibid.
15. Moldaliev, 33.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Kniazev.
19. Ibid.
20. Kassenova, 44.
21. Ibid., 45.
22. "Armed Militants in Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asia Newsfile*, September 1999, 8.
23. "Militants flee Kyrgyzstan," *Central Asia Newsfile*, October 2000, 9.
24. Filipov.
25. Kassenova, 45.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 46.
28. Moldaliev, 42.
29. Kassenova.
30. "Russia warns of possible air strikes on Afghanistan," *The Times of India*, 25 May 2000, <www.timesofindia.com/250500/25worl3.htm>, accessed 31 January 2001.
31. "Tajikistan: border guards 'will not be reduced,'" *Central Asia Newsfile*, December 2000, 9.
32. "Russia, China and Central Asia join fight against Islamic extremism," *Agence*

- France-Presse*, 21 April 2000; *Global NewsBank*, 2 February 2001.
33. "Kyrgyz Anti-Militant Operations: Aftermath," *Central Asia Newsfile*, November 1999, 9.
34. Xu Tao, "Extremist Threat in Northwestern China," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 5, 2000, 85.
35. "Russian paper claims radical Islam a threat to regional security," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 29 November 2000; *Global NewsBank*, 7 February 2001.
36. Moldaliev, 40.
37. Tao, 87.
38. Damon Bristow, "China Flirts With an Independent Proactive Afghan Policy," *Analyst*, 3 January 2001, <www.cacianalyst.org/Jan_3_2001/China's_Pro-Afghan_Policy.htm>, accessed 7 February 2001.
39. "Chinese Aid to Tajik Army," *Central Asia Newsfile*, August 1999, 9.
40. "Chinese Military Aid for Uzbeks," *Central Asia Newsfile*, October 2000, 8.
41. Filipov.
42. Ahmed Rashid, "Juma Namangani Returns to Tajikistan for Fresh Offensive," *Analyst*, 17 January 2001, <www.cacianalyst.org/Jan_17_2001/JUMA_NAMANGANI.htm>, accessed 7 February 2001.
43. "Aid to Kyrgyz Armed Forces," *Central Asia Newsfile*, December 2000, 9.
44. Kassenova, 47.
45. Amaik Martirosian, "The Great Silk Road Restored," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6, 2000, 177.
46. Inga Saffron, "In the post-Soviet era, opium has become a driving force in Central Asia," *Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau*, Knight-Ridder/Tribune News Service, 8 June 1998; *Global NewsBank*, 2 February 2001.
47. "Russia pushes for UN action on Afghanistan," *The Times of India*, 9 September 2000, <<http://www.timesofindia.com/090900/09amrc4.htm>>, accessed 31 January 2001.
48. Farhad Tolipov, "Geopolitical Stalemate in Afghanistan," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 6, 2000, 26.
49. Filipov.
50. Saffron.
51. "Trans-Turkish pipeline deal signed," *BBC News Online*, 18 November 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/europe/newsid_526000/526515.stm>, accessed 15 February 2001.
52. David B. Ottaway, "Vast Caspian Oil Field Found—Discovery May Spur US-Russia Pipeline Rivalry," *The Washington Post*, 16 May 2000.
53. Richard Giragosian, "Massive Kashagan Oil Strike Renews Geopolitical Offensive in Caspian," *Analyst*, 7 June 2000, <www.cacianalyst.org/June7/KASHAGAN_OIL_STRIKE.htm>, accessed 7 February 2001.
54. Ottaway.
55. Rashid.
56. Ibid.

Major Gregory R. Sarafian is a foreign area officer intern, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch, Germany. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy and an M.S.A. from Central Michigan University. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental United States and Europe, including training officer, 18th Field Artillery Brigade (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina; commander, Service Battery, 3d Battalion, 321st Field Artillery Regiment, Fort Bragg; assistant fire support coordinator, Fire Support Element, Division Main Command Post, 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), Bamberg, Germany; UN military observer, UN Observer Mission in Georgia, Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, Russia; and targeting officer, 3d Infantry Division Artillery, Bamberg. His article "UN Observer Mission in Georgia" appeared in the November-December 1997 edition of *Military Review*.



EXPEDITIONARY FORCES: SUPERIOR TECHNOLOGY DEFEATED THE BATTLE OF MAIWAND

Colonel Ali A. Jalali, former Afghan Army; and
Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired

Seasoned expeditionary forces with marked advantages in training, technology and intelligence can still falter and fail if their opponent acquires some advanced technology and uses the home terrain better. This historical piece describes a battle well known on the Indian sub-continent but little remembered in the West. Its lessons from more than 120 years ago are still vital although vehicles have replaced horses and satellite communications have replaced dispatch riders.


DURING THE LAST HALF of the 19th century, Great Britain was the unquestioned global power. Although the Russian Empire was steadily expanding across Asia, the British Empire already spanned Africa, Asia, Australia, the Middle East, the Americas and the Pacific Ocean. British armies were deployed in various colonies, and the Royal Navy held it all together. British armies in the colonies were a combination of regular British (English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish) regiments and locally raised regiments whose officers were both local and British. British and local political officers ran highly effective intelligence networks throughout the colonies. British colonial armies frequently dispatched expeditions to fight in neighboring countries or establish a presence for political goals.

The British army was the past master at mounting expeditions and relied on its reputation for military excellence, technological superiority, unit cohesion, excellent intelligence and contracted logistic support from the local infrastructure. British expeditions were usually combined units from British colonial armies and allied local armies and were based on political alliances. Occasionally expedi-

tions went fatally wrong. The Battle of Maiwand destroyed a British expeditionary brigade in Afghanistan. Even after 120 years, events of this forgotten battle provide relevant lessons to contemporary expeditionary forces.¹

The British invasion resulted from British apprehension concerning Russian expansion into Central Asia in the 1860s and 1870s.² Independent Afghanistan was caught between advancing Russia and the British crown colony of India and tried to balance the demands of these empires. In summer 1878, a Russian delegation called on the Emir of Afghanistan in the capital city, Kabul. Afghan border guards, probably by mistake, turned away a countering British mission. The British quickly declared war, invaded Afghanistan and occupied the key cities of Kabul, Kandahar, Jalalabad and Khost. The emir put his son on the throne and fled north—vainly seeking Russian aid. He died soon after in Mazir-e-Sharif, Afghanistan. After his son, Yakub Khan, failed as interregnum emir, his British-backed nephew, Abdur Rahaman Khan, eventually succeeded him. Britain controlled Afghanistan's foreign policy with British troops stationed in Kabul and Kandahar.

The British invasion resulted in Britain's controlling Afghani foreign policy with British troops stationed in Kabul and Kandahar. Britain effectively truncated Afghanistan into three independent provinces—Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Sher Ali Khan, another British protégé, became governor of Kandahar while Abdur Rahaman Khan governed Kabul. . . . Herat province was governed by Ayub Khan, son of the late emir, who was out of British reach and influence.



The .45-caliber Martini-Henry rifle had a maximum effective range of 400 yards and could fire 15 to 20 rounds per minute.

Arms illustrations by John E. Richards

Britain effectively truncated Afghanistan into three independent provinces—Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Sher Ali Khan, another British protégé, became governor of Kandahar while Abdur Rahaman Khan governed Kabul. A British Bombay army force, commanded by Lieutenant General J.M. Primrose, was stationed in Kandahar along with an Afghan army commanded by its governor. Herat province was governed by Ayub Khan, son of the late emir, who was out of British reach and influence. The British prepared to leave.

In spring 1880, it became apparent that Ayub Khan was preparing a large force of infantry, cavalry and artillery—probably with the goal of

11 July it had concentrated on the Helmand River.

Ayub Khan was trying to avoid decisive engagement with Burrows' brigade and move directly on Kandahar. He established a cavalry screen on his right flank to check the British brigade's movement from the south (Khushk-i-Nakhud). Burrows was tasked to prevent Ayub's passage to Kandahar or possibly to Ghazni by attacking him on the approaches to Kandahar. This left the British uncertain about the time and place of the battle. They had to monitor the enemy's movement closely to choose the right time, place and tactical formation to intercept the marching Afghan columns.


The British brigade consisted of two cavalry regiments, the 3d Bombay Light Cavalry (316) and 3d Sind Horse (260); two regiments of Bombay native infantry, the 1st Bombay (Grenadiers) (648) and the 30th Bombay (Jacob's Rifles) (625); the British 66th Infantry, minus two companies (516); half of the 2d Company Bombay Sappers and Miners; and E Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery (191). This was 2,599 combat soldiers, six 9-pounder cannons, and about 3,000 service and transport personnel.

The brigade trains was enormous. Besides normal supplies, additional ordnance and ammunition were carried, and the commissariat was augmented for a 30-day stay. Officers' kit and equipment were not limited. More than 3,000 transport animals—ammunition ponies, mules, donkeys, bullocks and hundreds of camels—were required to move the baggage. The animals required drovers, usually locally contracted Kandaharis. There were many other noncombatants, including cooks, water carriers, tailors, servants and stretcher-bearers.⁴

The British force was to join a larger Afghan army led by Sher Ali Khan, the Kandahar governor. The Afghan army had more than 6,000 soldiers, armed with British Snider rifles, four 6-pounder British smoothbore cannon and two 12-pounder



seizing Kandahar.³ On 9 June Ayub Khan's advanced guard left Herat heading toward Kandahar. The main body followed six days later. On 21 June the British learned of the movement. On 30 June the British ordered a brigade to advance from Kandahar to the banks of the Helmand River to prevent Ayub Khan's force from crossing. On 2 July a composite brigade commanded by Brigadier General G.R.S. Burrows began to move, and by



A panorama of the Maiwand battlefield.

Burrows decided to hold his position and defeat Ayub Khan's advance guard before the main body could close. With the arrival of Ayub Khan's advance guard on the Helmand's east bank, both sides intensified their reconnaissance. The British intelligence network faced obstacles from the growing anti-British popular uprising in the region. Brigade daily reconnaissance patrols to Sang Bur, Garmab and the Arghandab River in the south could safely monitor the approaches to Kandahar for only a brief time during the day.

British smoothbore howitzers.⁵ British intelligence calculated the opposing force of Ayub Khan at 10 infantry regiments, 2,500 cavalry and six batteries of guns—6,000 to 8,000 men in all.⁶


ON TO BATTLE

The British brigade had orders not to cross the Helmand River, but Sher Ali's Afghan army from Kandahar was already across. It was the hottest time of the year, and the river proved no obstacle, being practically dry and passable at numerous sites. The Afghan army from Kandahar pushed across the Helmand and took up positions on the far bank. As the combined force waited for the Afghan army from Herat, the governor's Afghan army troops from Kandahar became increasingly restless. It became clear that their loyalty was suspect, and Burrows and Sher Ali agreed to bring them back across the river and disarm them. Before this could be done, the Afghan infantry and artillery mutinied and moved to join the army from Herat. Much of the cavalry remained loyal. The British brigade launched a pursuit across the Helmand against the mutineers and recaptured the guns but not the artillery horses. Burrows formed an ad hoc battery with the captured smoothbores, but lacking artillery horses, he evacuated only 50 rounds per gun. The rest of the artillery ammunition was thrown into deep water holes in the Helmand River.⁷

Burrows was 80 miles from Kandahar with 25 miles of waterless desert immediately to his rear. The Helmand riverline was now indefensible, and Ayub Khan could cross almost anywhere. The combined Kandahar force had been approximately equal to the Herat force. The Herat force was growing from the addition of mutineers and local adherents. Consequently, Burrows withdrew some 35 miles to Khushk-i-Nakhud—where two of the five routes to Kandahar met and from where the other three could be reached readily. Burrows closed on Khushk-i-Nakhud on 17 July, the same day Ayub Khan's cavalry reached Burrows' previous position on the Helmand. Burrows was a three-day march from Kandahar. If he withdrew to the Kandahar fortifications, Ayub Khan's force might bypass Kandahar to take Ghazni and cut communications between Kabul and Kandahar. Burrows decided to hold his position and defeat Ayub Khan's advance guard before the main body could close.

With the arrival of Ayub Khan's advance guard, under Loynab Khushdil Khan, on the Helmand's east bank, both sides intensified their reconnaissance. The British intelligence network, run by Lieutenant Colonel Oliver St. John, faced obstacles from the growing anti-British popular uprising in the region. Brigade daily reconnaissance patrols to Sang Bur, Garmab (about 22 kilometers northwest and

The British troops had better training and discipline and were supported by an organized logistic system. The Afghan army was an odd assortment of fighters with differing levels of training, armament and organization. They were united only by common purpose. However, there was no guarantee that the army would stay together for long since, in the absence of a viable logistic support system, most of the combatants were fending for themselves. Even the regular units depended on local supplies.



The .557-caliber Snider was a pattern 1853 rifled musket that had been converted to breech-loading and could fire 10 to 15 rounds per minute.

north of Khushk-i-Nakhud) and the Arghandab River in the south could safely monitor the approaches to Kandahar for only a brief time during the day. Although British scouts detected the presence of small elements of the Afghan army at Sang Bur, Garmab and Maiwand three or four days before the battle, Burrows and St. John failed to determine their enemy's whereabouts. In fact the advance guard of the Afghan army arrived in Garmab on 25 July, while a number of its forward elements and a group of *ghazis* reached Maiwand the same day. The following day Ayub Khan arrived in Sang Bur just after the British patrol left the place. Ayub intended to march the following day (July 27) to Maiwand, which by then would be secured by his advance party.

On 26 July British spies reported that Ayub Khan's advanced forces were in Maiwand and that the size of Ayub Khan's force was 3,500 regular infantry; 2,000 cavalry; 34 cannons; 1,500 mutineers; and 3,500 irregular volunteers. It was evident that Ayub Khan was using the northern approach. The spies further reported that the main body should close on Maiwand on 27 July.⁸ Afghan intelligence pinpointed Burrows' force.

Burrows discounted the intelligence estimates on the force's size and the main body's closure time. Early on 27 July the British brigade began to move north toward Maiwand. The British 66th Regiment soldiers breakfasted early as usual, but the word did not get out in time. The native units, which normally breakfasted later at midday, were not fed, and many marched with empty canteens. The British brigade covered six-plus miles toward Maiwand. Spies met the column and confirmed that the Herat army's main body was six miles (two hours) from Maiwand. The Afghan army was moving at twice the rate as the baggage-encumbered British. It was too late to retreat and the Afghans had to be prevented from bypassing Kandahar, so the British decided to attack.


CORRELATION OF FORCES

There has been no balanced study of the correlation of forces in the Maiwand battle. Most British studies apply different criteria in calculating the overall strength of the opposing combat and supporting forces. British studies often suggest that a British brigade of about 2,500 faced an army of 15,000 to 25,000 Afghan regulars and irregulars. This assessment is misleading because it counts thousands of unarmed Afghan service and support elements, civilian camp followers and curious villagers as part of the Afghan combatants while discounting more than 3,000 British camp followers, service details and transport crews. Further, the correlation is based on pure numbers without factoring in qualitative aspects. A balanced correlation of forces considers both quantity and quality (weapons effectiveness, training, organization, morale, command and logistics).

The British force totaled 2,599 combat soldiers and about 3,000 service and transport details. The Afghan force comprised the 1st Infantry Brigade (3 Kabuli regiments, each 500 strong) 2d Infantry Brigade, (one Kandahari and two Kabuli regiments of 500 men each); 3d Infantry Brigade (three Herati regiments each 366 strong) the cavalry brigade (three Kabuli regiments of 300 each) and one mountain and four field artillery batteries (each battery had 100 gunners and 6 guns)—a total of 5,500 regular soldiers. Herati irregular horsemen numbered 1,500.⁹ Some 500 tribal horsemen defected from sirdar Sher Ali's army. About 1,000 irregular infantry also joined the army in farah, totaling about 8,500.

Many tribal warriors and local inhabitants also joined Ayub Khan's forces as they moved from Herat to Maiwand. These *ghazis* were poorly armed with locally made or old European muskets. Many carried only swords and spears or were unarmed and

Soldiers of the Royal Horse Artillery coming out of action before their battery position is overwhelmed.



From "My God—Maiwand!"

The British brigade's overall combat effectiveness was much higher than the Afghan army's. What determined the outcome of the battle, however, was not firepower but the Afghan forces' bold maneuver backed by Ayub Khan's effective command and control. Afghan maneuver changed the correlation of forces at the decisive moment when highly motivated ghazis' swords and spears were more effective than modern rifles.

followed the army to share the glory and spoils of a holy war (*Jihad*). Some British authors estimate the number of these *ghazis* as high as 15,000, which official accounts discount as an exaggeration.¹⁰


In small arms, the British infantry regiments had significant superiority over Afghan foot soldiers since the British soldiers were armed with Martini-Henry and Snider breech-loading rifles. The 66th was armed with the Martini-Henry rifle; the British native infantry had the older Snider rifles; the cavalry had the Snider carbine. The Martini-Henry rifle was a real technological edge for the British force. With a maximum effective range of 400 yards, this .45-caliber weapon could fire 15 to 20 rounds per minute. The Snider was a pattern 1853 rifled musket that had been converted to breech-loading and could fire 10 to 15 .557-caliber rounds per minute out to an effective range of 400 yards. The British infantry units were trained to conduct area fire out to 1,200 yards.

The opposing five Kabuli infantry regiments were armed with 1853 Enfield muzzle-loading rifles that fired two to three shots per minute. The Herati and Kandahari regiments carried locally produced copies of Enfield and Snider rifles with a 300-yard maximum effective range.¹¹ The irregular troops

were armed with an assortment of ancient Tower, Brown Bess and Brunswick flintlock muskets (possibly seized during the First Anglo-Afghan War) or primitive Afghan muskets with a 50- to 80-yard maximum effective range and a rate of fire of one shot per two minutes.¹² In terms of small-arms firepower, the correlation of forces was at least 8-to-1 in favor of the British infantry.

However, the Afghan army had better artillery; particularly its six very effective 12-pound, breech-loading, 3-inch rifled Armstrong guns. Their rate of fire was at least five rounds per minute. The Afghan artillery also included 16 6-pounder field guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, two 4.5-inch howitzers and four 3-pounder field guns—all smoothbore weapons. The British artillery had six 9-pounder muzzle-loading rifled guns and six smoothbore pieces—four 6-pounder field guns and two 12-pounder howitzers. The horse artillery's 9-pounder field guns could fire shrapnel, case shot and high explosive out to 3,500 yards.¹³ The Afghan artillery's effectiveness significantly increased through its continuous maneuver, eventually bringing some guns to 500 yards from the British line. Artillery played a dominant role in the battle.

The opening artillery fire war handicapped by an insufficient number of guns and poor visibility while their tactical advantage in early deployment was lost as they went on the defense on open terrain. Burrow's options included a bold attack at the flank of the Afghan columns before they could deploy or a defense along the ravine at the edge of Mahmudabad and Khik villages. The formation taken up by the brigade did not support either offensive or defensive action.



The Afghan musket, or *Jezail*, had an 80-yard maximum effective range and a rate of fire of one shot per two minutes.

The British troops had better training and discipline and were supported by an organized logistic system. The Afghan army was an odd assortment of fighters with differing levels of training, armament and organization. They were united only by common purpose. However, there was no guarantee that the army would stay together for long since, in the absence of a viable logistic support system, most of the combatants were fending for themselves. Even the regular units depended on local supplies. Not surprisingly, after the battle thousands of *ghazis* left to carry their wounded and dead to their homes or just celebrated the victory and left.

The British brigade's overall combat effectiveness was much higher than the Afghan army's. What determined the outcome of the battle, however, was not firepower but the Afghan forces' bold maneuver backed by Ayub Khan's effective command and control. Afghan maneuver changed the correlation of forces at the decisive moment when highly motivated *ghazis'* swords and spears were more effective in command and control than modern rifles.

MOVEMENT TO CONTACT AND ARTILLERY DUEL



At 0700 a 3d Bombay Light Cavalry squadron and two guns led the British column out of camp. The brigade staff and the rest of the 3d Bombay Light Cavalry and two more guns were 500 yards behind the advance party. Infantry regiments followed in parallel columns with the smoothbore battery and sappers between the columns. The 3d Sind Horse and two more guns comprised the rear guard, while a mixed force of cavalry and infantry escorted the slow-moving baggage.¹⁴

The main body of Ayub Khan's force left Sang Bur that morning, moving in several columns toward Maiwand. The cavalry regiments and irregular horsemen covered the right flank, and infantry regiments moved in regimental columns on the left.

The Afghan horse artillery's 24 guns moved with the infantry as did the six mountain guns mounted on mules. Large groups of *ghazis* moved from different directions toward Maiwand.

It was a hot day, with the temperature reaching 120 degrees Fahrenheit by late morning and the prevailing haze limiting visibility to under a mile. As the British column reached halfway between Moshak and Karezak (10 kilometers south of Maiwand), Burrows learned that Ayub Khan was moving in force on Maiwand. As the column moved near Mahmudabad village, further intelligence indicated Afghan columns were moving across the British Front from west to east six to seven miles away.¹⁵ Burrows decided to engage the Afghan force while it was on the march. He left the baggage at Mahmudabad, and the column turned northwest onto a barren plain cut by several ravines. On the far side of the village is a large ravine, 15 to 25 feet deep and 50 to 100 feet wide, which runs northeasterly. Farther to the north, near Khik village, a narrower ravine runs northwest which later provided cover for the Afghan infantry.¹⁶

As the British column veered to the left, Lieutenant H. MacLaine quickly led his two Royal Horse Artillery guns from the advance party across the ravine to the plain. He took up a firing position about a mile beyond the ravine and opened fire at a range of 1,700 yards. It was 1045 and MacLaine was firing into the middle or rear of the Afghan column. Another horse artillery gun section arrived and took up positions about 200 yards from the ravine. As the British column deployed, it formed two lines behind the guns with the Grenadiers on the left of the artillery battery, four companies of the Jacob's Rifles to the right and the 66th Foot on the extreme right. Four companies of the Jacob's Rifles were in reserve. The ad hoc smoothbore battery set up to the left rear of the Royal Horse Artillery. The cavalry regiments were deployed on the left rear in column formation. A mixed detachment of infantry and cavalry protected the baggage.



The Afghan command undertook a major force regrouping to resume the attack. . . . [Their] commander in chief Lieutenant General Hafizullah Khan halted the offensive temporarily. He regrouped his forces, which included moving artillery closer to the front line, building up infantry against the British center for the main attack and threatening the British flanks to shift the enemy's attention.

Although the British brigade forestalled the Afghan force in opening fire and deploying infantry columns into combat formation—two keys to success in a meeting battle—it failed to exploit tactical initiative. The opening artillery fire was handicapped by an insufficient number of guns and poor visibility while their tactical advantage in early deployment was lost as they went on the defense on open terrain, thus surrendering the maneuver initiative to the Afghans. Options open to Burrows included a bold attack at the flank of the Afghan columns before they could deploy or a defense along the ravine at the edge of Mahmudabad and Khik villages. The formation taken up by the brigade did not support either offensive or defensive action.


The Afghan army detected the British brigade's movement as it neared Mahmudabad. As the British column turned left to deploy for battle, the Afghan command matched the move and veered right. The Afghan artillery rushed to the fight as the front of the column began to turn around and retrace its steps from Maiwand. As the Afghan regiments de-

ployed, they saw the British forces lined up on the defense with their flanks open and vulnerable. Ayub Khan decided to attack the open enemy flanks by deploying cavalry to the far flank (his right flank) and moving irregular infantry and *ghazis* to the left flank where a ravine offered protection. He deployed regular infantry regiments in the center and ordered his 30 guns to take up positions on a line from the center to the left flank. Given the varying speed of infantry, cavalry and artillery, Ayub's force deployed into combat formation in a coordinated manner. The terrain allowed the irregular infantry and *ghazis* to threaten the British right flank while the British left flank, with its wider space for maneuver, was ideal ground for cavalry action. The Afghan deployment of regular infantry in the center was designed to maintain the stability of the Afghan line.

About 30 minutes after British guns fired the first shot, leading Afghan artillery pieces moved into range and began pounding the deploying British line. As more Afghan guns arrived, they moved into

The British repulsed Afghan cavalry on the left flank. However, the Afghan army was regrouping for the offensive. Artillery pieces were brought as close as 500 to 600 yards from British positions, some guns even closer. . . . Between 1400 and 1430 the fire from the Afghan guns diminished. The British hoped the Afghans were out of ammunition, but it was a prelude to an all-out attack. At about 1430 dense masses of irregulars supported by regular infantry rose out of the flanking ravine and fell on the British center and left. . . . The British infantry fire that had kept the Afghans at bay failed to check the ghazis' massed rush.

Afghan artillery included six breech-loading, 3-inch rifled Armstrongs with a rate of fire of five rounds per minute.



one of five firing locations that delivered punishing fire on the British formation. The 66th and Jacob's Rifles were partially protected since they were lying down behind a small fold in the ground. They suffered lightly during the artillery duel, but the Royal Horse Artillery battery, the Grenadiers and two Jacob's Rifles companies at the extreme left had little cover and suffered heavily. Ayub Khan not only had more guns than the British; his six breech-loading Armstrong guns also fired heavier shells. The Afghan artillery was firing so effectively that it was falsely rumored to be manned by Russian gunners.¹⁷ It took almost another half hour before the Afghan irregular infantry and cavalry deployed in combat formation about 800 yards from the British position. It was now a little past noon.

INFANTRY AND CAVALRY ACTION

The *ghazis* initiated the first Afghan infantry attack on the British line against the 66th Foot. Highly motivated by religious and patriotic fervor, large numbers of devout *ghazis* in white garments led the assault.¹⁸ The 66th, with its superior firepower, successfully repelled the successive waves of the attack

while inflicting heavy losses on the *ghazis*, whose rudimentary muskets, swords and spears were no match for the Martini-Henrys. The British line was firing in company volleys starting at 1,200 yards—a range at which the Afghan combatants could not return effective fire.¹⁹ At the same time, Burrows ordered two 12-pounder howitzers from the smooth-bore battery to reinforce the 66th. The artillery barrage and the Martini-Henrys' withering fire pinned down the *ghazis*, who took shelter in the ravine facing the British right flank.

On the British left flank, regular Kabuli cavalry regiments and irregular Herat horsemen in loose formations threatened the British open flank. Burrows ordered the grenadiers to wheel their two left companies slightly back and committed his entire infantry reserve to extend the fighting line. Further, he shifted the two 12-pounder howitzers from the right flank back to the center. Intensified British fire forced the Afghan cavalry to fall back and maintain an 800-yard distance from the British troops to be out of Snider rifle and carbine area fire range.

Meanwhile, Afghan artillery pieces moved forward to firing positions closer to the enemy as Afghan regular infantry regiments, in columns and squares, approached the British center. Irregular troops and *ghazis* accompanied the Afghan regiments. The Afghan artillery displacement slowed their bombardment, and Burrows decided to attack the Afghan infantry to break up its deployment for combat. At about half past noon, Burrows ordered the Grenadiers and the two Jacob's Rifles companies at its left to advance 500 yards and break up the impending attack with volleys of rifle fire. The regiment had barely moved 200 yards when heavy artillery fire forced it to halt, lie down and take up the defense.

At this time, the Afghan infantry had reached a line one-half mile from the British positions, with the Herati regiments facing the Grenadiers and the Kabuli regiments advancing against the Jacob's Rifles. The British commander ordered his troops to repel the impending Afghan attack by rifle fire. As the Heratis reached a line 800 yards from the British positions, the Grenadiers opened up with a regimental volley, causing heavy losses in the Afghan ranks. Despite successive attempts, the outgunned Herati regiments failed to resume the advance and were forced to retreat out of the Sniders' effective range. Kabuli regiments attacking the Jacob's Rifles met similar Snider rifle fire and were forced to halt.

During the next hour and a half, the Afghan command undertook a major force regrouping to resume the attack. Afghan sources describe this as the most critical phase of the battle. Troops had suffered heavy casualties, and many wounded needed immediate attention. The whole army was tired and thirsty after a long march. Many tribal irregulars wanted to evacuate their wounded and dead comrades from the battlefield.²⁰ Afghans still speak of a legendary heroine named Malala who, with a number of other Afghan women, helped *ghazis* on the battlefield. Reciting traditional patriotic ballads, Malala instilled a new spirit of valor and perseverance into the tired tribal warriors.²¹

Afghan forces commander in chief Lieutenant General Hafizullah Khan halted the offensive temporarily. He regrouped his forces, which included moving artillery closer to the front line, building up infantry against the British center for the main at-

tack and threatening the British flanks to shift the enemy's attention.²² While the main Afghan forces were regrouping, swarms of *ghazis* and irregular cavalry threatened the British baggage train at Mahmudabad village. This threat tied up a significant number of British foot and mounted soldiers throughout the battle.

CULMINATION AND BRITISH ROUT

Around 1300 a large Afghan buildup confronted the Grenadiers. *Ghazis* moved to the British rear through the ravines. At 1330 the British smoothbore battery withdrew since it was out of ammunition. This affected the morale of the native infantry on the left flank. While the British line suffered from continuous Afghan artillery fire, the British repulsed Afghan cavalry on the left flank. However, the Afghan army was regrouping for the offensive.

CAUTIONARY LESSONS FOR FUTURE EXPEDITIONS

At a certain point, quantity has a quality all its own. The Afghans massed 30 artillery pieces to 12 British, 8,500 infantry to 1,750 British infantry and about 2,000 cavalry to 575 cavalry. Quantity, coupled with the excellence of Afghan artillery and the proper use of terrain, assured the Afghan victory.

Technology is a tool, not an excuse to violate military principles. The Afghans negated the advantage of the rapid-firing Martini-Henry rifle by using the terrain to mask their approach for the critical attack. The British relied on the strength of their technology and chose their battle site on open ground surrounded by flanking ravines.

A high-technology force may be countered by a lower-technology force if that lower-technology force has invested in select high technology. The Afghans had the Armstrong breech-loading rifled cannon that outranged and outperformed the British artillery.

Logistics is a problem for an expeditionary force. The British chose to bring a month's worth of supplies rather than maintain a secure line of communication back to Kandahar. This encumbered the maneuver force with a large, slow-moving, unwieldy element that slowed the pace of advance to a crawl and tied up a significant portion of the combat force in trains protection.

Timely tactical and operational intelligence is a constant problem. The British force expected to meet the Afghan advance guard but met the entire army. The British did not have a good order of battle for the Afghan forces. The British human intelligence effort was fairly efficient but did not provide intelligence quickly enough. The commander also discounted accurate intelligence reports.

Water supply is a primary expeditionary concern. The British force was crippled by the lack of water. Even if sufficient water was available in the trains, resupply from the trains to the forward elements remained a problem. Today, the lack of an armored supply vehicle remains a problem for contemporary forces.

Alliances and coalition forces are only as strong as the weakest element. The combined British-Afghan force would have been a match for the Afghan force from Herat. When the Afghan force mutinied, the British force should have withdrawn to Kandahar.

The meeting battle is a highly probable form of combat for an expeditionary force. The British seized the initiative and opened fire first but did not take the Afghan force from the flank. Rather, it went to the defense after choosing the wrong terrain to conduct the meeting battle.

Ayub compromised his operational objective by becoming decisively engaged with a smaller force before reaching Kandahar. He could have changed the course of the war by blocking Burrows' brigade with a reinforced advance detachment while moving the main force directly to Kandahar where the British defenses were weakened. . . . Ayub [also] failed to turn his tactical success into operational achievement. He did not pursue the retreating British forces or strike unprepared British forces in Kandahar.



The Afghan army used local copies of the British pattern 53 Enfield rifled musket.

Artillery pieces were brought as close as 500 to 600 yards from British positions, some guns even closer.

Between 1400 and 1430 the fire from the Afghan guns diminished. The British hoped the Afghans were out of ammunition, but it was a prelude to an all-out attack. At about 1430 dense masses of irregulars supported by regular infantry rose out of the flanking ravine and fell on the British center and left. The Heratis hit the grenadiers and the Kabulis engaged the Jacob's Rifles. Masses of *ghazis*, some dressed in suicidal "white shrouds," spearheaded the attack. The British infantry fire that had kept the Afghans at bay failed to check the *ghazis'* massed rush.²³ The two Jacob's Rifles companies on the left came under enormous pressure. Having lost all their officers, the companies broke and fled to the Grenadiers who were facing Afghans at close quarters. At that distance the Sniders and carbines were not as effective as the Afghans' close-combat weapons.

As the left wing was about to dissolve, the Royal Horse Artillery battery began to withdraw. The Afghans captured two guns. The artillery's withdrawal led to the retreat of the Grenadiers and the Jacob's Rifles, which fell back on the left-hand companies of the 66th.

As the British line was fast dissolving, Burrows ordered a cavalry charge. But the poorly led action failed to stabilize the line, and the cavalry retreated toward Mahmudabad village. Since the cavalry was split into small pockets from the outset, it was unable to concentrate effectively at the decisive moment.

As the retreating native infantry fell back onto the ranks of the 66th, the British formation collapsed. Under intensifying pressure, elements of Jacob's Rifles and part of the Grenadiers retired to Mahmudabad, while the rest of the Grenadiers and the

66th were forced off to the right toward Khik. Desperate attempts to regroup for an organized stand failed amid the chaos. Elements of the 66th made an unsuccessful stand in the Khik orchards. About 100 soldiers made a final stand in a garden on the southern edge of the village and all perished.

Burrows followed the retreating troops through Khik and, seeing the hopeless situation, ordered them to retire. By 1500 the plain between Mahmudabad and Khushk-i-Nakhud was covered by a column of fugitives heading south toward Kandahar. The British suffered most of their losses during the retreat, although it would have been even worse if the Afghan army had not stopped for water and to loot the bodies and baggage train. The British lost 1,757 dead, 175 wounded, seven guns, 1,000 rifles, 2,425 transport animals, more than 200 horses, 278,200 rifle bullets and 448 artillery shells. The Afghan forces lost 1,250 regular soldiers and 800 to 1,500 irregular fighters.

The task organization of the British brigade was not compatible with stand-alone combat. Burrows' brigade initially was tasked and tailored to back up sirdar Sher Ali's forces that were deployed on the Helmand River to block Ayub's advance. However, once Sher Ali's army defected to Ayub's side, the British mission changed to fighting the entire Herat army without major reinforcement, a recipe for failure.

The Maiwand battle is characterized by the absence of well-defined tactical-operational coordination on both sides. Ayub compromised his operational objective by becoming decisively engaged with a smaller force before reaching Kandahar. He could have changed the course of the war by blocking Burrows' brigade with a reinforced advance detachment while moving the main force directly

From "My God - Maiwand"



As the retreating native infantry fell back onto the ranks of the 66th, the British formation collapsed. About 100 soldiers made an unsuccessful stand in a garden on the edge of Khik and all perished.

The British suffered most of their losses during the retreat, although it would have been even worse if the Afghan army had not stopped for water and to loot the bodies and baggage train. The British lost 1,757 dead, 175 wounded, seven guns, 1,000 rifles, 2,425 transport animals, more than 200 horses, 278,200 rifle bullets and 448 artillery shells. The Afghan forces lost 1,250 regular soldiers and 800 to 1,500 irregular fighters.

to Kandahar where the British defenses were weakened. Even after he defeated the British forces at Maiwand, Ayub failed to turn his tactical success into operational achievement. He did not pursue the retreating British forces or strike unprepared British forces in Kandahar. It took Ayub eight days to move from Maiwand to Kandahar. By then, he faced a more organized defense.

Similarly, British forces failed to mass operationally, settling for tactical successes. Instead of facing Ayub in Kandahar and shifting forces from Kabul, which was at that time secure under its new ally Amir Abdurrahman, they split their forces between Helmand, Kandahar and Kalat. When the British finally massed operationally by moving General Roberts' division from Kabul to Kandahar on 2 September, they defeated Ayub. This could have been done without sacrificing Burrows' brigade in late July.

The battle was decided by maneuver—a key factor for winning a meeting battle. When the opposing sides met at Maiwand, neither side had an appreciable terrain advantage. However, the Afghan forces successfully exploited British lack of mobility to threaten Burrows' brigade's open flanks. Maneuver of the Afghan artillery strengthened the Afghan tactical formation which was much weaker in small arms but stronger in artillery. The Afghans succeeded in moving their guns to within a few hundred yards of the enemy line. The lack of reserves denied tactical flexibility to the British formation. Deploying the cavalry in small packets hindered a decisive cavalry charge when the Afghan infantry penetrated the British line.

British cavalry use of carbines instead of swords during the counterattack significantly weakened its shock action. The Afghan *ghazis*' effective use of close-combat weapons played a major role in

breaking the British line. The longer-range Martini-Henrys, Snider rifles and carbines enabled the British infantry and dismounted cavalry to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. According to British sources, Burrows' brigade shot 382,881 rounds of rifle ammunition during three hours of intensive combat, approximately 2,000 rounds per minute—enormous firepower on a 19th-century battlefield. The fire halted the attack by overwhelming numbers of enemy troops. However, the lack of maneuver and failure to use terrain undermined the fire's effectiveness, and the British line dissolved.

Maiwand was one of the major military disasters of the Victorian era. On 22 January 1879, a British force at Isandhlwana lost 1,700 men during the Zulu wars. These two defeats reverberated through Britain with much the same impact as the 7th Cavalry's 1876 defeat at Little Big Horn where 244 US soldiers lost their lives. After Maiwand, Ayub's

force laid siege to Kandahar and was eventually defeated by a British relief force from Kabul. However, the British realized there was no military solution for their political objectives in Afghanistan. Shortly after the victory, the British army withdrew from Afghanistan into British India. Afghanistan was reunited and independent again—under Amir Abdurrahman. One result of the British defeat at Maiwand was Great Britain's 1895 decision to abolish the separate presidency armies (such as the Bombay army) and focus recruitment among the so-called martial races of Northern India—the Sikhs, Punjabis and Gurkhas. However, the basic British colonial army system and expeditionary procedures remained intact and continued, with good results and bad, through World War II. Their past expeditionary experience is still worth study by the expeditionary planners and commanders of today. 🕌

NOTES

1. Much of the material in this article is extracted from a paper author Ali Jalali wrote in Pashto. He presented the paper at the 120th Anniversary of the Maiwand Conference, Bonn, Germany, on 18 November 2000.
2. Map 1 based on maps in Brian Robson, "Maiwand: A Forgotten Disaster," *Army Quarterly and Defence Journal*, Volume 94, Number 2, 1967, 236.
3. Brian Robson, "Maiwand, 27th July 1880," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, No. 208, 1973, 194-95.
4. Leigh Maxwell, *My God — Maiwand: Operations of the South Afghanistan Field Force, 1878-1880* (London: Leo Cooper, 1979), 92-93.
5. *Ibid.*, 74.
6. Brian Robson, *The Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War, 1878-1881* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1986), 224.
7. Maxwell, 78-83.
8. Robson, *The Road to Kabul*, 228. There were actually 30 guns.
9. The Kabul, Herati and Kandahari regiments were named after the cities in which they were originally raised — Kabul, Herat and Kandahar. Over time, their ranks were filled with recruits from all over Afghanistan, but the regiments retained these designations.
10. Maxwell, 98; *The Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, Official Account*, London, 1908, 696.
11. As described by Mirza Mohammad Akbar, pay clerk of Ayub Khan's Kandahari regiment, *The Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, Official Account*, 696.

12. Howard Hensmann, *The Afghan War of 1879-80* (London: W.H. Allen, 1881), 324.
13. *Ibid.*, 197.
14. *The Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, Official Account*, 499-501.
15. Almost all British sources call the village "Mondabad," which is incorrect.
16. This village is recorded as "Khig" in British sources, which is incorrect.
17. William Trousdale, ed., *War in Afghanistan 1879-80, The Personal Diary of Major General Sir Charles MacGregor* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1985), 217.
18. Their white garment symbolized the shroud, meaning they were ready to fight until death. Such devoted groups, known as "kafan poshan" or "shroud wearers," were often seen in the Anglo-Afghan battles.
19. Maxwell, 130.
20. Afghan eyewitness account recorded by Yaqub Ali Khafi, *Padshahan-e Motaakherine-e Afghanistan (The Recent Kings of Afghanistan)* (Kabul, 1955), Vol. 2, 551. Printed from manuscript. Also see the account of the pay clerk of Ayub Khan's Kandahari regiments recorded in annex 28, *The Second Afghan War, 1878-1880, Official Account*, 696.
21. One of the couplets says in Pashto: "If you fail to be martyred at Maiwand, by God, my love, you will live only a disgraceful life." Malala's grave is now a shrine in her native Khik.
22. Yaqub Ali Khafi, 550-52.
23. "General Burrows Report," *London Gazette*, November 1880.

Ali A. Jalali is chief, Farsi Service, Voice of America, Washington, D.C. He served as a colonel in the Afghan army and was a member of the Afghan resistance during the Soviet-Afghan War. He has attended the Infantry Officer Advanced Course, Fort Benning, Georgia; the British Army Staff College, Camberley, England; the Soviet Frunze Academy, Moscow, Russia; and the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is the author of several books, including a three-volume military history of Afghanistan. His most recent book, The Other Side of the Mountain, co-authored with Lester Grau, is an analytical review of the mujahideen war with Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. He co-authored "Kashmir: Flashpoint or Safety Valve?" that appeared in the July-August 1999 issue of Military Review.

Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army, Retired, is a military analyst in the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He received a B.A. from the University of Texas at El Paso and an M.A. from Kent State University. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), the US Army Russian Institute, the Defense Language Institute and the US Air Force War College. He held a variety of command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Europe and Vietnam, including deputy director, Center for Army Tactics, and chief, Soviet Tactics Instruction Branch, CGSC; political and economic adviser, Headquarters, Allied Forces, Central Europe, Brunssum, the Netherlands; and diplomatic courier, Moscow. His article "The Tyranny of Time and Distance: Bridging the Pacific" appeared in the July-August 2000 issue of Military Review.

The Airborne Division in 2010

Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., US Army

For almost six decades US Army airborne forces have been key to worldwide US military operations. Usually manned at full strength, well equipped and well trained, flexible and adaptive airborne units have remained in demand even during times of downsizing and reduced funding.

Because of their unique capabilities, airborne troops will remain the centerpiece of the Army's rapid reaction, strategic-intervention capability. Nevertheless, advanced technologies and new organizational concepts suggest that the airborne division must evolve to meet the challenges of 2010.

Historical Overview

Based on Russian prewar experiences and spurred by German successes with parachute operations early in World War II, the US Army established a parachute training center to develop doctrine, equipment and techniques for airborne warfare.¹ Early parachute operations suffered from problems inherent in all new forms of warfare. Troop-carrier pilots often failed to insert paratroopers near desired drop zones, and assembly techniques needed constant improvement. The challenges of landing artillery and other heavy equipment by glider were daunting.

Still, after small-scale drops in North Africa and regiment-size operations in Sicily and Italy in 1943, the Army mounted corps-size airborne operations. Two full US divisions and a British airborne division dropped into Normandy on the night of 5-6 June. In August, there was a second major drop in Southern France followed by a larger drop in October. These drops led the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army to the assault on Arnhem in Operation *Market Garden*.² The final major air-

borne operation in Europe, Operation *Varsity* in March 1945, demonstrated that Allied airborne forces had overcome many early problems. In the Pacific, smaller drops supported operations in the Philippines, taking Corregidor by vertical envelopment and freeing Allied prisoners of war.

Postwar analysis of parachute operations revealed distinctive characteristics. Airborne soldiers were tenacious defenders and aggressive attackers. They were highly cohesive, ferociously trained and conscious of their elite status.³ Although early US and British airborne operations suffered from many operational problems, by war's end the US Army fielded powerful, combined arms parachute and glider units that could deploy over great distances for forced entry or as conventional ground units.⁴

Improved navigational aids and aircraft designs solved many problems. Larger aircraft and advanced cargo parachutes led to deactivation of inefficient glider units. Heavier artillery, light armor, antitank (AT) weapons and, eventually, attack helicopters increased the airborne division's punch. Airborne forces remained focused on developing physically tough, aggressive soldiers as the primary source of combat power.

During the Cold War, airborne units were on continuous alert. They could move rapidly to flash points and fight on arrival, which was a valued instrument of statecraft in a tense, volatile world. In Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama and Operation *Desert Storm*, airborne forces have been prominent as high-quality, rapid-reaction combat units. Airborne units have proven their worth in post-Cold War contingency operations, rapidly deploying by air

and conducting initial-entry and security operations in Rwanda, Bosnia, Operation *Provide Comfort* in northern Iraq and the noncombatant evacuation operations in Liberia.

Historically, organizational and doctrinal tension has always affected the airborne division. The requirement to stay light to permit rapid deployment by air clashed with the need to increase the division's firepower and mobility to make it more useful across the spectrum of conflict. Doctrinally, there was a debate about whether the airborne should be a specialized force used only for parachute assaults then withdrawn or used as a conventional force except for having a forced-entry capability.

Early concepts gave way to the view that the airborne division must balance strategic deployability with the need to conduct sustained, high-intensity combat operations. As the Army's principal early-entry force, the division must remain light enough to move quickly anywhere in the world, yet powerful enough to take its place in conventional operations against heavy and light forces worldwide.

Considerably heavier than true light divisions such as the 25th and 10th Mountain Divisions, the airborne division is really a middle-weight division with better tactical mobility and more firepower than its light counterparts. And, it is more strategically deployable than heavy divisions. The US Army currently fields one active airborne division and battalion-size task forces in Italy and Alaska.⁵ Brigade-size airborne task forces can deploy anywhere in the world in two or three days, far faster than can amphibious forces.

ALookAhead

The airborne division in 2010 will employ high-tech, information-based

systems as part of a larger joint force. In general, US forces will possess systems and capabilities that provide a decisive technological overmatch against most adversaries. But, they will fight outnumbered on the ground at great distances from the Continental United States on unfamiliar terrain.

In its forced-entry role, the airborne division can seize and defend airfields, establish lodgments and introduce an early US ground presence into threatened areas—capabilities that will continue to define its usefulness as a strategic asset. Because substantial forces must be held back for a possible second major theater war, only limited forces will be available. Pressures will be strong to win quickly, limit casualties and free forces for other contingencies.

These trends suggest that the airborne division must retain its focus on strategic mobility while substantially improving its tactical mobility and combat power. Without increasing personnel strength, the division must cover more ground more quickly, speed up its decision/action cycle and hit harder with a longer reach, particularly against armored opponents. Although by definition they are less effective against tanks than a heavy division, especially in open terrain, future airborne forces must be able to support fast-moving mechanized forces in the attack and defend against armor on any terrain.

Like other US ground forces, the future airborne division will almost certainly fight at a numerical disadvantage, often against armored opponents equipped with weapons of mass destruction. In future combat environments, the United States must maintain a strong lead in technology, air power and naval warfare and integrate joint forces into a single warfighting team. With limited forces available, the Army as part of the joint team must conduct rapid operations to gain a quick decision.

Sustained battles of attrition waged on linear fronts with a continuous line of contact will give way

to battles of penetration and encirclement that carry the fight to the enemy's rear areas. Such warfare calls for divisions that can plan, move and fight rapidly to apply the knockout punch. Information technology and weapon systems to make this possible are already available. However, to realize their full potential, Army divisional structure, particularly in the airborne division, must evolve.

Organizational restructuring also will be crucial to meeting future battlefield demands. The best place to start is with division headquarters, typically a large, overstaffed organ not well suited to fast-paced crisis decisionmaking. Now at 230 personnel, the division battle staff could safely be reduced by half.⁶ Advanced automation systems and leaner staffs can support faster, crisper battle command only if Army culture changes to emphasize leading, not staffing.

In 2010, information dominance will give the Army an edge, but if Army forces cannot exploit fleeting opportunities by acting decisively in space and time, then information dominance will be a chimera. Large, cumbersome staffs have never been conducive to mastering time—the all-important combat variable.

On a more fluid battlefield characterized by fewer US combat units, maneuver brigades must be able to fight semi-independently, controlling their own direct support (DS) units as integral parts of the formation. This capability will also pay dividends in noncombat missions. Although the division, as an echelon of command, will remain essential to the Army's ability to conduct land campaigns and operations, the ability to task organize into self-contained brigade combat teams (BCTs) will pay rich dividends in stressful operational environments.

Under this concept, DS artillery, engineer and forward support battalions will remain organic to their parent organizations but will be permanently *assigned* to maneuver brigades.⁷ As now, the three maneuver battalions should continue to carry the same regimental designa-

tion to foster *esprit*, cohesion and morale. An air defense (AD) battery armed with Avengers and a brigade scout company of 100 soldiers, including 18 sniper teams in its three scout platoons plus an unmanned aerial vehicle platoon, outfitted with long-range radios would complete the airborne brigade combat team (ABCT).⁸

With three battalions added to it, the ABCT is an appropriate command for a brigadier general assisted by a colonel as regimental commander of the three numbered maneuver battalions.⁹ Regimental identity, a crucial component of combat power, ties soldiers to soldiers and soldiers to units; fosters morale and *esprit* by linking unit members to regimental traditions; and promotes vertical and horizontal cohesion.

The BCT commander, a team builder, brings together all brigade elements on the battlefield and orchestrates systems to resource the fight and weight the main effort. His fight is the close fight and the division main effort using division and corps assets.

At the maneuver battalion level, fire-and-forget antiarmor systems will vastly increase AT capabilities of airborne infantrymen. The antiarmor company in each battalion will employ line-of-sight antitank (LOSAT) systems mounted on armored high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) while retaining its heavy weapons for use against other threats.¹⁰

The fire-and-forget Javelin has already replaced the obsolete Dragon as a medium AT weapon. The MG240 has replaced the venerable M60 medium machine gun. Increasing the number of sniper teams in the scout platoon from three to six and introducing two sniper teams into the weapons squad of the rifle platoon will help battalions engage high-value point targets at extended ranges—a capability now limited.¹¹ The new M120 heavy mortar should replace the mortar platoon's current 81-millimeter (mm) mortars.¹² These changes will increase the rifle battalion's end strength by 50 soldiers while greatly increasing firepower

and flexibility across a broad range of missions.

The Aviation Brigade

Emerging technologies are so promising that air platforms will become even more important. Combining traditional reconnaissance and security roles with attack aviation's speed and shock will give the aviation component commanding general (CG) a sledgehammer with which to attack enemy formations. Functionally, this organization more closely resembles a cavalry regiment than the traditional aviation brigade.

An ideal organization for an airborne cavalry regiment would have an RH66-equipped, air cavalry/light attack squadron; a dual-capable assault squadron fielding armed UH60L Blackhawks; a ground cavalry squadron; and a light armor battalion.¹³ Expanding division cavalry into battalion-size ground and air components will give the division powerful, overlapping reconnaissance and security capabilities better suited for information-based operations.

Commanded by either an aviation or armor brigadier general, the cavalry regiment will greatly enhance the division's situational awareness and give the division commander a potent combat formation of unequalled shock and striking power.¹⁴ With most combat service support (CSS) centralized in a large support squadron, the cavalry regiment can control attached maneuver battalions and function as a third maneuver headquarters if the tactical situation dictates.¹⁵

Although Army leaders canceled the armored gun system (AGS), the airborne division and the Army's nonmechanized divisions sorely need an air-transportable, light-armored vehicle fitted with a tank-killing main gun. While poorly suited for tank-on-tank duels, the AGS can be effective as part of an integrated, combined arms antiarmor defense. In the offense, the AGS-equipped, light-armor battalion can be used in mass or task organized to the ABCTs to defeat light armor and deliver mobile, protected heavy fires.

Should funding to revive the AGS not materialize, similar systems mounting wheeled and tracked 105-mm main guns are ready to go into production. The gun system would also be fielded with the ground cavalry squadron's scout troops.¹⁶ An added bonus would be the presence of armor leaders in the airborne division. Their expertise would enhance the division's performance in heavy/light and light/heavy operations, giving airborne brigades a combined arms flavor that was lost when the M551 Sheridan was removed from service.

Light armor would add punch to the airborne division, but division artillery (DIVARTY) is overdue for re-vamping. For many years, the Army's nonmechanized divisions have suffered from an undergunned DIVARTY. Because the towed 155-mm howitzer was too large and heavy for rapid air movement, light forces made do with the 105-mm gun. Although it was an excellent system, it lacked in range and weapons effects. However, exciting new developments make it possible to give the airborne DIVARTY much greater range and striking power without unduly sacrificing strategic mobility.

New variants of the towed 155-mm howitzer weigh half of what the current M198 does and have smaller crews and greater range. The light 155-mm howitzer can be slung under a single UH60. Like the 105-mm gun, two light 155-mm howitzers can fit into a single C130. The system can be airdropped, airlanded or delivered by the low-altitude, parachute extraction system. Improved munitions, a global positioning system (GPS) and other technologies that can locate enemy positions precisely will dramatically improve new gun systems' accuracy and lethality.

Another high-payoff innovation is the division's powerful, long-range general support (GS) artillery unit, which provides reach and striking power. The unit can attack enemy follow-on echelons and hit high-value targets in his rear. The High-Mobility Artillery System (HIMARS), a wheeled version of the modernized Guided Multiple Launch Rocket

System (GMLRS), offers a promising answer to this challenge. HIMARS fires the complete family of advanced multiple-launch rocket system munitions and can be transported by a C130. An 18-launcher HIMARS battalion of 300 soldiers will give the division the range and punch to fight high-intensity battles and engagements. And, it is significantly easier to move by air than its tracked counterpart.

Today, the airborne division has a single engineer battalion, many of whose tasks are nonstandard, such as airfield clearance, rapid runway repair and engineer raids. To strengthen the division's combat power in high-intensity operations and improve its ability to employ reinforcing corps engineer units, a small combat engineer brigade should be formed.

Each airborne battle coordination team would be supported by a strong DS engineer company, consisting of three sapper platoons, an assault/obstacle platoon with light engineer vehicles, an engineer maintenance platoon and a headquarters platoon. A brigade engineer leading a small engineer section would provide oversight, planning and coordination functions. At the division level, a GS engineer battalion, having three combat engineer companies and a bridge company, would provide road and airfield repair assets and a better capability to move, harden critical nodes and breach complex obstacle belts.

With DS units chopped away, what is left for division support, artillery and engineer commanders? They would not be irrelevant; they would play crucial roles. The DIVARTY commander would employ a powerful GMLRS battalion in general support of the division, overseeing several battalions of reinforcing corps artillery. The division engineer brigade commander would control a division GS engineer battalion and in most cases reinforcing corps engineer units. The combat support brigade would administratively control the division's main support; intelligence, signal and personnel service battalions; and military police and chemical companies. Each brigade

commander would double as the commanding general's principal planner and subject matter expert, providing oversight and assistance to associated intermediate DS units.

To improve tactical mobility, transportation assets in support battalions would allow brigades to move three rifle companies in one lift, with division transportation assets moving another three.¹⁷ These improvements, plus the 36 lift aircraft in the assault squadron, would help the airborne division more quickly reposition, refuel and rearm maneuver units on the battlefield.

A proposal to remove all CSS from maneuver battalions has been broached.¹⁸ The decision to concentrate all CSS at echelons above the battalion—employing new technologies to effect just-in-time battlefield support—offers advantages more apparent than real. The place for super efficiencies is in garrison and the depot because lives and battles would not be on the line. Tactical commanders, at least in a basic way, must be allowed to *command*, not just request, the minimal CSS needed to fight and survive. In keeping with this principle, the airborne division of 2010 should not disturb CSS assets' functional distribution in ground maneuver battalions.¹⁹

These organizational and weapon system improvements will greatly change how the airborne division fights on the ground, but its ability to conduct airborne operations also must improve. In the last 50 years, only marginal changes have been made to basic techniques. Most changes have been aviation-related, such as night flying, navigation, formation flying, long-range communications and adverse-weather delivery systems. The C17 has dramatically improved strategic airlift, giving joint commanders a better capability to move outsized cargo over great distances for paratroop or assault landing into denied areas. But, paratroopers must still drop from 500 to 800-foot altitude at slow speeds, and once on the ground, they need up to an hour or more to assemble, recover supplies and equipment and move toward objectives.

Fresh thinking about airborne

techniques and technologies might lead to parachute delivery systems that permit faster drop speeds at lower altitudes. One concept envisions using a pilot chute/drogue chute/main parachute system that would allow personnel drops from 300 feet at 300 knots. New technology might also permit faster assembly, using voice-activated communications systems and inexpensive individual direction prompters. GPS-guided cargo parachutes would also improve heavy-equipment drop accuracy and reliability, contributing to faster assembly and buildup of combat power inside the airhead.

Although the military used airborne forces with great effect in the airborne assault mode in Grenada and Panama, critics question parachute-operations feasibility in higher-intensity scenarios. Unquestionably, parachute assaults require detailed planning and resourcing, but they are no more complex or risky than air assault operations of similar size. Given the US military's absolute air superiority and assuming that basic doctrine considerations are observed, such as suppression of enemy air defenses and adequate preassault fires, mass tactical airborne operations will be as viable in this century as in the last.

Operational Effectiveness

Airborne assaults can be operationally effective when employed as part of a campaign plan that recognizes their unique strengths and weaknesses. Unlike air assault operations, airborne operations can be mounted over greater distances at greater closure speeds, enhancing surprise and shock. Combat power buildup can be significantly more rapid. In one hour a brigade-size combined arms task force with all supporting artillery, AT vehicles and three days of supplies can be dropped, assembled and committed to action at night in zero visibility. With appropriate close air support (CAS), corps artillery rocket fires and airdrop resupply, the force can establish strong blocking positions behind the enemy or seize river crossings, defiles or other high-value choke points to support the ad-

vance of mechanized or other conventional forces. A major parachute operation normally requires most of the tactical airlift available in a theater of operations, although only for a limited time.

A crucial point of doctrine is that airborne operations must never be considered an end in themselves; they must always support larger campaign objectives. In high-intensity battles against heavy forces, combined arms airborne assaults should be mounted in strength on favorable terrain and be supported by CAS and long-range artillery fires.

To achieve decisive results, airborne operations should be mounted at operational depths to achieve operational-level objectives, culminating in a linkup with reinforcing ground forces. Typically, such operations would involve initial seizure of key terrain by parachute assault followed by an assault landing or heavy-drop echelon to bring in more artillery, light armor, fuel and ammunition.

Long-range division assets such as HIMARS and Comanche helicopters, augmented by corps fires, would support the assault from airfields and stand-off firing positions. On suitable terrain and properly supported with tactical air, future airborne forces could repel counterattacks by heavy forces until relieved, giving the joint force commander a deep-attack option for disrupting and dislocating the enemy well beyond the main battle area. By streamlining, modernizing and reengineering, the airborne division would be able to incorporate new technology and organizational concepts to become more agile and lethal.

While the new division would be heavier, the ability to deploy brigade combat teams as currently configured would remain unchanged. If necessary, heavier elements such as the HIMARS or light armor battalions could be flown in later or moved by fast sealift. Stronger, faster, more flexible but still strategically deployable, the future airborne division must be an instrument of rapid, decisive combat. While retaining many structural virtues and strengths, the divi-

sion must evolve with the changing battlefield. Equipped with leading-edge technology and manned by tough, well-trained, aggressive soldiers, the division will remain ready and viable far into the 21st century.

NOTES

1. The Red Army pioneered airborne-warfare techniques, entering World War II with corps-size airborne formations. German *fallschirmjaeger* parachute units scored notable success while advancing across Belgium, storming Fort Eben Emael and taking Crete. To train, equip and develop doctrine for airborne forces, the US Provisional Parachute Group was formed in 1941, followed in 1942 by Airborne Command.

2. The First Allied Airborne Army consisted of the US 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions; Britain's 1st Airborne Division; Poland's Parachute Brigade; and supporting troop-carrier units and corps-level support formations. All were deliverable by parachute or glider.

3. The 2d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, set a world record in 1943 when it marched 118 miles in three days. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Band of Brothers* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 26.

4. The 101st Airborne's performance at Bastogne and the 82d Airborne's actions at St. Vith during the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944 and January 1945 demonstrated conclusively that when fighting in restrictive terrain, airborne units could defend successfully against Germany's best armored units. Equipped with large numbers of captured German *panzerfaust* and *panzerschreck* handheld AT weapons, airborne units conducted a tenacious, persistent defense. Information provided to the author in 1980 by LTG James Gavin, US Army, Retired, former commander, 82d Airborne Division.

5. The 1/508th is in Italy; the 1/501st is in Alaska. Other airborne units include the 1/507th, the airborne training battalion at the Infantry Center; the 1/509th, the opposing force battalion at the Joint Readiness Training Center; and various corps-level support units in the 18th Airborne Corps. Although more lightly equipped than conventional airborne formations, most special operations forces are parachute trained and capable of forced entry.

6. A division battle staff of 115 is certainly feasible if training management, garrison support and other non-combat functions are outsourced, privatized or transferred to other post activities.

7. This concept envisions the brigade commander in actual command of these units unless they are placed un-

der another brigade's operational control for specific tactical missions. The DIVARTY, division engineer (DIVENG) and divisions support command (DISCOM) commanders retain oversight and branch-specific technical and training responsibilities for organic DS units assigned to maneuver brigades. One option is to leave them as raters of DS units, with the brigade commander as intermediate rater and the commanding general as senior rater. Another is to have the brigade commander serve as rater for his DS units while soliciting letter input from DIVARTY, DIVENG and DISCOM commanders.

8. Given current US air dominance, eliminating the short-range AD battalion is justifiable. The brigade AD battery is intended to provide point defense of high value assets such as command posts (CPs) and the brigade support area against low-level rotary-wing threats.

9. With a brigadier general commanding the maneuver brigades, there would be no need for same-rank assistant division commanders. The division chief of staff would run the division main CP; the division support commander would run the division rear CP; and the commanding general would direct the fight forward from the division tactical CP, brigade CPs or from a command and control aircraft.

10. Until LOSAT is fielded, the vulnerable tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system should be replaced by the Javelin. Although the Javelin's range is slightly less than the TOW's, its fire-and-forget, soft-launch, top-attack features make it more survivable and effective. Another crucial requirement is to increase the antiarmor crew from three to four. Because of the density of weapons assigned to the crew, its multiple missions and its inability to function after even a single casualty, this modest increase is imperative. Heavy weapons would include the Mark-19 automatic grenade launcher and the M2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun.

11. Trained snipers are important force multipliers. Their value has been neglected too long in US Army infantry units. They can be effective against targets at ranges to 1,000 meters. The number of sniper teams per battalion should be increased from 3 to 24, which would provide tremendous improvement in long-range precision fires at low manpower costs.

12. Because the 81-mm mortar platoon already has HMMWVs, its replacement by the heavier M120 would not affect its mobility or deployability. Although ammunition for the 120-mm mortar is bulkier, the disadvantage is more than offset by the weapon's greatly improved range and effects. Through the early 1980s, airborne units had 81-mm mortars at company level and the 4.2-inch heavy mortar at battalion level, without degraded ability to resupply ammunition.

13. The assault squadron should field 38 Blackhawks in three troops of 12 each, plus two for headquarters. This would give the division the ability to move one infantry bat-

talion combat echelon in one lift. The weapon mix would depend on the mission. For air assaults, the UH-60 would be armed with miniguns. For light attack missions, rockets and Hellfires would be added.

14. With 25 Comanches in the air cavalry/light attack squadron and 38 Hellfire-equipped Blackhawks in the assault squadron, it is theoretically possible for the cavalry regiment to launch about 900 fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles in less than five minutes—enough to completely shatter an enemy tank division.

15. The ground cavalry squadron and light armor battalion would retain maintenance and support platoons.

16. Ideally, the squadron would employ three troops, each with two tank platoons, two scout platoons and a three-tube 120-mm mortar section. The ground cavalry squadron scout platoons would field the UpArmored HMMWV (UAHMMWV) mounting the MK19 automatic grenade launcher and M250-caliber heavy machine gun. By 2010 the future scout vehicle would replace the UAHMMWV.

17. Currently, airborne infantry battalions' organic trucks can move one rifle company team in a single lift.

18. This has already been announced for the reorganized Army XXI heavy division.

19. Aviation units' CSS in the cavalry regiment can be safely consolidated in the regimental support squadron since all aircraft must return to rear areas to refuel, re-arm, exchange crews and be serviced.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., is the commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Virginia and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental US, Grenada, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. His article "Building Unbreakable Units: The Role of Human Factors in War," appeared in the July-August 1995 issue of Military Review.

MR Almanac

Force Protection Implications: TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, Korea 1950

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., US Army, Retired

"They were Task Force [TF] Smith, which [General Douglas] MacArthur termed an arrogant display of strength, sent ahead into Korea to give the Communists pause. [Major General (MG) William F.] Dean had been ordered to move his entire 24th [Infantry] Division to the peninsula, but it was scattered the length and breadth of Japan, near six separate ports, and there were no ships immediately available. It would have to go in bits and pieces, of which Task Force Smith was the first."¹

Since July 1950, TF Smith and the

24th Infantry Division (ID) have been used as examples of poor tactical combat performance. However, instead of serving as an indictment, their actions should be reminders of the results of operational, national and strategic failure.

Poor operational and strategic intelligence; poor operational planning; and a lack of operational mobility and transportation were as much to blame for initial US failures in Korea as any problems tactical units might have had. The finger should have been wagged at senior

leaders all the way up to the National Command Authority.

In retrospect, TF Smith performed reasonably well, considering what it faced. Survivors of TF Smith have related, and analyses indicate, that even a larger, better-prepared force would have still failed, given the 4th North Korean People's Army (NKPA) Division's strength.²

Despite the tremendous setbacks in July and August 1950, TF Smith and the 24th ID played key roles in slowing North Korean forces in the drive to Pusan. The North Koreans

sion must evolve with the changing battlefield. Equipped with leading edge technology and manned by tough, well-trained, aggressive soldiers, the division will remain ready

NOTES

1. The Red Army pioneered airborne-warfare techniques, entering World War II with corps-size airborne formations. German *fallschirmjaeger* parachute units scored notable success while advancing across Belgium, storming Fort Eben Emael and taking Crete. To train, equip and develop doctrine for airborne forces, the US Provisional Parachute Group was formed in 1941, followed in 1942 by Airborne Command.

2. The First Allied Airborne Army consisted of the US 82d and the 101st Airborne Divisions; Britain's 1st Airborne Division; Poland's Parachute Brigade; and supporting troop-carrier units and corps-level support formations. All were deliverable by parachute or glider.

3. The 2d Battalion, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, set a world record in 1943 when it marched 118 miles in three days. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Band of Brothers* (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 26.

4. The 101st Airborne's performance at Bastogne and the 82d Airborne's actions at St. Vith during the Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944 and January 1945 demonstrated conclusively that when fighting in restrictive terrain, airborne units could defend successfully against Germany's best armored units. Equipped with large numbers of captured German *panzerfaust* and *panzerschreck* handheld AT weapons, airborne units conducted a tenacious, persistent defense. Information provided to the author in 1980 by LTG James Gavin, US Army, Retired, former commander, 82d Airborne Division.

5. The 1/508th is in Italy, the 1/501st is in Alaska. Other airborne units include the 1/507th, the airborne training battalion at the Infantry Center, the 1/509th, the opposing force battalion at the Joint Readiness Training Center, and various corps-level support units in the 18th Airborne Corps. Although more lightly equipped than conventional airborne formations, most special operations forces are parachute trained and capable of forced entry.

6. A division battle staff of 115 is certainly feasible if training management, garrison support and other non-combat functions are outsourced, privatized or transferred to other post activities.

7. This concept envisions the brigade commander in actual command of these units unless they are placed under another brigade's operational control for specific tactical missions. The DIVARTY, division engineer (DIVENG) and divisions support command (DISCOM) commanders retain oversight and branch-specific technical and training responsibilities for organic DS units assigned to maneuver brigades. One option is to leave them as raters of DS units, with the brigade commander as intermediate rater and the commanding general as senior rater. Another is to have the brigade commander serve as rater for his DS units while soliciting letter input from DIVARTY, DIVENG and DISCOM commanders.

8. Given current US air dominance, eliminating the short-range AD battalion is justifiable. The brigade AD battery is intended to provide point defense of high value assets such as command posts (CPs) and the brigade support area against low-level rotary-wing threats.

9. With a brigadier general commanding the maneuver brigades, there would be no need for same-rank assistant division commanders. The division chief of staff would run the division main CP; the division support commander would run the division rear CP; and the commanding general would direct the fight forward from the division tactical CP, brigade CPs or from a command and control aircraft.

10. Until LOSAT is fielded, the vulnerable tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile system should be replaced by the Javelin. Although the Javelin's range is slightly less than the TOW's, its fire-and-forget, soft-launch, top-attack features make it more survivable and effective. Another crucial requirement is to increase the antiarmor crew from three to four. Because of the density of weapons assigned to the crew, its multiple missions and its inability to function after even a single casualty, this modest increase is imperative. Heavy weapons would include the Mark-19 automatic grenade launcher and the M2 .50-caliber heavy machine gun.

11. Trained snipers are important force multipliers. Their value has been neglected too long in US Army infantry units. They can be effective against targets at ranges to 1,000 meters. The number of sniper teams per battalion should be increased from 3 to 24, which would provide tremendous improvement in long-range precision fires at low manpower costs.

12. Because the 81-mm mortar platoon already has HMMWVs, its replacement by the heavier M120 would not affect its mobility or deployability. Although ammunition for the 120-mm mortar is bulkier, the disadvantage is more than offset by the weapon's greatly improved range and effects. Through the early 1980s, airborne units had 81-mm mortars at company level and the 4.2-inch heavy mortar at battalion level, without degraded ability to resupply ammunition.

13. The assault squadron should field 38 Blackhawks

in three troops of 12 each, plus two for headquarters. This would give the division the ability to move one infantry battalion combat echelon in one lift. The weapon mix would depend on the mission. For air assaults, the UH-60 would be armed with miniguns. For light attack missions, rockets and Hellfires would be added.

14. With 25 Comanches in the air cavalry/light attack squadron and 38 Hellfire-equipped Blackhawks in the assault squadron, it is theoretically possible for the cavalry regiment to launch about 900 fire-and-forget Hellfire missiles in less than five minutes—enough to completely shatter an enemy tank division.

15. The ground cavalry squadron and light armor battalion would retain maintenance and support platoons.

16. Ideally, the squadron would employ three troops, each with two tank platoons, two scout platoons and a three-tube 120-mm mortar section. The ground cavalry squadron scout platoons would field the UpArmored HMMWV (UAHMMWV) mounting the MK19 automatic grenade launcher and M2.50-caliber heavy machine gun. By 2010 the future scout vehicle would replace the UAHMMWV.

17. Currently, airborne infantry battalions' organic trucks can move one rifle company team in a single lift.

18. This has already been announced for the reorganized Army XXI heavy division.

19. Aviation units' CSS in the cavalry regiment can be safely consolidated in the regimental support squadron since all aircraft must return to rear areas to refuel, repair and maintain.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hooker Jr., is the commander, 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Virginia and is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He has served in various command and staff positions in the Continental US, Grenada, Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. His article "Building Unbreakable Units: The Role of Human Factors in War," appeared in the July-August 1995 issue of Military Review.

MR Almanac

Force Protection Implications: TF Smith and the 24th Infantry Division, Korea 1950

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., US Army, Retired

"They were Task Force [TF] Smith, which [General Douglas] MacArthur termed an arrogant display of strength, sent ahead into Korea to give the Communists pause. [Major General (MG) William F.] Dean had been ordered to move his entire 24th [Infantry] Division to the peninsula, but it was scattered the length and breadth of Japan, near six separate ports, and there were no ships immediately available. It would have to go in bits and pieces, of which Task Force Smith was the first."¹

Since July 1950, TF Smith and the

24th Infantry Division (ID) have been used as examples of poor tactical combat performance. However, instead of serving as an indictment, their actions should be reminders of the results of operational, national and strategic failure.

Poor operational and strategic intelligence; poor operational planning; and a lack of operational mobility and transportation were as much to blame for initial US failures in Korea as any problems tactical units might have had. The finger should have been wagged at senior

leaders all the way up to the National Command Authority.

In retrospect, TF Smith performed reasonably well, considering what it faced. Survivors of TF Smith have related, and analyses indicate, that even a larger, better-prepared force would have still failed, given the 4th North Korean People's Army (NKPA) Division's strength.²

Despite the tremendous setbacks in July and August 1950, TF Smith and the 24th ID played key roles in slowing North Korean forces in the drive to Pusan. The North Koreans

were thrown off schedule, which permitted the US military to establish the Pusan perimeter and led to the NKPA's eventual defeat. This is often conveniently overlooked to prove the high cost of tactical unpreparedness. However, TF Smith and, subsequently, 24th ID elements, successfully conducted what was once called a high-risk delay.

Operational Implications

Operational implications of committing occupation forces in Japan to combat in 1950 offer relevant lessons for today. With reductions in unit strengths, training readiness and capabilities of current US forces, the Army would do well to reexamine historical precedents regarding incremental application of force to a conflict.

The situation that faced the 8th Army in Japan bears many similarities to situations the Army now faces in force projection. Most notable is the severe shortage of strategic transportation assets available for timely response.³ This specific problem directly affected the operational concept of how the Advanced Command (ADCOM) and 8th Army conducted initial missions in the 1950 delay to the Naktong River.

Given the US Armed Forces' current capabilities, force-projection doctrine might have to be practiced under circumstances similar to those of July 1950. Deployment to Saudi Arabia in Autumn 1990 occurred before downsizing fully affected the US military. The problem is more critical now with aging aircraft and a severely deflated military.

Had the Iraqis taken advantage of the situation early during Operation *Desert Shield*, the 82d Airborne Division's history during that time might read more like TF Smith's. The major difference for the Army units was that *Desert Shield* soldiers had received high-quality training and equipment.

Specific analysis of TF Smith and 24th ID actions shows that incremental deployment of the 24th ID, especially TF Smith, was the 8th Army's only proper operational course of action. Unfortunately, some historians, such as author Clay Blair, give

their actions short shrift: "The Americans had achieved little in this piecemeal and disorganized waste of precious lives and equipment. At most they delayed the NKPA a total of three, possibly four, days."⁴

Taken out of operational context, three to four days might seem inconsequential, but the 24th ID was only part of the delaying force. The 1st Cavalry and 25th ID deployed in depth behind the 24th ID. Proper analysis must consider the entire delay.

Korea 1950

Deploying units from Japan was key to the 8th Army's ability to establish a contiguous defensive perimeter before the North Koreans arrived in force.⁵ Therefore, US forces' initial deployment from Japan was time-sensitive because of the relatively short distance from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) to the southern end of the peninsula. Also, the lack of defensible terrain and the presence of natural barriers stymied tactical units' dispositions. These factors limited MacArthur's options.

The NKPA had the advantages of initiative and momentum. This was especially true after it crossed the Han River south of Seoul where organized South Korean resistance crumbled in the western corridor. Spearheaded by armor forces traveling on Highway 1, the main avenue of approach from Seoul to Pusan, the NKPA intended to move swiftly to Pusan, then consolidate with follow-on forces. The 4th NKPA ID led armor and truck-mounted infantry units as they advanced along this axis.⁶

The 4th NKPA ID followed the Soviet model when planning operations. There was a strict timetable for daily advances, and subordinate units received march objectives. If all went well, the 4th NKPA ID hoped to advance an average of 20 kilometers a day once it broke through South Korean defenses north of the river.⁷

Meanwhile, in Japan, MacArthur's choices for committing ground forces were limited. Although the landing at Inchon was in the planning stage, no ships or US Marine Corps troops were available for a

seaborne invasion. Like today's strained US military, the US Air Force (USAF) did not have enough in-theater lift capability to fly necessary forces to Korea from Japan. Nor were airfields sufficiently developed to handle heavier aircraft even if they had been readily available.⁸

MacArthur had to decide quickly whether to send a force—any force—or to wait, organize and fully equip an element of the understrength occupation forces. Sending units piecemeal into combat is desirable but is what happened in Korea as a conscious decision. The decision to send a small detachment of US ground troops was based on rational suppositions. Acting decisively and participating in the ground conflict immediately would demonstrate US resolve to deter communist aggression. And, the NKPA would not continue the fight if it knew it was fighting a world power in ground combat. In retrospect, this assumption was obviously faulty.

The operational implications were fairly clear—establish a presence on the Korean peninsula quickly with whatever force was available; slow the NKPA's advance; then reinforce forces on the ground deployments from Japan. Failure to perform these actions would result in lost seaports and would require forced entry from the sea to regain a foothold on the peninsula. Time was critical; the last substantial obstacle to the NKPA's southward advance was the Naktong River.

Accepting Risk

The solution in 1950 provides a classic example of what might occur for the US in the future. The 8th Army was to deploy a regiment of infantry immediately. The 24th ID was the closest Army unit in southern Japan to ports of embarkation. It was to send a unit by air as quickly as possible with the balance of the force to follow by sea.⁹ Thus began the events that placed the ill-equipped and undermanned TF Smith in its predicament.

Military leaders clearly understood the implications of committing forces to combat piecemeal, and they willingly took the risk that the

unit might be defeated in detail. Quantitative analysis of ADCOM and 8th Army's delay to the Nakdong River shows that the operational objective was met, but at a tremendous cost.¹⁰

MacArthur and Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker accepted the risk. Figures relating to time and distance factors, the method of measuring success in this case, are so complex that to limit the study of the delay to the Nakdong River alone might easily lead to simplistic conclusions. However, numbers clearly show that the North Korean advance was exceedingly slow under the circumstances and that the incremental application of US combat power definitely caused the North Koreans to fall behind schedule.

The July 1950 operational considerations also relate to current force-projection scenarios. Timely, incremental deployment into a theater to retain a foothold and a less-timely application of greater combat power were essentially the tradeoffs the 8th Army faced. Then, as now, strategic lift capability was a limiting factor that frustrated planners at all levels.

Along with ADCOM and 8th Army defenses, other factors slowed and prevented NKPA units' timely crossing of the Nakdong River. From what verifiable facts support, a combination of internal and external factors—the friction of war—delayed their advance. Internal factors included poor command and control, limited communication means, rigid tactical doctrine and artificial restraints in their operational plans. External factors included effects of weather and terrain, opposing ground actions and direct application of UN air power.

The results of the 8th Army's delay to the Nakdong River can be quantitatively assessed and contradict assertions that TF Smith and the 24th ID's initial actions were of no consequence. Simple mathematical analysis supports a generalization regarding the operational conduct of the delay and whether the example offers legitimate lessons. Because we know the NKPA's doctrine and have access to captured NKPA orders for the offensive, this information be-

comes control data with which to evaluate the NKPA's actual performance. We can compare the effect of US operations against NKPA units with the actual communist plan. We can make logical assumptions to determine what would have happened had ADCOM and the 8th Army not fought as it did along Highway 1—for example, if the force had waited for sufficient combat power before moving against the North Koreans.

On 1 July, Dean's 24th ID was alerted to send elements to Japan immediately by air.¹¹ The commander of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Bradley Smith, quickly cobbled together a task force and flew to Pusan on 2 July. Smith, a former Infantry School instructor, was a World War II combat veteran of the South Pacific.¹² His battalion was one of the best-trained infantry battalions in the 24th ID, despite personnel shortages, a lack of serviceable equipment and an unavailability of good maneuver areas for training.

The lack of air transportation reduced battalion personnel initially deployed to a relatively small, two-company, one-artillery battery task force pared out of the 1st Battalion, 21st infantry. On 2 July, these forces were sent north from Pusan with orders to block NKPA units moving south out of the Seoul area on Highway 1 toward Taejon.¹³ Highway 1 runs from Seoul to Taejon then to Waegwan through the mountains that parallel a rail line. This small but primary avenue of approach runs diagonally across the southern peninsula from the northwest to the southeast, terminating at Pusan. Based on poor intelligence and broad guidance, Dean intended to conduct a series of delays along this major corridor to aid the arrival of his remaining his force.

Juk-Mi Pass

Smith emplaced his forces along the high ground dominating both Highway 1 and the rail line, which ran through a relatively long tunnel under the extreme right flank of his position. Highway 1 bisected a saddle in the hill known as Juk-Mi Pass. The task force's two infantry companies were situated abreast

about four kilometers south of the pass on each side of the highway. One platoon was sited west of the highway, but the majority of the infantry troops were sited east of the road. An artillery battery was disposed to the rear.¹⁴ The terrain was undeniably the most defensible available.

The 4th NKPA ID and the 107th Tank Regiment were approaching TF Smith. Having crossed the Han River on 1 July, these units were leading the advance down Highway 1. Between 1-4 July, the 4th NKPA ID fought the remnants of the 1st and 7th IDs that were defending the Han River's south bank.¹⁵ By 4 July, the North Koreans had overcome South Korean resistance, entered Suwon and were visible from the hills adjacent to Juk-Mi Pass.

The North Koreans had moved 30 kilometers in four days, much less than the planned movement rate of 20 kilometers a day. However, they had to break through the South Korean main line of resistance, fight numerous actions north of the Han River, cross the river and move up initial logistic support from the DMZ. Under the circumstances, these movement figures are well within norms.

The distance from Suwon to Osan is just over 10 kilometers. The 4th NKPA ID left Suwon early on 5 July about the time TF Smith was settling into position on the hillside at Juk-Mi Pass. Tanks led the North Korean movement followed by motorized infantry then dismounted infantry. To maintain order, the armor and motorized infantry moved slowly so the dismounted infantry could follow closely. Still, by the time the North Koreans encountered TF Smith, a gap had developed between mounted and dismounted elements.

Movement was confined mostly to main roads because of poor trafficability. Most of the countryside was covered with rice paddies. Off-road movement was difficult for infantry and virtually impossible for armored vehicles. Smith knew this and disposed his antitank (AT) weapons to cover Highway 1 and the rail line.

The battle began at 0816, 5 July. North Korean tanks initially broke

through US positions and continued to Suwon without slowing appreciably. With the exception of the artillery battery's direct fire on the tanks, the North Koreans suffered no losses. The old, understrength bazooka and 57-millimeter recoilless rifle shells just bounced off the Soviet-designed armor. After two heavy engagements, TF Smith began a withdrawal under pressure at 1400.

Unfortunately, the direct support artillery battery, A Battery, 52d Field Artillery, was defeated. The tanks cut the landlines to the forward observers, and all radios went dead. The tanks continued engaging the 105-millimeter guns in direct-fire duels. The 4.2-inch heavy mortar section ran out of ammunition. After the initial engagement there was no indirect fire support. Close air support (CAS) was nonexistent. Because of recent fratricide incidents, CAS was restricted from operating south of the Han River. This prohibition effectively hobbled US ground maneuver elements and gave communist forces a distinct advantage.

A withdrawal in contact is probably the most difficult tactical maneuver to conduct even for well-trained units. For untrained units, the sequenced withdrawal quickly degenerated, becoming a rout. Grossly outnumbered US soldiers were overrun. The entire fight lasted from six to seven hours, actually a reputable showing based on simulations. By about 1500, organized resistance ceased, and TF Smith scattered.¹⁶ After executing captured US wounded, the 4th NKPA ID continued to Osan where it reorganized after covering approximately 15 kilometers.

From Osan to Taejon

While TF Smith was fighting to the north at Juk-Mi Pass, the 1/34 Infantry, 24th ID, was digging in about 10 kilometers south of Osan. Their positions were about halfway between Osan and P'yong'taek. The 34th Infantry Regiment had followed the 21st Infantry Regiment to Korea and was rushed forward along Highway 1 to back up TF Smith.

The North Koreans moved out of Osan early on 6 July and encountered the 1/34th Infantry between 0600 and 0800. On 6 July, the 107th

Tank Regiment led the movement south, only to find a blown bridge north of P'yong'taek. The 1/34th Infantry encountered the same problems as TF Smith had: they had no AT weapons that could stop T-34s, and more important, they could not tie-in flank defenses. They fought no more than three hours before withdrawing.¹⁷ Meanwhile, the 34th Infantry Regiment was falling back to Ch'onan, about 20 kilometers south of P'yong'taek. The North Koreans spent the remainder of 6 July repairing the blown bridge and finding fording sites.¹⁸

Fearing envelopment, the 3/34th Infantry, which was supposed to defend Ansong in a parallel position to the east of the 1/34th Infantry, withdrew without fighting. The 4th NKPA ID moved against relatively light resistance and covered the 20 kilometers expected of it during the day's march. On 7 July, the 4th NKPA ID left P'yong'taek moving south toward Ch'onan 20 kilometers away. By evening the North Koreans were in Ch'onan. The 3/34th Infantry succeeded in engaging only the 4th NKPA ID reconnaissance elements north of the town, then withdrew into Ch'onan.

While the North Korean march figures for 6 and 7 July do not belie the total picture, traveling 20 kilometers a day was costly. They were getting farther from their base of supplies. Their artillery required bulky ammunition, and their vehicles needed fuel, which had to be transported over roads increasingly interdicted by UN air power. Also, the 4th NKPA ID was forced to fight, causing them to deploy and reorganize along Highway 1 after each engagement. These time-consuming deployments slowed them down and broke their momentum. To continue to meet the goal of 20 kilometers a day they would have had to press soldiers who were already suffering from the physical effects of combat and constant marching in the monsoon heat.

Small engagements and battles occurred that continued in a similar manner for other elements of the 24th ID as they were committed piecemeal against the North Koreans. On 9 July, the first elements of

the 25th ID arrived in Korea. At Chonui (10 July), Choch'iwon (11-12 July), the Kum River Line (15-16 July) and Taejon (19-20 July), US units engaged and slowed the North Korean advance. The fights from Osan to Taejon covered about 100 kilometers and took the North Koreans 15 days. While these desperate battles were being fought, the 1st Cavalry Division boarded ships for Korea on 15 July. In Tokyo, MacArthur's staff began plans for an amphibious assault to conduct an operational envelopment of the North Koreans.¹⁹

The North Koreans moved the greatest distance during the campaign to the Nakdong River in the two days following the battle at Osan—20 kilometers each day. On both days they fought engagements before continuing. However, for the following 13 consecutive days, the North Koreans covered only 60 kilometers, fighting three more battles en route. This movement to Taejon averaged only 4.6 kilometers per day. This was a substantial decrease in march tempo, which appears to correlate with the increasing application of air power and the resistance encountered from newly arrived 24th ID units.²⁰

After the battle for Taejon on 20 July, where Dean was captured, the North Koreans faced 1st Cavalry and 25th ID elements that took up the fight from the 24th ID along the Taejon-Taegu corridor. The 1st Cavalry and 25th ID continued to delay the North Koreans as additional US units arrived. The 24th ID was withdrawn behind Taegu to refit and reorganize. The 25th ID also blocked the Chunchon/Wonju approach, the route of a North Korean supporting attack toward Taegu.

On 31 July, the 2d ID arrived, and on 2 August the 29th Regimental Combat Team arrived. US strength was building slowly and forces were being deployed into the line along the Nakdong River. On 1 August the 1st Cavalry withdrew over the river at Waegwan and destroyed the bridges.

TF Smith's Value

Numbers prove that Blair was only partially correct in his analysis of the 24th ID's contribution to the

delay of the North Koreans. His overall assessment is questionable. First, the physical and mental effects of numerous engagements and battles took the edge off NKPA forces and physically tired them. Also, the constant losses in personnel and supplies degraded the NKPA's fighting potential. How then can we ascertain whether the operational decision to hastily commit the 24th ID piecemeal into Korea was the correct decision? It becomes a cost-benefit analysis.

If the North Koreans planned to move about 20 kilometers a day along the route from Seoul to the Nakdong River, and the route is approximately 230 kilometers by road, then the NKPA should have reached the Nakdong River in approximately 11 to 12 days. This assumes they were conducting an exploitation after initially defeating ROK forces that were defending well forward—north of the Han River.

If the North Koreans had moved unimpeded by ground combat to the Nakdong River, they might have been able to launch a large-scale, coordinated attack from the march. Overwhelming the defenders along the Nakdong River would have allowed them to secure a bridgehead quickly. Instead, they arrived tired and off-balance from the numerous contacts they had experienced during their advance.

Instead of arriving at the Nakdong River within 12 days of leaving Seoul, the North Koreans did not arrive in strength until after 1 August, 24 days after their first engagement against TF Smith. The 24th ID was directly responsible for delaying the North Koreans about half the distance from Suwon to the Nakdong River, approximately 90 kilometers from Osan to Taejon. The North Koreans took 15 days to cover this distance, more than three times as long as it would have taken them to reach the Nakdong River crossings near Waegwan had they achieved their goal of 20 kilometers a day.

Those 15 days allowed more than two additional US divisions to arrive in Korea. If the North Koreans had not been slowed and attrited before they reached the Nakdong River, UN forces would have lost the chance to

establish a reasonable defense along the last natural terrain barrier en route to Pusan, which would have been catastrophic. Instead, the North Koreans were forced to conduct an opposed river crossing after their momentum had been broken. Instead of crossing on about 18 July, they did not attempt a major crossing until 26 August.²¹

What contributed to the North Koreans' failure? Poor communications and a desire to maintain strict command and control were two reasons. Reporting was poor, largely because not enough radios were available for timely reports. For example, at Osan the 4th NKPA ID's advance guard was engaged, and the infantry was separated from the tanks. Later, two North Korean regiments of the division's main body marched into the area without having received any communication about TF Smith's location.

On 7 July, air interdiction also began taking a serious toll just when the North Koreans' momentum seemed to be building. Between 7 and 9 July, during the battle of Ch'onan, North Korean columns moving down the western axes of advance received a tremendous blow. UN fighter-bombers caught North Korean armored and motorized columns on the roads, destroying an estimated 44 tanks and 197 trucks. On 10 July, during the battle at Chonui, North Korean follow-on and logistic elements were caught in march column on the roads near P'yongtaek and were devastated. USAF fighter-bombers were credited with destroying 38 tanks, 7 armored carriers and 117 trucks. Interestingly, the vehicles were backed-up at the bridge, which withdrawing 34th Infantry Regiment forces had blown up on 7 July.

There is no doubt that continued destruction of road-bound North Korean units greatly helped relieve the pressure on 24th ID units. While air power was not directly decisive against the large numbers of infantry forces in the North Korean army, it certainly appears to have helped slow them down by indirectly affecting their support.

Several other factors must also be considered. The North Koreans

were forced to follow Highway 1 in column because off-road mobility was impossible. Once dismounted infantry deploy tactically, reorganizing for renewed movement becomes time consuming. This was especially so for the North Koreans who had to rely on vocal, whistle, and hand and arm signals to communicate with troops moving through rice paddies.

The 4th NKPA ID deployed not once or twice, but as many as eight times against 24th ID delay positions. Cumulative effects of smaller deployments cost the North Koreans more time than one or two larger deployments. Everyone in the follow-on elements had to stop and wait while lead forces fought through. While the 8th Army might not have specifically intended for this to occur, it was a welcome by-product of piecemeal commitment of battalions and regiments.

Under these circumstances, 24th ID deployments of battalion-size forces provided the depth to blunt an armored attack and prevented the North Koreans' all-out pursuit. Had the North Koreans defeated one or two large units in delaying positions, they might have been able to envelop, bypass and move to the Nakdong River before US troops could prepare another delaying position. Fighting a number of smaller engagements tired the North Koreans, hurt their efficiency and slowed their momentum.

It might be presumptuous to assume that quantitative analysis of the North Korean's movement to the Nakdong River can reveal hard evidence that TF Smith and the 24th ID decisively affected the North Korean advance. However, numbers show that TF Smith and the 24th ID's efforts were critical to successfully establishing a defense on the Nakdong River. If the 24th ID was successful, then TF Smith was integral to that success. TF Smith's actions were the first in a series of actions. When taken together, these actions caused the North Koreans to fail.

The implications for operational planners at higher levels are evident. Committing the 24th ID piecemeal, employing the division unsupported on either flank and failing to provide proper joint or combined

arms requirements caused the 24th ID and the 8th Army to pay a severe price. During the delay from Osan to Taegu, the 24th ID lost almost 2,000 men killed, wounded and missing during 18 days of combat. The division was reduced to about 4,000 men by the time it was withdrawn from Taegu and replaced in the line.²² Yet, the 24th ID did what it was supposed to do—delay the North Koreans along the most dangerous avenue of approach to Pusan.

No More TF Smiths

Former Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) General Gordon R. Sullivan's statement, "No more Task Force Smiths!" is a metaphor intended to reflect the US Armed Forces' condition rather than being a specific criticism of TF Smith. Unfortunately, many misinterpret Sullivan's quote as a specific criticism of TF Smith. TF Smith's performance is often attributed solely to equipment, training and troop fitness factors. These contributing factors do not change the fact that US soldiers had to fight an overwhelmingly superior enemy force under terrible conditions.

Computing rough force ratios shows the disadvantage under which TF Smith and the 24th ID labored. Still, they slowed the North Korean advance until two other divisions could arrive in the Pusan perimeter. In fact, the 24th ID's contribution must be measured in hours and days. In the end, the delay by the 24th ID, 1st Cavalry Division and 25th ID directly contributed to North Korea's failure to reach the barrier the Nakdong River provided.

At a high cost, TF Smith and the 24th ID accomplished their missions. Colonel James T. Stewart's view differs from Blair's in this regard: "The NKPA around Pusan perimeter was nothing more than a skeleton which had been depleted by direct destruction and starved by the air interdiction program."²³ The earlier tragedy in no way reflects poorly on soldiers of a neglected army that had been serving as a constabulary occupation force.

Situations confronting the US Army today have the potential to repeat at least some of the actions of

1950. As the Army prepares for conventional missions and takes on the competing requirements to act as an international police force, it suffers from diminishing resources, is subject to shortfalls in strategic deployment transportation and, consequently, suffers declining readiness.

Committing lightly armed or grossly outnumbered delaying forces is a possibility senior commanders and planners must consider during risk analysis. The risk assessment might not allow a bloodless operation, which many leaders, soldiers and citizens expect. US forces might not have the luxury of a 6-month buildup like that which occurred before Operation *Desert Storm*.

Is the US Army prepared psychologically, and has it prepared the nation psychologically, for the costs of a conflict in which our military does not hold the initial advantage? It happened before. What makes us so sure it will never happen again? While we hope we can trade space for time when outnumbered, there might be little or no space to trade, in which case force attrition might be the result. In this regard, "No more Task Force Smiths!" rings hollow.

NOTES

1. T.R. Fehrenbach, *This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness* (New York: Macmillan, 1963), 98.

2. Brigadier General (Retired) Bradley Smith, in a 16 November 1990 letter to me, states: "Without AT mines and 3.5-inch rocket launchers, my whole battalion would not have done much better than we did with two companies." Smith's dispositions would have met today's standards for infantry battalion defensive positions. The units and weapons were best sited to take advantage of elevation, fields of fire and observation. Task Force Smith's ability to delay as long as it did is remarkable. TF Smith members interviewed for this article include retired LTC Duane Scott, commander, Battery A, 52d Field Artillery; retired COL Jack Doody, heavy mortar platoon leader; retired COL Philip Day, rifle platoon leader, C Company, and retired COL William Wynick, platoon leader, C Company. I also corresponded with retired BG Lynch, rifle platoon leader, B Company.

3. Robert Frank Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 6-7. The USAF had limited lift capability in June 1950. The 8th Wing, 5th Air Force, had 12 C-54s at Ashiya Air Base, Japan. The 374 Troop Carrier Wing at Tachikawa had two squadrons of C-54s. The 21st Troop Carrier Squadron at Clark Field, Philippines, was also alerted. In a telephone interview on 18 November 1995, Day said the C-54s could carry 50 troops or a limited number of troops with a couple of jeeps and trailers.

4. Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), 115. Actually, 8th Army elements slowed the North Korean advance three times longer than Blair gives them credit for.

5. William Glenn Robertson, *Counterattack on the Nakdong, 1950* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1985), 9.

6. General Headquarters, Far East Command Intelligence Section, Intelligence Summary, 4th North Korean ID, 41-50. Declassified 20 August 1975. Document provided by Joe Bermudez. The 4th NKPA ID was TF Smith's primary antagonist. With 3d NKPA ID elements, it fought the 24th ID until 22 July. The 4th NKPA ID, organized as a typical North Korean division, was com-

posed of the 5th, 16th and 18th Infantry Regiments and the 4th Artillery Regiment. T-34s that preceded the 4th NKPA ID were from the 107th Tank Regiment. The 4th NKPA ID's total strength at the outbreak of the war was approximately 11,000 men. It suffered about 3,400 casualties in the opening week of the war and was given the honorific title Seoul Division for its part in the capture of Seoul. On 3 November 1950, US forces destroyed the 4th NKPA ID, the remnants dispersing into the hills.

7. Operations Order No. 1, 4th ID (NKPA), 22 June 1950. ATIS Translation No. 200045, 30 October 1950. Provided by Joe Bermudez.

8. Charles E. Miller, *Airlift Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Air University Press, 1988), 195. Except for those near Seoul, the few airfields in Korea were not suitable for large operations. Unfortunately, by the time TF Smith arrived, the North Koreans already occupied them. The Pusan airfield deteriorated rapidly under the weight of the C-54s that delivered TF Smith. The smaller, less capable C-47s, which could carry only 18 troops, had to be substituted until repairs were made.

9. Top Secret message from LTG Walton H. Walker to MG William Dean (Eyes Only), dated 30 June 1950, declassified 4 January 1953.

10. Until 8th US Army headquarters arrived in Korea, BG John Church was the commander of the advanced elements. On 15 July, 8th US Army headquarters took command of all ground units.

11. Robertson, 6. The tasking for 24th ID to send a regimental combat team to Korea was based primarily on the proximity of division elements to air and sea embarkation ports. The division's initial elements were sent by air, large elements followed by sea.

12. In a telephone conversation with Smith on 10 September 1990, he said the Osan position was the last in a series of five he reconnoitered on 4 July en route north from P'yongtaek toward Suwon. Smith had no illusions about what he was up against. Not knowing the enemy's location, his leader's reconnaissance was as much contingency planning as anything.

13. John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Morrow, 1991), 77.

14. Blair, 102.

15. Roy E. Appleman, *South to the Naktong North to the Yalu, June-November 1950, US Army in the Korean War* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1961), 82.

16. Interview with retired LTC Duane Scott, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Smith was the commander of A Battery, 52d FA, TF Smith, on 5 July 1950.

17. Appleman, 84.

18. *VFW Magazine* (June-July 2000), 13-14.

19. Robert Jackson, *Air War Over Korea: Sixteen Stories of Heroism in the Air* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), 19.

20. James Stewart, *Airpower: The Decisive Force in Korea* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1957), 19.

21. Stewart, 9. While I believe Stewart's title is exaggerated, he provides an interesting alternative perspective of air operations. In a letter to me, Wynick claims that USAF kills tended to be overrated. They "spent a lot of time shooting up dead tanks" in the middle of his company's positions. This occurred after the battle at Osan since ADCOM had asked GEN George E. Stratemeyer, commander, Far East Air Forces, to temporarily suspend operations south of the Han River after 3 July because of fratricide and civilian casualties caused by uncoordinated fighter bomber attacks. An ammunition train alongside TF Smith was mistakenly strafed as it arrived in P'yongtaek on 3 July. These factors, plus the lack of good weather were the prime reasons air power was not used at Osan. And, even if air power had been available, TF Smith had no forward air controllers.

22. The cost computes to about 111 men a day, roughly an understrength 1950 rifle company. Another way to express the cost is about 20 men a kilometer from Osan to Taegu.

23. Stewart, 9.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., US Army, Retired, is the Senior Army Instructor, Leavenworth High School JROTC, Kansas. He received a B.S. from the US Military Academy, an M.A. from Webster University and an M.M.A.S. from the US Army Command and General Staff College. He is also a graduate of the Israeli Army Armored Corps Commanders Course. He served in various command and staff positions in the Continental United States, Korea and Germany.

Review Essay

A War To Be Won

James B. Patrick

The book club called *A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War* the definitive history of World War II.¹ When I received my copy, I turned immediately to the history of the Belgian Bulge. In November 1944 I was a second lieutenant of combat engineers, fresh out of Officer Candidate School. My destination was the war in the Pacific. The Bulge changed that. Instead of going to the Pacific, I was sent to Belgium as a casualty replacement.

At war's end, I was in Worms, Germany, where I stayed in the occupation army until February 1947. So in any book about World War II, I always look first for the story of the Bulge and the epic tale of the engineers blowing up the three Meuse River bridges right in the face of German General Jochen Peiper's SS armored column. Peiper's cry of fury and frustration: "Those damned engineers!" is for me the high point of that heroic saga.

Authors Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett omit Peiper's cry of rage, but they do describe his subsequent trial at Nuremberg for the Malmedy Massacre. They relate the trial much as does Charles B. MacDonald in *A Time for Trumpets*.² However, they claim that Peiper's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment when "Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin used his influence . . . because of Peiper's `anticommunism.'"³

In fact, US Senator Robert Taft knew what many in Europe had heard—some German witnesses had been beaten until they would have confessed to the assassination of Abraham Lincoln. Taft caused an uproar about the hypocrisy of the entire business. Soviet judges were on the bench. McCarthy, a freshman senator who had little influence, followed Taft's lead.⁴ Murray and Millett follow MacDonald's account, but the "anticommunism" seems to be their own invention.

I wondered if Murray and Millett had made up any other good McCarthy stories, so I looked in the index. McCarthy was not mentioned. Neither were Bletchley Park, Drumbeat, Paukenschlag, Enigma, Ultra, Magic or Purple, Katyn Forest or Kasserine Pass, posit or proximity fuze, radar, Henry Kaiser or liberty ships, submarine or Uboat, OSS, Oran or Venona, all of which appear somewhere in the text. In fact, the index is only 14 pages long. MacDonald's book has 25 index pages for a work that covers little more than a month of the war.

The book contains a fair number of maps, but they are in black and white. Dark gray arrows show US or

Allied movements. Black arrows indicate enemy movements. Since the maps contain many arrows, the lack of contrast is a real nuisance. Also, I found a dozen misspellings and one dubious translation.

Many sections are good, and various section summaries are insightful. But, Murray and Millett have an annoying habit of inserting inappropriate wisecracks and snap judgments, usually with no supporting evidence for their opinions. In particular, US General Douglas Mac-Arthur can do nothing right: "If noble words could kill, MacArthur would rank with Genghis Khan as a slayer of millions."⁵ "MacArthur's paranoia [and] lust for [publicity] were well known."⁶ "After five months of battle in France, Mac-Arthur saw no field service again and his premature generalship . . . cut him off from the rigorous professional military education of the interwar years. He was a general impresario . . . most given to geopolitical lecturing, not generalship."⁷ Many readers know that George C. Marshall had never fought in battle, and that US General Dwight D. Eisenhower saw his first dead US soldier while being flown over the Kasserine Pass battlefield. But Murray and Millett never let go. MacArthur "was always hostile to those who were his equal."⁸ Even the final Japanese surrender on the battleship *Missouri* was arranged by "general-dramatist MacArthur" and was "MacArthur's bit of *kabuki*."⁹

The authors cite nothing to support these grotesque opinions. In fact, documentation is not a strongpoint of their book. I counted 34 cheap shots, exactly half of which were antiMacArthur.

They also make nasty cracks about Chinese General Chiang Kai shek, US Major General Lewis H. Brereton, the entire Swiss nation, Czechoslovakian President Eduard Benes, US General Leslie Groves, German Panzerleader Heinz Guderian, US General Mark Clark and Pope Pius XII.¹⁰ This scholarly smartaleck behavior seems to be a current academic fad. I find it sophomoric and annoying.

To be fair, the authors give US General George S. Patton the credit he has always deserved but not always received. On the German side, General Erwin Rommel and Field Marshal Eric von Manstein get fair and, I believe, accurate treatment. The authors even have a good, albeit brief, criticism of the US Army's infamous replacement system devised by Marshall in World War I, which caused casualty rates four to five times as high as those sustained by troops who had trained together.¹¹

In other places, the authors too readily accept common wisdom. For example, Russian KGB defector Viktor Suvorov advanced the interesting thesis that Russian Dictator Joseph Stalin was actively preparing to attack German Dictator Adolf Hitler when the Germans launched Operation *Barbarossa* in June 1941.¹² Suvorov provides considerable evidence for this thesis, which makes more sense than the usual view that Stalin—of all people—was a gullible simpleton outfoxed by the crafty Hitler.

Murray and Millett seem unaware of Suvorov's thesis. Even though they observe that by "stationing the Red Army's best units in the border areas, [Stalin] ensured their destruction at the campaign's outset [and] the worst disasters . . . occurred in the center. There the Red Army had deployed its troops well forward

in Sovietoccupied Poland."¹³ It seems not to have crossed the authors' minds that there might have been a reason why the Red Army was deployed so far forward when Hitler struck.

When describing the arrival on the Moscow front of fresh Russian troops from Eastern Siberia during the winter of 1941/1942, Murray and Millett do not mention that this reinforcement was only possible because Richard Sorge, a Soviet spy in Tokyo, had been able to assure Stalin that Japan would not attack in the Russian East. So, one of the most important intelligence victories of the war goes unnoticed in this "definitive history."

Murray and Millett are especially weak in their appreciation of the effects of intelligence operations. Surveying some peripheral fallout of the war, they mention Yugoslavia, where "Tito's communist partisans made short work of their main opponents, the Serbian Chetniks of Draza Mihailovic."¹⁴

What Murray and Millett do not say, and perhaps did not know, is that Mihailovic did well as long as he was supported by the British. But Yugoslav affairs were handled by the British Special Operation Executive Office in Cairo, where James Klugmann, a Communist of British double agent Kim Philby's stripe, doctored the reports to make British Prime Minister Winston Churchill think that Tito was fighting the Germans while Mihailovic was fighting only Tito.¹⁵ Disgusted, Churchill switched British support to Tito. A communist firing squad ended Mihailovic's life, and Yugoslavia slid behind the Iron Curtain.

The authors' description of how the Russian winter affected the *Wehrmacht* is excellent. In late summer 1945, I was in charge of two battalions of German prisoners—one *Wehrmacht* and one SS—who were assembling prefabricated quarters at Bad Aibling under US engineer supervision. The *Wehrmacht* battalion, of barely company strength, had no officers left and was commanded by a sergeant who had been in the first drive on Moscow. Because I spoke some German, we chatted, mostly about his plans to move to the United States as soon as he could, but also about the Moscow Campaign. Murray and Millett's account tallies perfectly with the sergeant's description of that cold winter.

Why any army would attack Russia with no preparation for the Russian winter is hard to understand, but that is exactly what the Germans did. Suvorov claimed that Stalin's intelligence chief had carefully monitored German army purchases of winter supplies. Because there was no increase, he assured Stalin that German troop movements on the frontier could not mean an attack. After the attack, Stalin forgave the intelligence chief, who had fully expected to be shot.

Suvorov's explanation for the apparent insanity of the German attack without proper preparation is that Hitler realized Stalin's intentions too late to accumulate supplies. He struck the Soviets in what was, in essence, a spoiling attack. Although I cannot accept the entirety of Suvorov's thesis, it makes enough sense to merit some discussion in any serious World War II analysis.¹⁶

A definitive history should also mention poison gas which, like Sherlock Holmes's dog that did not bark, had been expected to play a major role in the war and did not. We know from the disaster in Bari Harbor when the liberty ship John Harvey was sunk by bombing that all the major combatants expected and tried

to prepare for gas warfare, keeping stocks of gas near the front. When Vbombs began falling on London, Churchill wanted to retaliate with gas and was only talked out of it with difficulty.

In a war in which every other atrocity, from mass firebombing of cities to herding people into concentration camps to nuclear-weapons use, occurred, the nonuse of gas is anomalous. I have heard that some US officers wanted to use gas to neutralize Japanese defenses on Iwo Jima, but US President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to authorize it.

Murray and Millett also slight the ongoing dispute over the Pearl Harbor attack. To be fair, Robert B. Stinnett's *Day of Deceit* probably did not appear until after their book was in press, but there was enough in print to suggest that the common version of the deceitful Japanese and the innocently trusting Roosevelt might be a bit too simple.¹⁷

Murray and Millett accept the usual picture of Japanese Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's task force moving in radio silence, even though several stations and the *SS Lurline* picked up and reported extensive Japanese naval chatter in the North Pacific. With the new evidence Stinnett presents, anyone who still maintains that Roosevelt was surprised by the Japanese "sneak" attack is misinformed.

Murray and Millett also claim that Spanish Dictator Francisco Franco "deliberately drew out the [Spanish Civil War] to kill the maximum number of his loyalist opponents."¹⁸ Later they assert that "Franco . . . was making clear his eagerness to join the Axis as quickly as possible."¹⁹ Both statements are wrong. In fact, Hitler and Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini tried desperately to get Franco to join the Axis. Franco would flirt, but he never would join.

Some of their allegations are outright crazy. They assert: "some planners knew that the Germans had begun to develop nuclear warheads."²⁰ As anyone with even a passing acquaintance with World War II knows, the German atomic program, directed by Werner Heisenberg, did not even get close to developing a fissionable device. The authors also grandly affirm that "anti-Semitism and anti-Communism fused in the twentieth century," which is why, I suppose, Stalin killed and imprisoned so many Jews.²¹

The authors' most grandiose howler is their assertion that the "German victory [in May 1940] came perilously close to destroying Western civilization."²² Apparently North America did not count as part of Western civilization.

Other sweeping allegations are possibly true but inherently unprovable. For example, they say, "Rommel proved himself the premier battlefield commander of the war."²³ Rommel was certainly excellent in the North African desert, but how good would he have been in New Guinea? We have no way of knowing, and it does not matter anyway. Such grand assertions are worthless, as any competent military history professor should know.

The authors assert that British General Bernard Montgomery "proved to be one of the great field commanders of World War II."²⁴ Montgomery had an advantage over Rommel of nearly 4:1 in troop strength, 3:1 in tanks and almost 4:1 in aircraft.²⁵ With odds like that, it would require genius to lose.

Murray and Millett share the civilian delusion that a competent commander is intolerant of subordinates' failure. Thus Marshall is "almost always an extraordinarily good judge of talent."²⁶ Later they write approvingly of the "ruthlessness with which Eisenhower sacked senior officers who failed."²⁷ Both Marshall and Eisenhower advocated the zero-defects doctrine, but when compared with the Third Army where, for all his bluster, Patton was conservative in relieving officers for mistakes, reasonable tolerance for unavoidable blunders in war correlates with better performance.²⁸

The book is subject to a common weakness of many World War II books—the morality play of good guys versus bad guys. One would have hoped to see this attitude eliminated by now. But, to Murray and Millett, German generals were all "convinced" Nazis, as though they had choices, but Russian generals are never described as "convinced" communists. As a result of this stereotyping, the authors miss useful insights. For example, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, whom I consider the best allaround commander the Germans had, was a typical Prussian Junker of the old school. He was loyal to his country but thoroughly contemptuous of the upstart Nazis. When he received a monetary award for distinguished service, he characterized it as *saugeld*, an almost obscene German expression of disgust.

After the Allied breakout in Normandy, agitated German General Wilhelm Keitel asked Rundstedt, "What shall we do?" Rundstedt replied, "What shall we do? Make peace, you fools! What else can you do?"²⁹ Yet, Murray and Millett can only say of Rundstedt: "Despite his postwar claims of having been disinterested in politics, he would loyally serve Hitler and the Nazi regime to the bitter end."³⁰

The worst aspect of *A War to Be Won* is the clumsy handling of the war's moral aspect. The description of Nazi atrocities is straightforward; there are several illustrations of concentration camp inmates and civilians who were executed; and the authors describe, with little or no comment, corresponding Soviet atrocities.³¹ But, they do not mention the Soviet use of prisoners as the first wave in attacks through mine fields or as barrier troops. Stalin's infamous rape order also receives no comment. Japanese atrocities are only adequately described and illustrated.

I could find no reference to the US Strategic Bombing Survey conducted immediately after the war.³² The US Army Air Force had high hopes that the survey would justify the bombing program. Instead, it showed that German industrial production increased right up to the end of the war. The only effective bombings were those of railroads and oil fields.

The massive raids on cities, deliberately kindling firestorms like the Dresden bombing, with the accompanying slaughter of civilians, proved to have been unjustifiable atrocities that had no demonstrable effect on German military capabilities. Murray and Millett refer to "German industry, which ringed major cities."³³ Blasting German cities to rubble from the center out merely reflected the

fact that, facing intense flak and fighter opposition, "precision" bombers had trouble hitting any target smaller than an entire city.³⁴

In the book section titled "The Air War in Retrospect," the authors balance the effect of forcing Germany to build antiaircraft guns and fighter planes instead of field pieces and bombers to find some sort of hypothetical justification.³⁵ They also persuade themselves that the combined bomber offensive was not elegant or humane, but it was effective. That formulation is unacceptable. One can easily imagine Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels declaring that producing munitions at Auschwitz was not elegant or humane, but effective.

In the epilogue, the authors desperately argue against "moral equivalence," claiming that the Germans and Japanese "came close to destroying the two great centers of world civilization and to imposing in their stead imperial regimes founded on racial superiority, slavery and genocide."³⁶ This evades the real difficulty. No one is arguing that the war itself was wrong or that the wrong side won. The point is that some US-perpetrated atrocities did not contribute significantly to winning the war. They were just atrocities. Hindsight allows us to see the mistakes and ponder the important lessons.

Peiper was condemned to death for allowing his troops to kill 71 to 86 US prisoners of war in the Malmedy Massacre. To be sure, his mission was one that made looking after prisoners difficult. Of course, that is no excuse. Still, when I looked across Nuremberg during the time of the War Crimes Tribunal, as far as I could see was nothing but shattered rubble. Over it still lingered the characteristic smell of all bombed cities—a faint mixture of smoke and the sicklysweet smell of corpses rotting under the ruins. How many of Peiper's men had parents, siblings or sweethearts buried in the ruins? That reflection does not alter my belief that Peiper should have been shot for murdering prisoners, but I do not feel selfrighteous about the US role, either.

In tragedies the hero sins, either unavoidably or through ignorance. World War II was a tragedy, which is why I so dislike Murray and Millett's glib wisecracks and smug judgmentalism. Like thousands of others, I entered the war as a sophomore and emerged from it as a man who had successfully commanded men. And, like thousands of others, I lost my best friend and college roommate, who died serving as a machine gunner. So, I believe I speak for my generation in resenting the book's flippant tone. The book concludes with the majestic Periclean elegy for the fallen Athenians of the Peloponnesian War. The oration's tone is far more suitable for the subject than the one Murray and Millett use.

The definitive history of World War II might never be written, although Churchill's history of the war comes close.³⁷ Yet, Churchill is such a ferocious partisan that none but the British receive the respect they deserve. If there is ever a definitive history, it should certainly have more sympathy and understanding for the suffering soldiers and civilians of all sides, and the harried, confused officers who led as best they could.

1. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
2. Charles B. MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge* (New York: Morrow, 1985).
3. Ibid., 468.
4. Arthur Herman, *Joseph McCarthy* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).
5. Murray and Millett, 174.
6. Ibid., 205.
7. Ibid., 206.
8. Ibid., 272.
9. Ibid., 525-26.
10. Ibid., Kai-shek, 232; Brereton, 440; Swiss, 408, 557, 563; Benes, 481; Graves, 518; Guderian, 69, 72; Clark, 377, 385; Pope Pius XII, 383.
11. *Stars and Stripes* had several articles during the Anzio and Cassino Campaigns quoting company commanders on the excessive casualty rates among replacements.
12. Viktor Suvorov, *Icebreaker*, Thomas B. Beattie, trans (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990). From a Communist comment that "Hitler is the icebreaker of the revolution."
13. Murray and Millett, 120, 122.
14. Ibid., 564.
15. David Martin, *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1990).
16. Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1973). Whaley mentions the "preventive war hypothesis" dismissively but admits that Keitel, for whom he has nothing but contempt, and Kesselring believed it. In rebuttal, Whaley cites the memoirs of Manstein and General Walter Warlimont. Manstein's *Lost Victories* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) is ambivalent. The Soviet positions were suited to defense in depth but "the pattern could have been switched in no time. . . ."

With a minimum of delay, the Red Army [which was] numerically . . . superior to the German Army . . . could have become capable of going over to the attack." Warlimont, who was only a staff colonel until Barbarossa, is the only aggressive skeptic. Whaley's book appeared 17 years before Suvorov's allegations were published, so Whaley had no opportunity to respond.

17. Robert B. Stinnett, *Day of Deceit* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

16. Murray and Millett, 5.

19. Ibid., 84.

20. Ibid., 534.

21. Ibid., 534.

22. Ibid., 75.

23. Ibid., 266.

24. Ibid., 270.

25. Ibid., 271.

26. Ibid., 272.

27. Ibid., 417.

28. See Major Daniel P. Bolger, "Zero Defects," *Military Review* (May 1991), 6173, which is one of the most insightful analyses of the World War II command climate in Europe I have read.

29. Unknown.

30. Murray and Millett, 47.

31. The illustration showing German prisoners of war at Stalingrad reads: "Of the 90,000 who fell into Soviet hands, barely 5,000 survived."

32. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), September 30, 1945, online <www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm>.

33. Murray and Millett, 506.

34. Since most German cities were founded in the Middle Ages or earlier, factories from the industrial era were almost always on the periphery or in the suburbs. City centers contained shops, apartments or cultural buildings. I was stationed briefly in Allach, an outlier of Munich. The entire center of Munich had been blasted to rubble, but in Allach, across the street from US quarters, was a jet engine factory, crudely camouflaged, with finished engines still on the test blocks. Two bombs, obviously jettisoned, hit the plant. One destroyed the workers' bicycle racks; the other scattered bottles from the dispensary over the parking lot.

35. Murray and Millett, 331.

36. Ibid., epilogue.

37. Winston Churchill, *The Second World War* (out of print).

James Patrick served in Germany as a platoon leader of combat engineers in 1945 and stayed in the Occupation Army after the war. He was a battalion adjutant before returning to the US in 1947. He received a B.S. from MIT and an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Harvard. After a 20-year career as a research chemist, he spent 25 years as chairman of the chemistry department of Mary Baldwin College.

[**Return to Table of Contents**](#)

Millett's glib wisecracks and smug judgmentalism. Like thousands of others, I entered the war as a sophomore and emerged from it as a man who had successfully commanded men. And, like thousands of others, I lost my best friend and college roommate, who died serving as a machine gunner. So, I believe I speak for my generation in resenting the book's flippant tone. The book concludes with the majestic Periclean elegy for the fallen Athenians of the Peloponnesian War. The oration's tone is far more suitable for the subject than the one Murray and Millett use.

The definitive history of World War II might never be written, although Churchill's history of the war comes close.³⁷ Yet, Churchill is such a ferocious partisan that none but the British receive the respect they deserve. If there is ever a definitive history, it should certainly have more sympathy and understanding for the suffering soldiers and civilians of all sides, and the harried, confused officers who led as best they could.

NOTES

1. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett, *A War to Be Won* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

2. Charles B. MacDonald, *A Time for Trumpets: The Untold Story of the Battle of the Bulge* (New York: Morrow, 1985).

3. *Ibid.*, 468.

4. Arthur Herman, *Joseph McCarthy* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

5. Murray and Millett, 174.

6. *Ibid.*, 205.

7. *Ibid.*, 206.

8. *Ibid.*, 272.

9. *Ibid.*, 525-26.

10. *Ibid.*, Kai-shek, 232; Breton, 440; Swiss, 408, 557, 563; Benes, 481; Graves, 518; Guderian, 69, 72; Clark, 377, 385; Pope Pius XII, 383.

11. *Stars and Stripes* had several articles during the Anzio and Cassino Campaigns quoting company commanders on the excessive casualty rates among replacements.

12. Viktor Suvorov, *Icebreaker*, Thomas B. Beattie, trans (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990). From a Communist comment that "Hitler is the icebreaker of the revolution."

13. Murray and Millett, 120, 122.

14. *Ibid.*, 564.

15. David Martin, *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1990).

16. Barton Whaley, *Codeword BARBAROSSA* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1973). Whaley mentions the "preventive war hypothesis" dismissively but admits that Keitel, for whom he has nothing but contempt, and Kesselring believed it. In rebuttal, Whaley cites the memoirs of Manstein and General Walter Warlimont. Manstein's *Lost Victories* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982) is ambivalent. The Soviet positions were suited to defense in depth but "the pattern could have been switched in no time. . . . With a minimum of delay, the Red Army [which was] numerically . . . superior to the German Army . . . could have become capable of going over to the attack." Warlimont, who was only a staff colonel until Barbarossa, is the only aggressive skeptic. Whaley's book appeared 17 years before Suvorov's allegations were published, so Whaley had no opportunity to respond.

17. Robert B. Stinnett, *Day of Deceit* (New York: The Free Press, 2000).

18. Murray and Millett, 5.

19. *Ibid.*, 84.

20. *Ibid.*, 534.

21. *Ibid.*, 534.

22. *Ibid.*, 75.

23. *Ibid.*, 266.

24. *Ibid.*, 270.

25. *Ibid.*, 271.

26. *Ibid.*, 272.

27. *Ibid.*, 417.

28. See Major Daniel P. Bolger, "Zero Defects," *Military Review* (May 1991), 61-73, which is one of the most insightful analyses of the World War II command climate in Europe I have read.

29. Unknown.

30. Murray and Millett, 47.

31. The illustration showing German prisoners of war at Stalingrad reads: "Of the 90,000 who fell into Soviet hands, barely 5,000 survived."

32. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (European War), September 30, 1945, online <www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm>.

33. Murray and Millett, 506.

34. Since most German cities were founded in the Middle Ages or earlier, factories from the industrial era were almost always on the periphery or in the suburbs. City centers contained shops, apartments or cultural buildings. I was stationed briefly in Allach, an outlier of Munich. The entire center of Munich had been blasted to rubble, but in Allach, across the street from US quarters, was a jet engine factory, crudely camouflaged, with finished engines still on the test blocks. Two bombs, obviously jettisoned, hit the plant. One destroyed the workers' bicycle racks; the other scattered bottles from the dispensary over the parking lot.


35. Murray and Millett, 331.

36. *Ibid.*, epilogue.

37. Winston Churchill, *The Second World War* (out of print).

James Patrick served in Germany as a platoon leader of combat engineers in 1945 and stayed in the Occupation Army after the war. He was a battalion adjutant before returning to the US in 1947. He received a B.S. from MIT and an M.S. and a Ph.D. from Harvard. After a 20-year career as a research chemist, he spent 25 years as chairman of the chemistry department of Mary Baldwin College.

MR Book Reviews



FORT ROBINSON AND THE AMERICAN WEST, 1874-1899, Thomas R. Buecker, Nebraska State Historical society, 1999, 265 pages, \$40.00.

In *Fort Robinson and the American West, 1874-1899*, Thomas R. Buecker gives more than just a history of a place. This superb book is detailed, extremely well written and filled with high-quality illustrations. Buecker, adding greatly to knowledge of the Indian War period from 1874 to 1899, skillfully weaves events surrounding Fort Robinson into the greater scheme of western expansion.

What I particularly like about Buecker's history is how closely it ties in with major events that occurred on the northern plains at the

height of the great Sioux War of 1876-77. Also, his depiction of civil-military relations during the era is particularly instructive for today's professional officers. Interagency friction certainly caused problems for a peacetime force thrown into a peacekeeping role not of its own choosing.

Buecker gives a partial view of Bureau of Indian Affairs attempts to control local agencies in situations for which it was obviously not equipped. The Army's frequent intercession on behalf of the Bureau caused great anxiety for commanders and troops. For a short time the Army was allowed control of the agencies to help stem armed violence and commanders' frustration.

Fort Robinson began as a camp to quarter troops supporting operations at the Red Cloud Agency. Eventually the fort developed into an outstanding permanent post supporting the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Indian Agencies. As temporary log structures gave way to permanent dwellings, Fort Robinson became one of the finest Army posts in the west.

Buecker describes the fort as developing in the same manner as current military installations, being built in stages as funds became available. Funding to make significant improvements came when the perceived Indian threat increased, and because of its proximity to Pine Ridge Reservation, the fort flourished.

Appendix B lists the famous regiments stationed at various times at Fort Robinson. The list includes the 2d, 4th, 8th, 9th and 14th Infantries and the 3d, 5th, 6th and 9th Cavalries. The 9th Cavalry spent more cumulative time at the post than any other. Buecker gives a balanced view of the blemishes of this well-known regiment as well as its glories.

This book is a great addition to my reference library. I will certainly take it with me when I visit Sioux War sites on future Staff Rides.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

GOD'S ASSASSINS: State Terrorism in Argentina in the 1970s, Patricia Marchak with William Marchak, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal, 1999, 339 pages, \$39.95.


Patricia and William Marchak present a good basic history of Argentina's political background in *God's Assassins*. The title indicates a religious core for the Argentine terrorist war. However, although the guerrillas had third-world "priests" as perceived allies, and the military thought itself fighting a holy war against communism, the authors present nothing more than typical "God's on our side" rational.

The guerrillas believed they were engaged in nothing more than armed

demonstrations, although with terrorist incidents. On the military side, interviewees deny or minimize kidnappings, assassinations and torture. In fact, one officer denied any knowledge of such incidents in the area under his control, explaining that he was "only a lieutenant colonel."

The military won the terrorist war, but only by also becoming terrorists—enthusiastic terrorists—torturers who loved their work. The book does not evaluate the cost of such a victory.

K.L. Jamison,
Kansas City, Missouri



MACARTHUR'S WAR: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero, Stanley Weintraub, Free Press, NY, 2000, 374 pages, \$27.50.

Generally speaking, there have been two types of books about the Korean War: those written by authors who meticulously detail battlefield operations but seem ponderous to most readers, and those who write with a more literary flair but often rely on others for detailed research. The best of the latter books are *The Korean War* (Max Hastings, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1987) and *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953* (Clay Blair, Times Books, New York, 1987).

I add *MacArthur's War* to this select list.

Stanley Weintraub writes clear, fast-moving prose about big issues of national policy as well as military operations in the field. Other writers give more detailed accounts of incidents such as the march north to the Yalu River in October 1950 and the subsequent retreat south. However, I have never read a better account of US Army General Douglas MacArthur's last months of command, during which his behavior went "from disregard of Washington to outright defiance."

A senior subordinate commander once said of MacArthur: "The best and the worst thing you hear about him are both true." In 1951, he was at his worst, as Weintraub shows in this devastating portrait.

MacArthur had never violated an order, largely because he rarely got one. The State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Harry S. Truman mentioned their concern about various military operations. However, all had invariably acquiesced to MacArthur's preference. Then MacArthur went too far. On 5 December 1950, to stop MacArthur's calls for attacks on Chinese territory, Truman issued a blanket directive saying "all public statements about foreign policy must first be cleared with the State Department; all pronouncements concerning military policy must be cleared with the Department of Defense."

Afraid of MacArthur's wrath if he were singled out, Truman sent the directive to all major military commanders and several civilian officials, such as the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, hardly a prime critic of the administration. MacArthur responded by writing a letter to a prominent newspaper: the Administration's directive was only its "most open drive . . . against me. . . . I was warned back in August from various sources—all reliable—that just such a campaign was to be initiated, based on the pretense of my inability to break out of the Pusan perimeter. That plan

was abandoned when the Inchon landing took place.”

MacArthur took his revenge by torpedoing negotiated peace talks, telling the Chinese he was ready to accept their surrender in the field. He went too far. Truman “could no longer tolerate [MacArthur’s] insubordination.”

MacArthur could be a gracious man. He had certainly charmed Truman at their Wake Island meeting. And, although relieved in April 1951, he still welcomed his replacement, LTG Matthew Ridgway into his Tokyo headquarters, telling him that “there is something wrong mentally [with the President] and he won’t live six months.” MacArthur, Ridgway later said, “could conceive of no possible reason why Truman would relieve him except there was something wrong mentally. . . . Really amazing!” Readers will see a lot of new books on Korea this year. They will not see many better than *MacArthur’s War*.

Michael Pearlman,
Leavenworth, Kansas

GREAT WORLD WAR II BATTLES IN THE ARCTIC,

Mark Llewellyn Evans, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1999, 192 pages, \$55.00.


Presumably, a book titled *Great World War II Battles in the Arctic* would be about just that. It is not. There is no mention of major land battles such as the unsuccessful multicorps German effort to take Murmansk, the Soviet Karelian front, arctic defense or the Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes Offensive, which was the largest battle in military history fought north of the Arctic Circle. The only land actions author Mark Llewellyn Evans discusses are the considerably smaller British/French/Polish landings at Trondheim and Narvik, Norway, and the attendant naval battle.

The book is primarily about *naval* actions. Should it be retitled “Great World War II Naval Battles in the Arctic?” Probably not. It dismisses Soviet naval efforts as those of bunglers and incompetents and does

not address the mass of Soviet naval archive material that has been released over the past 10 years. Evans also ignores the significant role of Soviet naval aviation and the Soviet use of motor torpedo boats. The 838 Soviet naval sorties launched to support British and US arctic convoys are also given scant notice.

So the book is essentially about British and US naval and aviation encounters with German navy and aviation forces in the arctic. This is still an important topic worthy of study. However, without maps or information from German archives, the book does not greatly aid students or scholars. There is some new archival material from British and US sources, but the book is essentially a repackaging of Vice Admiral B.B. Schofield’s *The Russian Convoys, 1941-1945* (out of print). Interested readers would do better with Schofield’s work, which reads well and has great maps.

Lester W. Grau,
Leavenworth, Kansas



PATTON AT BAY: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December, 1944, John Nelson Rickard, Praeger Press, Westport, CT, 1999, 295 pages, \$45.00.

The Lorraine Campaign during World War II occurred at a critical point in the overall fight against the Germans. Allied logistics were

stretched to the limit, and the terrain was becoming less conducive to armored warfare. The fortress of Metz was in US General George S. Patton’s sector. The West Wall stood between Patton and the Rhine. Adverse weather restricted air support of ground operations; Patton’s Army was reduced in size; and forces under British General Bernard Montgomery received priority of effort. All of these conditions factored into how Patton conducted operations.

With its many lessons in leadership and operational art, this book is well worth reading. The maps add much to the discussion and the notes are of extra interest. There is also an excellent bibliography.

MAJ William T. Bohne, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

NOTHING SHORT OF WAR: With the Australian Army in Borneo, 1962-66, Neil C. Smith, Citadel Press, Melbourne, 1999, 191 pages, \$40.00.

In January 2000, I visited the North Borneo region of Malaysia. While walking around, I saw many “Indons,” as Indonesians are called locally. It was obvious that their homeland’s economic and social troubles had driven them into the bordering country. I thought, “Where Sukarno failed to penetrate Sabah, Brunei and Sarawak, his lowly peasants have succeeded.”

In the 1960s Sukarno longed to include all parts of current Malaysia in a greater Indonesia. He and others envisioned Indonesia as encompassing all of the people of Malay stock or who had been part of the former Dutch East Indies. The new country would extend from the New Guinea boundaries with Papua to the regions where Malays numerically dominate and populations of Thais and other peoples begin.

The problem facing Sukarno in the northwest area of this dream plan was the British territories of the Malay Peninsula—Singapore, Sultanate of Brunei and the Borneo regions of Sarawak and British North Borneo, now called the Sabah State of Malaysia. The Malay Peninsula

had just defeated a communist attempt at revolution. A political solution had been reached to have a Malaysian state encompassing all the areas on Peninsula Malaya and the areas of Borneo, less the Sultanate of Brunei.

Under Tunku Abdul Rahiman's leadership, a confederation was being born. Sukarno, frustrated at seeing an alternative to Indonesia in the northwest area, proclaimed that the British were establishing a new colonialism. His scheme was to destabilize the region and eventually incorporate it into Indonesia. The chief instruments of destabilization were subversion and penetration by military units to disrupt the Confederation.

Borneo, called Kalimantan in Indonesia, has a contiguous land border between Indonesia and the new state of Malaysia. From the Indonesian side, penetrations can be made without the major water barrier found in West Malaysia. The battles that ensued occurred on jungle mountain trails. The war was a war of ambushes, booby traps and sharp confrontations between patrols. The outcome was a foregone conclusion, but it takes a while sometimes for the loser to recognize it.

Peter Charles Unsinger,
San Jose State University,
California

THE BOER WAR GENERALS,

Peter Trew, Sutton Publishing Limited, Great Britain, 274 pages, 1999, \$44.95.

The Boer War Generals is a fine introduction to the conflict between Britain and two Boer republics in southern Africa during the late 1800s. The US military audience knows the Boer War best from the 1980 movie *Breaker Morant* (Fox Lorber Productions) and E.D. Swinton's 1986 book *The Defence of Duffer's Drift* (Avery Publishing Group, Penguin Putnam, New York).

The Boer War Generals makes the century-old conflict come alive through the almost-always interesting technique of analyzing tactics, strategy, battles, campaigns and


force structures as manifestations of the will of a conflict's key military leaders. The book focuses on principals on both sides who demonstrated exemplary military leadership. The British generals—Lord Fredrick Sleigh Roberts and Lord Horatio Herbert Kitchener—were senior officers at or near the end of long, distinguished careers fighting in outposts of the British Empire. They knew the business of deploying forces to areas of austere resources and mounting campaigns against tough indigenous foes.

Their Boer counterparts—Generals Jan Christian Smuts, Louis Botha, C.R. De Wet and J.H. De la Rey—were much younger, in most cases exercising their first independent commands. They proved more than up to the task. In fact, author Peter Trew points out that their performances foreshadowed lifetimes of achievement.

The Boer War was the first conflict that combined relatively simple aspects of conventional warfare with complicated political-civil-military issues involving political self-determination. Trew, analyzing the tactics and campaigns that led to British success, is especially good at describing the many set-piece battles fought by division-level and smaller forces to seize or defend towns, hill-tops, river-crossing points and other terrain-based objectives.

In the war's later stages, the British developed unconventional techniques to defeat Boer guerilla forces decisively. The British reorganized their brigades into columns of company-plus size forces that mounted drives in a given area to kill or capture Boer males, almost all of whom were combatants. The drives eventually broke the back of the Boers, although the British desired the final, negotiated settlement as much as the Boers. *The Boer War Generals* suggests just how determined an army has to be to defeat an opponent totally mobilized for self-defense, fighting on its own turf and reliant on unconventional tactics.

MAJ Pete Molin, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas




RACE FOR THE REICHSTAG: The 1945 Battle for Berlin, Tony Le Tissier, Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR, 1999, 239 pages, \$57.50.

In *Race for the Reichstag*, Tony Le Tissier, the last British Military Governor of Spandau Allied Prison, builds on his earlier work about the Soviet Union's collapse. Tissier could easily have provided a short summary of the fighting at the Seelow Heights to set up the story but, instead, begins the historical narrative abruptly, with a breezy account of the Soviet breakthrough on the Oder Front that cleared the way for the Soviet assault on Berlin. However, this is not the definitive work on the battle for Berlin.

The book has a hasty, throw-together feel, which is reinforced by the many errors in fact, spelling and identification. The maps included are generally unhelpful, cluttered and difficult to read. Any type of standardization for the maps would have been better than what is provided. Also, surprisingly, there is no topographical map of the Berlin area, which would reveal how terrain influenced military operations. Plus, there is no map showing the series of defensive lines that ringed Berlin. Tissier writes at length about these defensive lines, and it would have been helpful to be able to trace them on a map. Yet, I recommend the book for readers already well versed on

the Eastern Front for, ultimately, it complements other books on the subject.

LTC Robert G. Smith, USAR,
Germantown, Maryland



JOSHUA CHAMBERLAIN: The Soldier and the Man, Edward G. Longacre, Combined Publishers, Conshohocken, PA, 1999, 395 pages, \$29.95.

hocken, PA, 1999, 395 pages, \$29.95.

Edward G. Longacre's book about Joshua Chamberlain is not a biography; it is an attempt to place Chamberlain the hero in the context of Chamberlain the man. Although Longacre does not admit it up front, he uses historical psychoanalysis in his study. The result is unsettling and unsatisfying. Chamberlain is not the perfect man, and Longacre spends too much time pointing out Chamberlain's foibles. Longacre never comes to grips with the "so what?" factor. So what if Chamberlain's marriage was difficult? None of his faults seem to have contributed greatly to his actions at Little Round Top during the Civil War.

Nonetheless, the book deserves a reading. No hero is as depicted on equestrian statues or larger-than-life bronze images. Heroes are men and women with flaws like ours and personalities formed by accidents of birth, education and experience. Some are called to confront challenges that in retrospect make them seem larger than life. Chamberlain

met his challenge at Little Round Top and on other battlefields and lived to enjoy the notoriety. That is what sets him apart.

Longacre takes a broader view. Chamberlain is a hero because he overcame difficulties as a scholar, a husband and only incidentally as a soldier. To Longacre, Gettysburg is not Chamberlain's defining moment but one of many in a life of redemption. To me, Longacre is mistaken. Gettysburg was more important than the ultimate success of Chamberlain's marriage or his academic career, but Longacre is right in asserting that these smaller undertakings made Chamberlain the man he was.

COL Gregory L. Fontenot, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

THE LITTLE WAR OF PRIVATE POST: The Spanish-American War Seen Up Close, Charles Johnson Post, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1999, 376 pages, \$15.00.

This reprint of a classic memoir is part of a larger public remembering

Pass In Review

GUERRILLA DIPLOMACY: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War, Robert K. Bringham, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999, 211 pages, \$35.00, HB.

THE ARMED FORCES of CHINA, Desmond Ball and Ray Funnell, eds., I.B. Tauris, London. Distributed by St. Martin's Press, New York, 1999, 288 pages, \$19.95, PB.

SOLDIER AND WARRIOR: French Attitudes toward the Army and War on the Eve of the First World War, H.L. Wesseling and Arnold J. Pomerans, trans., Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 2000, 248 pages, \$65.00, HB.

The National Liberation Front (NLF) was a useful political tool with which the North Vietnamese sowed dissension in South Vietnam. It also interacted on the international stage with many communist and nonaligned nations. NLF diplomatic activities fostered the view of a true revolution against the United States and South Vietnam. One of the more important points made in the book is that the United States failed to capitalize on the differences in tactics, strategy and diplomatic policy the NLF used.—**LTC John A. Hardaway, USA,** *Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

The Peoples Republic of China is seeking a broader role in the world's geopolitical-economic stage. A statement in the book's conclusion reflects the author's insights: "[There are] two Chinas—a China that is driven by the nationalist impulse and bent on assertive military power and a China that seeks to be fully incorporated into an interdependent world. At this moment China is neither, but it is poised to move decisively in either direction." This book is informative and insightful. I recommend it.—**Richard L. Milligan,** *Leavenworth, Kansas*

This book examines why "people so casually set off a conflict that would expand into a war which would last four years, claim millions of human lives and cost billions and have effects that can be felt even to this day." What value did the French attach to the military, and how can such attitudes be explained? The book offers important background information on World War I causes pertaining to France and explores the tension between political right and left and the roles the military played in that environment.—**MAJ Jeff Smidt, USA,** *West Olive, Michigan*


of a small conflict known as the Spanish-American War. In spite of its seeming insignificance, the war was important in the history of the US Army and Fort Leavenworth. Lessons that emerged, concerning training, doctrine, organization and logistics, operational art, expeditionary warfare and joint operations are still relevant. However, Post's memoir gives only a private soldier's view of the war. For more dimensions, readers should look elsewhere.

Post relates experiences, recording humorous, horrific or bizarre happenings that occur during battle. He speaks of his fellow soldiers in a generous but unsparing manner, then turns his full wrath on people in positions of authority who he believes abused their rank and failed in their duty. Viewed from his level, the entire land campaign was a hastily thrown-together expedition designed to help the Navy destroy Spanish Admiral D. Pascual Cervera's fleet. There was no grand strategy and the tactics, along with logistics, were rudimentary.

Post, a soldier in the 71st New York Infantry, relates his experiences on land and sea—in railcars, camps and troop ships. He explores the relationships between officers and men, regulars and volunteers, and he obliquely touches on race relations in US society. He speaks of eating surplus beef, originally intended for the Japanese in 1894, Army bacon and hardtack. He gives full, rich descriptions laced with wry wit. The book includes black-and-white reproductions of Post's watercolors, which bring scenes and personalities to life and provide a visual counterpoint to the written experience.

After the war, Post was quarantined at Montauk Point, spending three months in a New York City hospital recovering from what the doctors called "Compound-Enterictyphoid-Malaria." As he put it: "I was lucky. I had survived." The book is a valuable reminder that the ultimate weapon in war is the individual, motivated soldier.

Lewis Bernstein,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



REFUGEE RIGHTS AND REALITIES: Evolving International Concepts and Regimes, Frances Nicholson and Patrick Twomey, eds., Cambridge University Press, NY, 1999, 378 pages, \$69.95.

Refugee Rights and Realities: Evolving International Concepts

MAKING PEACE PREVAIL: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia, Alice Ackermann, Syracuse University Press, NY, 2000, 217 pages, \$45.00, PB.

KOREA ON THE BRINK: From the "1812 Incident" to the Kwongju Uprising, 1979-1980, John A. Wickham, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 1999, 240 pages, \$20.00, PB.

CARLO ROSSELLI: Socialist Heretic and Antifascist Exile, Stanislao G. Pugliese, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999, 240 pages, \$35.00, HB.

It is difficult to find a silver lining in the current Balkan crises, but Alice Ackermann has. In her three-year study of the Republic of Macedonia she builds on Michael Lund's US Institute of Peace study of the factors that contribute to the success of "preventive diplomacy." After a short historical tour of worldwide ethnic conflicts, she defines preventive diplomacy and gives recent examples of its failures and successes. She also provides a proven model for peace and conflict prevention in Macedonia. Though many of the model's elements can be imported to other conflicts, its utility can still be reduced by two factors: unwilling host-nation leaders and an unready, unaccepting populace.—**MAJ Malcolm Frost, USA, Fayetteville, North Carolina**

Former Chief of Staff of the Army General John Wickham's tour in Korea coincided with one of the most tumultuous periods in modern Korean history. A series of crises threatened domestic Korean stability and severely tested the strength of the United States-Republic of Korea alliance. Readers interested in the coordination of political and military strategies to achieve national policy objectives will find much to contemplate.—**MAJ Karen Gibson, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**


Carlo Rosselli was one of Italy's most outspoken antifascists and authored Italian "liberal socialism" during the 1920s and 1930s. This tragic-heroic account sets the power of an intellectual against the force of prevailing ideology. Rosselli's heretical philosophy resulted in his imprisonment, exile and murder by Italy's fascist regime.—**LTC Lynn L. Sims, USAR, Retired, Mechanicsville, Virginia**

and Regimes is a collection of 17 papers on refugee issues by 19 subject-matter experts who explore the changing ways nation-states and nonstate actors deal with refugees. The book's origin was a 1996 conference at the University of Nottingham that explored the topic "Refugee Rights and Realities: Approaches to Law and Policy Reform." Although written from a European context, the work examines worldwide trends.

The essays address international refugee law and policy, assess the rights of refugees and asylum seekers and contrast these rights with the realities of nation-state practice. The essayists often go into excruciating detail to show the legal and practical ramifications of the "evolving refugee definition."

Nicholson and Twomey also cover the developing role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, who is increasingly involved in humanitarian-assistance operations. They also detail nation-state responses to refugee trends and refugees' individual rights. This highly technical book is useful for policymakers, civil affairs personnel, lawyers and planners who might have to deal with the issue of refugees in the future.

MAJ Scott D. Aiken, USMC,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas



NAVAL STRATEGY IN NORTHEAST ASIA: Geo-strategic Goals, Policies and Prospects, Duk-Ki Kim,

Frank Cass, Portland, OR, 2000, 213 pages, \$57.50.

Cold War remnants still hang over Northeast Asia. The Korean Peninsula, which remains a major flashpoint, is the site of one of the potential major theater wars that US security strategy addresses. With this situation as his backdrop, Commander Duk-Ki Kim, of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Navy, focuses on maritime relations in this volatile area. In *Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia*, Kim expresses two aims—to explore options for cooperative maritime security and to examine the regional powers' maritime security policies.

This well-researched book follows the maritime policies of Russia, China, Japan and the United States from the Cold War into the post-Cold War environment. It provides an excellent discussion of regional territorial and border issues that are outside a direct confrontation on the peninsula. These issues include disputes between Russia and Japan, Korea and Japan, and China and Japan.


Despite the fact that Korean maritime strategies are in the middle of the regional conflict, Kim does not discuss South Korean or North Korean maritime policies or maritime boundary disputes. The impression is that Korea is simply caught up in the maelstrom of other nations' problems.

Kim's treatment of Japan's actions and intentions also show some of the animosity between the two countries. For example, he states: "It is likely that Japan will emerge as a military superpower in Northeast Asia in the twenty-first century. . . . The grave concerns of the Asia-Pacific region are now focused on what effect the Japanese military build-up will bring about in the post-Cold War situation in the region." This distrust of Japanese objectives can be seen throughout the book. Again, maritime confidence-building measures are only a subset of greater, political and social cooperation.

Overall, *Naval Strategy in Northeast Asia* provides an excellent discussion of regional problems with a specific maritime focus. However, it

does not tie maritime measures to a broader goal.

LCDR David R. Grambo, USN,
Virginia Beach, Virginia



JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace, Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 1999, 362 pages, \$45.00.

Although the Cold War has been over for a decade, the state of international relations and how people of various cultures and countries will interact is still unclear. *Justice Among Nations* entices readers to look closely at international relations through a careful, critical analysis of past political philosophers.

Authors Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Ahrens Dorf masterfully combine philosophy, theology and morality into a history of international relations from the ancient Greeks to the present. The authors concisely present each philosopher's major points and determine whether each proves his case. This requires extensive background knowledge of other aspects of the philosopher's thinking and of historical events that shaped the international environment of the time.

The historical journey begins in ancient Greece and Rome, moves through the Judaic, Christian and Islamic periods of theology, continues into realism and idealism and ends with modern realism and neo-

realism. Two major issues clearly have no concrete answers. First, there is an inherent and timeless conflict between realism and idealism. Second, there is disagreement whether there are timeless, immutable basic truths that govern individuals or states and, if there are, where these truths come from and whether they inspire peace or conflict.

Justice Among Nations is a well-researched, concise book. The extensive footnotes provide detail and resources for further exploration of each philosopher's arguments. This book is an excellent contribution to the study of justice in international relations.

MAJ Michael J. Johnson, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

THE BOOK OF WAR: 25 Centuries of Great War Writing, John Keegan, Viking Penguin, NY, 1999, 496 pages, \$34.95.

John Keegan is widely known and highly regarded for the intellectual depth of his historical writings. His previous works have focused on leadership, campaigns or entire wars. *The Book of War* is a collection of original writings that span approximately 2,300 years of warfare. Many selections are by such well-known persons as Thucydides, Xenophon, Davey Crockett, Stephen Crane, Rudyard Kipling, Erwin Rommel, Siegfried Sassoon, Winston Churchill and Ernie Pyle. Others, less famous, nonetheless bring insight to war's humanity and inhumanity.

Keegan divides his work into three parts. The theme of the first section, chronologically from the Peloponnesian Wars to 1800, is the motivation for war. The second section addresses 19th-century warfare, particularly European armies deployed outside the continent. Section three focuses on the 20th century and the explosion of technological advances in warfighting.

However, there is so much overlap among the themes that the distinctions Keegan attempts to make among the three eras are indistinct. Changes in technology lead to changes in tactics. Leadership is constant, but good leaders understand the relationships between technology, tactics and logistics and adapt doctrine accordingly.

The longbow at Agincourt in 1415 affected tactics much as the rifled musket did in a later century. Self-interest was as important to the Melians and Athenians in 416 B.C. as it was to Saddam Hussein in 1990. Separations of history into eras based on dominant themes serves little purpose and are easily challenged.

The value of Keegan's work is the assembly of primary source material. Sources cover warfare in China, the Aztecs in Mexico, Constantinople, Malta, the Crimea, the Indian wars of North America, colonial South Africa, Europe during World Wars I and II, Vietnam and the Gulf War. Students of military history rarely find a collection that contains writings by Josephus along with those of Studs Terkel. Yet, while including such diverse authors, Keegan has ensured that each author has had firsthand knowledge of the war or battle about which he writes. That personalizing of events is what brings credibility to these accounts.

LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas

Video Game Review

SQUAD LEADER, Microprose, Hasbro Interactive, Avalon Hill, 2000, \$39.95. (System Requirements: Pentium II 233 MHz or higher, 32MB RAM, 300MB Hard Disk Space, 4X Speed CD ROM,

MR Letters

JROTC Spells the Future

The article "JROTC, Recent Trends and Developments" by Colonels John W. Corbett and Arthur T. Coumbe in the January-February 2001 issue of *Military Review* is right on target. As a retired Army officer in Southern California, I have been involved with JROTC programs through various professional military organizations.

Corbett and Coumbe are correct that JROTC is booming in many high schools. All four services have programs in Southern California. Many school districts desire the program because it teaches students discipline, responsibility, citizenship and respect for authority. I have seen the program flourish in low-income neighborhoods and in high schools composed of upper middle class students. General Colin Powell should be commended for re-energizing the program.

Although not a direct recruiting program, JROTC does orient young people to investigate the military. Graduates of JROTC are prime recruiting targets. The Army has a great opportunity to support this

and the senior program. Wise recruiters from all services attend JROTC award ceremonies in the spring to get a look at some of America's best youth.

One senior ROTC program at a local university had a joint training program with several surrounding high schools. More of such programs might orient high school graduates to consider senior ROTC at a university or pursue an appointment to a military academy.

JROTC is a great program for students from all economic backgrounds. Superintendents of school districts support the programs, and a ready pool of retired officers can become professors of military science in high schools. You have published an excellent account of a valuable, low-profile Army program and a prime recruiting area for future soldiers and officers. My only complaint about the article is the photo on page 42; it is not the best representation of an Army officer giving the oath of commissioning.

COL William J. Reals Jr.,
USAR, Retired,
Mission Viejo, California

2MB Win 95/98 compatible SVGA video card, Win 95/98 compatible sound card, and Direct X, v.7.)

In 1977 the Avalon Hill Game Company released *Squad Leader* and overnight ushered in the golden age of board wargaming. Since the advent of computer gaming, many designers have considered producing *Squad Leader*, and many players have looked forward to it. Microprose, a well-known name in computer gaming, took up the challenge and produced a slick-looking game of the same title. Unfortunately, that is where the similarity ends.

Squad Leader is a turn-based, individual soldier game that misses the mark on all levels, from its flat, lifeless graphics to the soldiers' cheesy screams and shouts. Game play is hampered by an outdated and cumbersome square grid system to control movement—that is, if the player can find all of his soldiers. Many times the soldiers are

hidden in the dull graphics, and the player must cut away levels of terrain to find them. Unfortunately, with every cut the map becomes uglier and less useful. A map rotation feature would have helped immensely.

The interface is less than intuitive with myriad buttons that cover the bottom quarter of the screen. To insure the right actions will be executed, the player must double-check these buttons' settings for every soldier. The sound effects are good, but after hearing screams of "medic" or "momma" a few times the novelty wears off.

Microprose is to be commended for trying to introduce a turn-based game at a time when real-time titles dominate the wargame genre. However, this effort falls short. The novice will become disenchanted, and the hardcore gamer will be disappointed.

LTC M.R. Pierce, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

MR Writers' Guide

As an official Army publication, *Military Review* is not copyrighted. However, individual author copyright can be obtained by special arrangement. Please let us know if you want copyright protection, and we will send you the application forms. Acceptance by *Military Review* gives CGSC the right to reproduce and use the article for training.

For more information concerning submissions, write to the Editor in Chief, *Military Review*, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or call (913) 684-9334/9327 or DSN 552-9327, or check out the *Military Review* website at <www.cgsc.army.mil/MilRev>.

Subscribe
To

Military Review

***MR* Letters**

JROTC Spells the Future

The article "JROTC, Recent Trends and Developments" by Colonels John W. Corbett and Arthur T. Coumbe in the January-February 2001 issue of *Military Review* is right on target. As a retired Army officer in Southern California, I have been involved with JROTC programs through various professional military organizations.

Corbett and Coumbe are correct that JROTC is booming in many high schools. All four services have programs in Southern California. Many school districts desire the program because it teaches students discipline, responsibility, citizenship and respect for authority. I have seen the program flourish in low-income neighborhoods and in high schools composed of upper middle class students. General Colin Powell should be commended for re-energizing the program.

Although not a direct recruiting program, JROTC does orient young people to investigate the military. Graduates of JROTC are prime recruiting targets. The Army has a great opportunity to support this

and the senior program. Wise recruiters from all services attend JROTC award ceremonies in the spring to get a look at some of America's best youth.

One senior ROTC program at a local university had a joint training program with several surrounding high schools. More of such programs might orient high school graduates to consider senior ROTC at a university or pursue an appointment to a military academy.

JROTC is a great program for students from all economic backgrounds. Superintendents of school districts support the programs, and a ready pool of retired officers can become professors of military science in high schools. You have published an excellent account of a valuable, low-profile Army program and a prime recruiting area for future soldiers and officers. My only complaint about the article is the photo on page 42; it is not the best representation of an Army officer giving the oath of commissioning.

**COL William J. Reals Jr.,
USAR, Retired,
Mission Viejo, California**

Keegan divides his work into three parts. The theme of the first section, chronologically from the Peloponnesian Wars to 1800, is the motivation for war. The second section addresses 19th-century warfare, particularly European armies deployed outside the continent. Section three focuses on the 20th century and the explosion of technological advances in warfighting.

However, there is so much overlap among the themes that the distinctions Keegan attempts to make among the three eras are indistinct. Changes in technology lead to changes in tactics. Leadership is constant, but good leaders understand the relationships between technology, tactics and logistics and adapt doctrine accordingly.

The longbow at Agincourt in 1415 affected tactics much as the rifled musket did in a later century. Self-interest was as important to the Melians and Athenians in 416 B.C. as it was to Saddam Hussein in 1990. Separations of history into eras based on dominant themes serves little purpose and are easily challenged.

The value of Keegan's work is the assembly of primary source material. Sources cover warfare in China, the Aztecs in Mexico, Constantinople, Malta, the Crimea, the Indian wars of North America, colonial South Africa, Europe during World Wars I and II, Vietnam and the Gulf War. Students of military history rarely find a collection that contains writings by Josephus along with those of Studs Terkel. Yet, while including such diverse authors, Keegan has ensured that each author has had firsthand knowledge of the war or battle about which he writes. That personalizing of events is what brings credibility to these accounts.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA,
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas**